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1 N T R 0 D U C T I 0 N 
A) Scope of Thesis. 
B) Some Unfinished Business in Classical Human Ecology. 
C) Defining Classical Human Ecology. 
D) A Brief Introduction to the Background in which Classical Human 
Ecology emerged, flourished and declined. 
A: SCOPE OF THESIS 
a) THE PRIMARY AIM IS TO RECOUNT THE CRITICISMS. 
Classical Human E~ology (C.H.E.)(l)owes something to the dominant 
ideas in biology, economics and philosophy of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. The thorough-going student would no doubt, 
in examining issues in ecology, carry his studies not only back 
beyond Darwin to Malthus, but he would also discuss the deeper 
philosophical issues involved. The distinct ideas of Descartes, the 
nominalism of Ockham, the contributions of Hobbes and Hume and many 
others, would all be part of the background scene. It goes without 
saying that Charles Darwin's work has a special relevance; also the 
Social Darwinists and early sociologists, who, because they are 
closer in time to the C.H.E.s, have perhaps a prior claim on our 
attention. While this thesis does not totally ignore the ramifi-
cations of this vast field the scope is very narrowly defined. 
Attention is almost exclusively focused on the C.H.E.s. The intention 
is to concentrate on the original material not so much in the belief 
that it is important to rediscover a "lost vitality" as Turner (in 
Park, l967:ix) suggests, although this suggestion is not entirely 
without merit~ 2 )as in the belief that there is a need to appreciate 
(1) Seep. 6f.for definition and discussion. 







the reasons for the original vitality and the errors made because 
of it. What I wish to do is to recall the criticisms which mounted 
up against the Chicago school, and to present them systematically. 
b) THE NEED FOR A SYSTEt-'lATIC TREAniENT OF CRITICAL ISSUES. 
The need for such a treatment has come to me from three sources. 
First, from a study of general textbooks and other books termed 
secondary material(l)(because they borrow from criticisms made 
originally in the late thirties and early forties) a very strong 
impression was gained of criticisms or issues mentioned in an ad.hoc. 
fashion. The discussion was haphazard, and with notable exceptions~2 ) 
inadequate. Secondly, this impression was confirmed by Sjoberg who 
pointed out a need for som_e systematic treatment of the said issuesP) 
'0 
Naturally each theorist is entitled to chose those criticisms or 
" issues which seem to him to be pertinent.· This is not denied. On the 
other hand there was little hint, even in those passages that purported 
to offer a summary of such issues~ 4 )of any systematic treatment. 
Thirdly, as I read through material I have classed as falling under 
the rubric "Modern Ecology," I became convinced that a look-back on 
the old controversies would prove worthwhile. The need for this is 
argued more thoroughly later on (see Chapter 5, C.). 
c) THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED. 
An evaluative discussion presupposes the existence of criteria 
against which the material will be measured - and it is important 
to be explicit about my assumptions and procedure. Both Martindale 







Weber,M.: The City. 1958. See Don Martindale's article 
"Prefatory Remarks." 
Reissman,L.: The Urban Process. 1964 • 
Sirjamaki,J.: The Sociology of Cities. 1964. 
Gist ,N .P., G'ava, S .F.: Urban Society. 1964 
Mann,P.H.: An Approach to Urban Sociology. 1965. 
Hauser,P.H., Scnore,L.F.: The Study of Urbanization. 1965 • 
See Gideon Sjoberg's article, "Theory and Research in 
Urban Sociology." 
KHnig,R.: The Community. 1968. 
Bell,C,. Newby,H.: Connnunitv Studies. 1971. 
Nottridge,H.E.: The Sociology of Urban Living. 1972. 
(2) Reissman's (1964:Ch.5.) is .the most thorough. 
(3) This is discussed at some length in section B of this chapter . 





(in Weber, 1958:22) and Turner (in Park, 1967:xxvi) suggest a two 
stage approach to the development of ecological theory among the 
C.H.E.s (cf.Park, 1939; 1952:251). On the other hand Alihan's 
(1938:ll) major critical work sees the whole "ecological conceptual 
frame" as built upon a dichotomous distinction between the terms 
"community" and "society." As my major purpose is to recall systema-
tically the "primary critical material"(l)it has seemed to me a good 
idea to identify what I term major theory generating concepts. There 
are three such concepts discussed in the three following chapters: 
The Natural Area Concept; The Ecological Concept : Argument by Plant 
and Animal Analogy; The Socio-Cultural Concept : Argument by Dichotomy~ 2 ) 
These three chapters mark what I see to be three stages in the develop-
ment of the C.H.E. These stages are not meant to be mutually exclusive. 
There is the initial stage in which the focus of attention seems to 
have been more concerned with a spatial analysis similar to a geographic 
orientation: the Natural Area concept. Then came the ecological develop-
ment, regarded here as argument by analogy; and following this a. final 
stage in Park's concern, in the 1936 and 1939 papers, with the manner 
in which the biotic aspect was related to the moral aspect -i.e. a 
concern with ironing out the problems of the dichotomous assumptions 
which arose more ~articularly out of the second, ecological stage. 
Using these three theory generating concepts I refer to the original .. 
writings, and to the criticisms (both primary and secondary) levelled 
against them. After each discussion a summary and conclusion follows 
in which the criticisms, or issues as I have termed them, are identi-
fied, defined and related to the above discussion. With regard to 
definitions I intend to be quite pragmatic and to borrow from the 
labours of others. My procedure will be as follows: First, Theodorson 
and Theodorson's (1970) A Modern Dictionary of Sociology, will be 
consulted. The merits of this book are, not only that it is recent, 
but more important, it is the work of a single pair of authors working 
together, and will therefore provide some systematic and consistent 
treatment. Secondly, other methodological or definitional works were 
(l) Theodorson (1961) has conveniently collected a number of essays 
together under the title "Criticisms of the Classical Position," 
and it is to these "that I refer. 
(2) For a summary of the components of these major theory generating 





needed to deal with the special issues which arose in C.H.E. -
here due acknowledgernent will be made in the text. It is intended 
that the generally acknowledged criteria of methodological evaluation 
will be used, such as consistency in deductive logic, clarity and 
consistency in the use of definitions, adequacy of empirical evidence, 
etc. 
While no claim to comprehensiveness or to lack of bias is made in 
the selection and discussion of the issues, the list proposed does 
make some contribution to a systematic treatment of issues otherwise 
mentioned in a variety of places in what seems to be a haphazard 
manner. 
d) THE SECONDARY AIM : AN APPLICATION OF ISSUES TO MODERN ECOLOGY. 
A-final chapter with some preliminary remarks on the application of 
this scheme to Modern ecology is made. 
e) A BRIEF STATE~ffiNT OF AIMS . 
Formally stated, the subsequent analysis aims at identifying systema-
tically some issues in Classical Human Ecology and discussing them in 
the light of methodological criteria derived from the above mentioned 
sources. It is hoped that this discussion will contribute to a more 
systematic evaluation of criticisms or issues in Classical Human 
Ecology; prove to be of some use in providing constraints in contri-
butions to Modern Ecologyo 
B: So.t-JE UNFINISHED BUSINESS IN CLASSICAL IM1AN ECOLOGY . 
a) CLASSICAL HUHAN ECOLOGY TODAY. 
Considerable time has been spent digging a hole for the old model, 
and it would seen1 that for many Classical Human Ecology is well and 
truly buried. Schnore (1965:33) tells us that of the 4200 members 
of the American Sociolqgical Association only 100 selected Human 
Ecology as a major interest - and this in 1960. More recently 







revised it is not a dead horse even today - except in the sociological 
fraternity." However, even in the sociological fraternity the case 
is not finally sealed for there are still signs of continuing intere~t 
in Classical Human Ecology. Not unexpectedly perhaps, but still it 
is worth recording, that recent works in urban sociology(l)still 
reproduce what has become the Chicago school's badge of identifica-
~ion- the concentric zone diagram of Burgess (complete with river). 
But this is only symbolic. Other testimonies to an abiding interest 
in the C.H.E.s lie in the fourth posthumous publication of Robert E. 
Park (Turner (ed),l967)~ 2 ) and in the excellently received book by 
Coser we note that Park is among the twelve carefully chosen "masters" 
of sociological thought. Besides this there is the very interesting 
reference to Park by Buckley (1967:19) with regard to process analysis. 
Me~e interest though is perhaps too slight a reason for dragging some-
one up from limbo. There is, however, some unfinished business; and 
with the new interest in ecology it seems that this would be a good 
moment to look again at the old issues . 
b) THE NEED FOR CLARIFYING THE ISSUES. 
In a recent article reviewing "Theory and Research in Urban Sociology" 
(Hauser and Schnore, 1965:159) Sjoberg, speaking of.the ".historical 
accident" that in America early students of the city were heavily 
committed to ecology, makes this comment: 
Some theoretical-dilemmas afford the urban sociologist with 
a unique opportunity to contribute to social theory more 
generally. For one thing, the urban field is a major battle-
ground for those who stress the impact on urban life of 
"objective conditions" - the external environment, population 
structure, and the like -and those who emphasize, for instance, 
the role of social or cultural values as a key determinant 
of the so-called objective conditions and of human action 
in general. Urban sociologists could make a major contri-
bution if they would clarify, perhaps even resolve, some of 
the issues that se arate the antarronists: the "materialists" 
and "non-materialists". My emphasis 
He goes on to say in a footnote (1965:183): 
The cleavage between the "materialists" and the "non-
(1) e.g. Timms, D.W.G.: .The Urban Mosaic. 1971. 
Mann, P.H.: An Approach to Urban Sociology. 1965. 
Pahl, R.E.: Patterns of Urban Life. 1970. 
(2) A fifth publication, Elsner, JI.Jr.(ed): Robert E. Park- The Crowd 
and the Public, 1972, has just been brought to my attention. It 
has not been possible to refer to this book in this text. 
materialists" in sociology is generally ignored in survey 
studies dealing with social theory; see, for example, 
Don Hartindale, The Nature and es of Sociolo ical 
Theory (Boston: Houghton Hifflin, 1960 • But this 
neglect is not an index of its importance, for the 
differing assumptions about reality influence one's 
choice of research problem and explanatory variables. 
The "materialists," who differ to some degree among them-
selves, reject the study of values, attitudes, ideas, or 
beliefs or else seek to predict these by studying object-
ive conditions. Horeover, they tend to examine the social 
order in highly mechanistic terms. A comparison of 
"materialists" and "non-materialists"· is complicated by 
the heterogeneity of the latter. 
6 
It is interesting to note that when Hollingshead (1947, Theodorson, 
196l:ll4) formally proposed a "withdrawal" from Human Ecology (i.e. 
C.H.E.) in 1947, he suggested a "surrogate" or substitute: "the 
cultural factor." While this need not concern us here the point is 
taken up later on. (Chapter Five). 
Two points are made: 
l. It would be pretentious ·,to claim that any of these issues is 
finally resolved in this thesis. The preliminary tasks, so far as 
Classical Human Ecology is concerned, are primarily clarificatory 
and systematic, and it is this more limited task we aim at here. 
2. So far as Hodern Ecology is concerned the point is that there 
were clashes of opinion in the past, and I believe that ori.e of the 
best contributions sociology can make to the present lies in digging 
up its own past. 
C: DEFINING CLASSICAL HUHAN ECOLOGY 
a) TWO POINTS NEED TO BE MADE: 
First, it is proposed that Park's work be treated as of a piece. 
Park is singled out for special mention as he was undoubtedly the 
most persistent in his .commitment to an· ecological explanation. He 
is the generally acknowledged "father" of C .H.E., and it is to his 
writings more than to others that we turn to discover the ramifica-








Second, following a now conventional description (cf. Bell and 
Newby, 1971:92), it is proposed that the writings of the C.H.E. be 
treated as though they were unified by the same general assumptions: 
"They are unified not so much by their methods, though they all tended 
at some stage to tramp the streets, as by the general ecological model 
of the city, first formulated by Park and elaborated by Burgess and 
by their field of interest: Chicago." Bell and Newby refer, as is 
frequently the case, to the C.H.E.s as a "school••, again indicating 
thereby some ~ommon commitment or approach. 
b) C.H.E. AS A "SCHOOL11 OF THOUGHT. 
The C.H.E.s themselves spent considerable energy in attempting to 
arrive at a definition of human ecology. The complexity of these 
discussions derives from the fact, as Alihan (1938:8-10; 108-135) 
noted·so clearly, that "Characteristic of the ecological school is 
its tapping of many sources for its conceptual framework." Quinn 
(1950:3-ll) has offered a convenient summary of the various individual 
approaches which he describes as 11 seven contrasting points of view. 11 
Basically what he does is to trace the commitments back to the original 
sciences from which a point of departure is made. While it is true 
that, for instance, Park (l916;1952:l-2PJtarted from a spatial and 
geographic point of view and later incorporated within this frame-
work an ecological elaboration, it would be a mistake to regard these 
views as "contrasting. 11 Also, while it is true that McKenzie's conception 
of human ecology appears to have had more of an economic orientation 
than Park's, again it would be a mistake to regard these as "contrasting11 
viewpoints, for they all shared in an interest in classical economics 
(cf. Sjoberg 1965:164) and were all fascinated by differences in land· 
values. This is not to say that there were never any disagreements 
among them in emphases or even in particulars (e.g. cf. Park 1929; 
1952:189), though generally speaking these are not prominent. Indeed, 
as Theodorson (1961:4) points out, 11 McKenzie did not criticize Park's 
exclusion of culture from ecological analysis, nor specifically challenge 
the basic tenets of classical ecological theory. 11 
c) PARK 1 S THOUGHT REGARDED AS UNITIVE. 
Park's work itself was not consistent, and over a period of some thirty 
years to expect that it would be, would seem to be unreasonable. 
Moreover, as Coser (1971:357)(cf. Janowitz l969/70:xiv) points out, 
(1) Where two year dates are referred to in the brackets, the first 




Park was not a tight theorist. Nevertheless, at the same time, from 
1916 to 1939 (the period in which papers on ecology are produced) 
there is no dramatic break in his thought. It was only in 1938 that·· 
Alihan's book appeared which marked the onslaught of heavy criticism. 
As Alihan (1938:xi) stated, testifying to the general unity of approach, 
While certain changes and modifications in the ecological 
theory and methods may well be expected, it has been surmised 
from the analysis of the development of the school since its 
inception that it has persisted in its fundamentals and that 
whatever changes may occur will not markedly affect the essence 
or the direction of the school. There is apparent, moreover, 
continued adherence to these fundamental principles in the 
great majority of the individual factual studies. 
This could be applied more specifically perhaps to Park than to any of 
the other writers. 
d) THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS. 
Martindale (1958:22) remarks in a footnote, that "In 1918 Park borrowed 
some concepts from the plant ecologist and turned them into a unified 
explanation." This is undoubtedly a reference to the major work, 
Introduction to the Science of Sociology, l92l,l92q, by Park and Burgess 
in which basic ecological concepts formed titles of important chapters: 
Competition, Conflict, Accommodation, Assimilation. Alihan (1938:9) 
succintly points out, 
As the name of their disciple indicates, they have leaned 
most heavily upon plant and animal ecologies, particularly the 
former, on the· assumption that man is an organic creature and 
therefore subject to the general laws of the organic world and 
that the behavior in plant and animal communities is parallel 
to certain aspects of behavior in the human community. Thus 
Burgess claims that "the processes of competition, invasion, 
succession, and segregation described in elaborate detail 
for plant and animal communities seem to be strikingly similar 
to the operation of these processes in the human community." 
Most of the writings to which we shall refer were written during a 
period, when, as Shils (196l:lq39) puts it, "as children of their age, 
they came under the almost cosmic weight of Darwinian influence. They 
therefore believed in natural processes of evolutionary growth." The 
basic assumptions therefore could possibly be in short labelled 
Darwinist. Gettys' (l9q8; 1961:99) sun~ing up of this situation is 
along this line: "The Darwinian formula appears extensively throughout 
the theoretical framework of the school," but adds that "the influences 








e) DEFINITIONS OF CLASSICAL HUMAN ECOLOGY. 
This impression (of a reliance on Darwinism or social Darwinism and 
upon classical economics as well as geography) is well attested in 
Park and Burgess' major work mentioned above. Interestingly though 
a major discussion of the nature of Human Ecology must be sought 
elsewhere (cf. e.g. Park,l916;1925:l-2; 1926;1952:165-166; 
1936;1952:153-155; McKenzie,l925:63-64; 1926;1961:30; 1931). 
It is not the intention to enter into a major definitional discussion 
at this point, for this has been done elsewhere on several occasions 
(cf. Wirth, 1945;1961; Hollingshead ,1947;1961); and a discussion of 
definitions would raise issues more appropriately dealt with in other 
contexts in the thesis. Two definitions, however, illustrating the 
above discussion are mentioned. The first is perhaps more generally 
used to describe C.H.E.: 
(1) McKenzie established as the aim of human ecology "to discover the 
principles and factors involved in the changing patterns of spatial 
arrangement of population and institutions, resulting from the inter-
play of living things in a continuously changing culture." The 
reference to spatial patterns is derived from a geographic reference. 
This definition is quoted by Reissman (1964:93-94) . 
(2) Park (1936;1952:158): "Human ecology is, fundamentally, an attempt 
to investigate the processes by 'vhich the biotic balance and the social 
equilibrium (l) are maintained once they are achieved and (2) the 
processes by which, when the biotic balance and the social equilibrium 
are disturbed, the transition is made from one relatively stable order 
to another." The explicit reference to the biotic factor is to be 
noted here. Implicit also is a reference to competition as a basic 
social process and thereby a reference to classical economics. 
f) OTIIER ASSUMPTIONS. 
Other shared assumptions are derived from what we have termed loosely 
as Darwinism - the belief in natural laws as being of crucial explanatory 
significance, and the belief of their discoverability through empirical 
observation, a belief also in applying the methods and approach of the 
physical sciences in the social sciences (cf. Park and Burgess 1921, 
1924; l969/l970,Chapter. l). These assumptions are discussed in more 




It almost goes without saying that despite the interest in ecology 
the writers were primarily sociologists. Park (1926;1952:165) observed: 
"Human ecology, as the sociologists would like to use the term, is, 
however, not identical with geography, nor even with human geography. 
It is not man, but the community, not man's relation to the earth 
which he inhabits, but his relations to other men, that concerns us 
most." 
g) A DUAL COMHITMENT. 
Here then, we have a dual commitment, to ecology and to sociology. 
Man, as Hollingshead (1947;1961:109) points out occupies a "unique 
position ... in the realm of living things: to wit, his place in nature 
as an animal and his role in societies as a possessor of culture ... 
man, the animal, is inextricably tied in to the web of life along with 
all other creatures. Unlike them, though, he is connected with the 
nonorganic system of his socio-cultural heritage." The dilemma the 
C.H.E.s faced is this: He had to decide the extent to which human 
society is subject to the same principles that guide organization in 
plants and animals. It is this diiemma, and the solution to it pro-
posed by the C.H.E.s that gives rise to the issues discussed. 
D: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE 
BACKGROUND IN WHICH CLASSICAL 
HU}MN ECOLOGY EMERGED, FLOURISHED 
AND DECLINED. 
While it will be of some interest in the last chapter to compare the 
motives and tactics of Modern and Classical ecologists, this section 
serves to introduce a number of important features which characterize 
the Classical school~ 
a) THE QUICK RISE TO FAME. 
In 1921 Park and Burgess published their only major work, Introduction 
to the Science of Sociology; it \·laS an "almost instantaneous" success 
(Janowitz, 1969/1~70:xiv), and became the leading textbook for the next 
two decades. It is generally recognized that the authors exerted a 





Somehow Park·and Burgess created a rare "atmosphere actively promoting 
first-hand research into various aspects of the city." For many 
.ecological theory "was a sort of injunction: Go ye~£orth and gather 
facts" (Martindale in Weber, 1958:23,30). Burgess (1967:8) writing 
towards the end of his career and looking back on earlier days, 
records how "At one time we had so many research projects in the 
department, it was said that every graduate student had ,a project. 
That wasn't literally true, but there was enough truth in it to 
warrant the statement." This heavy emphasis on empirical studies in 
the earlier decades when sociology was seeking recognition in the 
academic community as an autonomous science, set the pattern for the 
future. (cf. Turner l967:ix). 
The point here is that within sociology at least, the ecological 
model or theory generated considerable enthusiasm, for it provided 
students with a ready framework within which their own interests could 
be studied and interwoven with others. Coser (1971:382) paints a 
picture of many students in consultation with Park in the development 
of realistic research problems: "His work thus evolved almost literally 
through an interplay between him and an audience of eager students."(l) 
b) PRAGMATISM AND THE OBJECTIVE SCIENTIST. 
The major driving force in the Chicago school was Park. Burgess 
(1967:3) describes his experience as a fellow worker with Park: "He 
lived and slept research. I never knew when I would get home for 
dinner." Park belonged to the general pragmatic movement of ideas 
(Coser, 1971:373) which led him to focus on the pathologies of society 
(cf. Turner,l967:xvi). It should be remembered that Park had been a 
newspaper man for a great number of years before he became a sociologist. 
This experience had taught him to ask of a situation, "What is the Big 
News"? The journalism in which he had participated had among other 
things concentrated on exposes of corruption in municipal affairs, 
but he learned that "while newspaper publicity aroused a great deal 
of interest and stirred the emotions of the public, it did not lead 
to constructive action."(Burgess,l967:3). Park's disillusionment in 
(l) See Coser (1971:372) for an "imposing roster" of presently w·ell 
kiiown sociologists who are among Pari{' s students. ( cf. Martindale 




in newspapers as an effective method of reforming the city and putting 
right the glaring wrongs led to his commitment to sociology, and to 
the discovering of the basic underlying "forces" or "processes" which 
moved the enormously complex city. 
Reacting against moralists he became convinced that an objective approach 
was required. The notion though, that, because of a heavy commitment 
to empiricism Chicago sociology is devoid of value concerns is erroneous 
(cf. Janowitz,l969/70:xviii). 
c) ACADEMIC RESPEC'fABILITY AND THEORY. 
The Chicago sociologists were acutely aware that they had to offer 
more than the mere trappings of science (Coser,l971:333); they needed 
a recognized body of theory. It was to this end that in 1918 Park 
borrowed some concepts from plant ecology and turned them into a unified 
explanation~!) The result was an imposing book of over 1000 pages·· 
which became known as the "green bible." The book was enthusiastically 
described by E.A. Ross (cf. Janowitz,l969/70:xv) as "the last word of 
perfection." While this attitude may not have been universal, the 
book came to be seen as representative of the conceptual apparatus 
used in the Chicago school. It was a book that was designed for the 
classroom- Janowitz (l969/70:xii) is no doubt accurate when he tells 
us that "for twenty years ... {1-€} was the leading textbook in the discip-
line," though he possibly exaggerates when he says graduate students 
"throughout the -country [used it] as they prepared for their doctoral 
examinations and research endeavours." The very success of American· 
sociology today owes something to the recognition Park earned in the 
academic world in developing a set of concepts which allowed for 
systematic classification and analysis of social data~ 2 ) 
d) RESEARCH AND CORPORATE ACTION. 
The City of Chicago held a great fascination for the Chicago sociologists. 
It was a city, which in the two decades in which the Human Ecologists 
flourished, grew by more than one half million per decade - and had 
(l) See Footnote 28 in·Martindale,l958:22. 
(2) See Coser (1971:357) for a biography of Park, and for a summary 





done so, at that rate, for the previous five decades. In 1860 the 
population was 112,172; by 1930 it was 3,376,438. It was no wonder 
the attention of the sociologists was caught. Burgess (1967:4-5) 
has described this period in some detail and it is worth reproducing 
his description at length: 
Chicago had been flooded with wave after wave of immigrants 
from Europe. The number of new arrivals had been especially· 
heavy from 1890 to 1910. World War I had caused this flow 
to cease, but immediately after the war there was great 
speculation that it would be renewed - with perhaps even 
greater activity. By the time our studies began, the various 
ethnic neighbourhoods were well established, with each ethnic 
group having its own churches, schools, newspapers, restaurants, 
stores, social clubs, politicians, and welfare stations. By 
this time, too, public sentiment had crystallized into rather 
firm prejudice and discrimination against the new arrivals 
from Eastern and Southern Europe. Anti-Jewish, anti-Polish, 
anti-Italian, and anti~Czech feelings were especially strong 
in particular neighbourhoods. In those days, even Germans, 
Irish, and Swedes were regarded by the old-line English 
families as being socially inferior ..• The public prejudice 
and desire for segregation of the foreign stock made it 
possible to maintain a housing shortage for these groups 
despite rapid building in other parts of the city ... The 
children of immigrants, standing between two cultures, were 
loyal neither_ to their parents nor to America ... They had 
formed street corner groups that were acting in open defiance 
of both the desires of their parents and the social rules of 
the community at large. The city administration was commonly 
regarded as being corrupt, and politicians were manipulating 
the ethnic neighborhoods for their Ol\~ advantage. Many 
families were desperately poor; widows struggling to bring 
up a brood of children were very common in those days, since 
mortality rates were high and death of the breadwinner during 
the prime of life was not uncommon. There was much need for 
charitable social service in the ethnic neighborhoods. 
Two titles of Park's essays express his attitude to Chicago and to 
sociology: "The City as a Natural Phenomenon" and "The City as a 
Social Laboratory." It seemed to Park (1929;1952:81) that Chicago 
constituted a "social laboratory" in which human nature was magnified 
and therefore more easily studied: "the city, with its natural regions, 
becomes a 'frame of reference,' i.e., a device for controlling our 
observations of social conditions in their relation to human behavior." 
It was only within this framework that a rapidly changing city could 
be grasped scientifically. Mostly the forces which were supposed to 
move the individuals and institutions, conceived discretely, were 




~ '. 1~. 
which problems like juvenile delinquency were to be controlled lay 
in the extent to which man could understand these forces. One of the 
.main insights insisted on by the Classical Human Ecologists (Park, 
1929;1952:197) lay in the notion of tackling problems within the 
framework of the natural areas. 
The Chicago school had a great deal of success in convincing city 
authorities such as the Health Department of Chicago to invest great 
sums of money in researching the natural areas. Planners too, apart 
from sharing a liking for concepts such as neighbourhood, zones, 
natural areas, were happy to go along with the assumption that the 
city had a characteristic organization composed of natural areas, 
each area having its own distinctive institutions, groups, person-
alities, etc~l) 
Their success was complete when in the 1930's the City Council decided 
to adopt this scheme as a basis for regular census data gathering. 
Under the directorship of Chicago sociologists the-now Chicago Community 
Inventory publishes the Local Community Fact Book of Chicago every 
I 
decade when censuses are made. There are seventy-five community areas 
of Chicago and information useful to municipal business and welfare 
is to be discovered therein. It is no idle boast when Burgess (1967:12) 
can say after a lifetime's work: "At this university there is perhaps 
the greatest collection of basic social data of any city in the world" -
and yet there is a 'gap which as the present Professor Donald Bogue of 
the Chicago Department of Sociology ( 1967: II!), acknowledges: "A major 
gap in urban research had persisted for some decades at the university 
in the urban studies research program. This was lack of a facility for 
carrying out systematic research on more distinctively sociological 
and social psychological aspects of urban life." This "lack of facility" 
is of course a direct result of the ecological bias of the founders. 
Undoubtedly success in the earlier decades with the community leaders 
and the planners reinforced the drive in the direction of understanding 
and grasping "ecological principles" - and this is without a doubt a 
major source of its present continuing attraction. 
(l) See Burgess in Burgess and Bogue, 1964;1967:7-8 . 
• 
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e) THE DECADE OF CRITICISM AND DISILLUSIONHENT. 
The authors of the major criticisms have already been identified 
(see footnote l,page 3). What is attempted here is a brief indication 
of the depth of that disillusionment. Bell and Newby (1971:94) note 
quite calmly that "the approach of pursuing ecological studies of the 
community in conjunction with detailed fieldwork seemed to stop after 
the early 1930's."· 
This is to pass very lightly over the "devastating" blows which had 
"mounted up" against what has become known as Classical Human Ecolot?.,-y. · 
Perhaps it was the suddenness of the collapse that caused the extreme 
frustration that can be discerned in Gettys' (1940;1961) article. 
The point to note is that it was only towards the end that Park and 
his colleagues had to face fierce criticism - it was evident that in 
th,e academic circles of the 20's and 30's Darwin's "heavy hand" 
offered considerable protection. 
The end tale is told very briefly in two apt sentences abstracted 
from Reissman (1964:95,113): 
Ecology did not fail in this earliest period when it used 
biological principles as a stimulus for methodological 
purposes, however, but it failed later, for complex and 
uniquely sociological reasons. 
And reviewing the movement as a whole: 
The enthusiasJp. born .... of condensing urban complexity to a 
.wondrously simple and orderly set of laws had disappeared, 







THE NATURAL AREA CONCEPT 
A) Introduction. 
B) The Urban Community Concept. 
C) The Zonal Concept. 
D) The Natural Area Concept. 
E) Reviewing the "Strong'' .Points. 
F) Issues and Conclusion. 
A: INTRODUCTION 
a) TWO PRELIMINARY REMARKS . 
First, it is important to clear up a confusion which may otherwise 
arise. In these first two sections headed The Urban Community Concept, 
and The Zonal Concept, the term "natural area" is given its original 
meaning in which the term indicates no particular group or area. At 
this stage the term is used in a vague way. So far as Park was concerned 
his initial usage indicates a geographic type concept in which spatial 
elements and physiological elements were important. Later the term 
came to have an ecological or bi-ological reference. As it eventually 
came to be used; though, it referred to a smaller area of cultural or 
social homogeneity within the city. 
Second, it should be noted that no official definition of this important 
term was given by Park. The definition identified below is therefore 
my own interpretation of how Park saw the natural area. A full definition 
should not be sought - rather the characteristics or elements identified 
here are considered to be essential to the definition with which Park 
and his colleagues worked. This is not to say that other characteristics 
may not be identified- Nottridge's (1972:29~30) reconstruction should 
be consulted as another example,only that those identified here are: 
(a) essential; (b) given (a) additional characteristics would not 






b) THE MATHEMATICAL BASIS OF THE NATURAL AREA CONCEPT. 
There is little doubt that Park shared in the exciting possibilities 
of mathematical representation: "mathematics ... has l:Jeen the model of 
exactness to which the other sciences have invariably striven to 
attain" (1929;1952:178). Since Descartes, in his quest to establish 
the qualities of matter, chose as his criterion those conceptions 
which alone could be described as clear and distinct (like the truths 
of geometry), the mathematical concept has appealed to scientists . 
For Descartes the only ideas about matter which could be clearly 
and distinctly conceived were extension and motion. As other assumptions 
involved no such self-evident qualities no knowledge could be derived 
from them. Given these premises, then, we have in the concepts 
matter (extension) and motion: "all the data necessary for explaining 
the entire world in strictly mathematical terms."(Rogers,l929,1935:249-250). 
Descartes' example of the mountain and the valley is instructive. 
He states: "It appears that existence can no more be separated from 
theessence of God, than the idea of a mountain from that of a vallw, 
or the equality of its three angles to two right angles from the essence· 
of a rectilineal triangle."(Quoted by Versveld,l9.54:24) . 
In short, there are two steps in the argument above: 
(1) Intuitive, whereby the world of things is grasped by the clear and 
distinct ideas, matter and motion; 
(2) Deductive, whereby the concepts are related to one another in an 
invariable and ordered manner so that the one always implies the other 
just as a mountain implies a valley. 
Park's argument with regard to the nature of the natural area and the 
urban community is accomplished in like fashion. First, the intuitive 
step, by which the clear and distinct idea - in this case the natural 
area is grasped. On the first page of the 1915 "bench mark" essay 
we have the following sentence: 
There are forces at work within the limits of the urban 
community -within the limits of any natural area of human 
habitation, in fact -which tend to bring about an orderly 
and typical grouping of its population and institutions. 
(1915;1925:1). 
Asserted here is an identity between the urban community and the natural 
habitat (or area). In subsequent essays Park (1929;1952:181) claims 
that "Every community has a location" and that, at the very least 
"the community will always have a center and a circumference" (1925; 
1952:66). Second, by the deductive ~tep, by which it is argued 
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that every natural area because it has a location must also have a 
circumference; or because it has limits must contain within these 
limits natural forces operative therein; or because there are natu~al 
forces contained within limits, the limits themselves are shaped by 
the natural forces; etc. 
c) A "WORKING" DEFINITION OF THE NATURAL AREA CONCEPT. 
Without pursuing the matter any further it is assumed that the two 
essential elements constituting the natural area concept, and the 
urban community concept with which it is identified, are as follows: 
(.1) The most important characteristic of the natural area 
is its limits or boundaries. 
(2) Within these limits "forces" are said to be operating 
in such a way that the constituent parts or elements 
are orderly and typically grouped. 
d) Tflli NATURAL AREA CONCEPT AS A BASIS FOR THREE KEY C.H.E. CONCEPTS. 
These are three concepts in which this "logic" is elaborated. They 
are regarded therefore as having equaJ logical status. They stand 
out as beacons in the writings of the C.H.E.s - they are: 
(1) The Urban Community Concept. 
(2) The Zonal Concept. 
(3) The Natural Area Concept (cf. section A:a) above). 
What will be said to apply in one .:case can be transferred with little 
problem to the other two cases. In the discussion that follows it 
has been convenient to single out different concepts for making 
certain points. This convenience arises out of the nature of the 





B: THE URBA.t~ COMMUNITY CONCEPT" 
a) S~~y AND DIRECTION OF FURTrU8R INQUIRY. 
As we have seen Park identified the natural area concept - a concept 
similar in character to Descartes' concepts of matter and motion -
with the urban community. The terms "city," "urban community" or 
even "community" are used indiscriminently in identifying this 
concept. And while Park was not always consistent in his ~sage 
(Alihan,l938:13), it was a concept he employed throughout his leader-
ship of the Classical Human Ecologists history. The question is not 
whether such a concept is legitimate -it is. It represents some 
reality. What we_ are interested in is: the manner in which it is 
held to be real; the adequacy with which such a concept can be said 
to represent the city; the degree of consensus among those who use 
the concept. 
b) THE ~~R IN "~ICH THE LIMITS OF TifE URBAN COMMUNITY ARE SAID TO BE REAL. 
A convenient place to begin is with Sjoberg (1965:162). He criticized 
the Classical Human Ecologists in general for their failure "to recognize 
that the city is shaped along certain lines by the broader, embracing 
society ... much of its ecological and social structure is determined 
by social forces external to it." (CL Janowitz in Preface to Park 
and Burgess,l969/1970:xvii). This is an important criticism for the 
overall impression one gains from Park's writings is that he thought 
of the city as a fairly compact entity. Implied in his oft repeated 
notion of the city as a ''social laboratory" (1929) is the idea that 
the city could be contained in such a thing as a laboratory. Of course 
_Park never intended this extension to the metaphor. However, he did 
say (1936;1952:137) that "The city is the microcosm in which is reflected, 
often in advance of their actual appearance, changes impending in the 
~acrocosm," and it was with cities especially that he was concerned -
particularly Chicago. 
While this is an important criticism, it is, I believe, one which 
Park was not totally unaware of, for he too maintained, on more than 
one occasion, that in tl;le modern worid·"there are no longer any 
communities wholly detached or isolated" (1925;1952:66; 1936;1952). 




of any community the communal institutions - economic, political, and 
cultural -will tend to assume a more or less clearly defined and 
characteristic distribution. For example, the community will always 
have a center and a circumference, defining the position of each single 
_community to every other." (My emphasis). It is not wholly explicit 
that the circumference is defined not only by internal forces operating 
within a given community but also by the relations between communities, 
but enough is given to allow us to see that in fact Park would have 
had little difficulty with this criticism of Sjoberg's. 
This discussion serves to highlight the importance to which Park 
attached. to "limits" and gives some idea of the extent to which his 
ideas of the city.were influenced by the concept of the natural area. 
The discussion is taken a step further by examining other ways in 
which Park used the key feature "limits;" Two passages are quoted: 
The city itself has been identified with an administrative 
area, the municipality; but the city, with which we are 
here concerned, is not a formal and administrative entity. 
It is rather a product of natural forces, extending its own 
boundaries more or less independently of the limits imposed 
upon it for political and administrative purposes. This has 
become to such an extent a recognized fact that in any thorough-
going study of the city, either as an economic or a social 
unit, it has been found necessary to take account of natural, 
rather than official, city boundaries. (1925;1952:167) 
Speaking of the city as a natural phenomenon Park (1939;1952:118) says: 
Conceived in this way the limits of the urban community are 
not likely to be identified with the city as an administrative 
unit, but rather with the metropolitan region, the boundaries 
of which are not arbitrarily fixed but coextensive with the 
area within which the city, as a natural phenomenon, actually 
functions or, perhaps, with the area within which it excercises 
a dominant economic and a somewhat less obvious cultural 
influence. 
A number of assertions are made in these two passages and can be listed 
as follows: 
·1. Unlike the formal, administrative and political boundaries the 
natural boundaries are extended "more or less independently." Park 
is more explicit about this in another contexti e.g. speaking of the 
natural areas of the city, Park ( 1929; 1952:196) says, ·i,'They are 
'natural' because they are not planned, and because the order that 
they display is not the result of design, but rather of manifestation 
J. 
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of tendencies inherent in the urban situation." (See also Zorbaugh, 
1926 in Theodorson,l96l). 
2. The formal administrative boundaries fixed by officialdom are 
"arbitrary." The term "formal" also carries this connotation. 
3. For study purposes "as an economic or social unit" the natural 
boundaries are to be chosen rather than the administrative ones. 
4. ··Natural boundaries can be measured by taking readings on 
economic and cultural factors which can be described as "dominant." 
What we have here is a dispute between the appropriateness of one 
set of boundaries weighed against another. Let i.t be said right 
in the beginning that had Park maintained assertion 3 and left it 
at that, allowing the results of the various premises to answer for 
themselves in terms of insight gained, usefulness, etc., there would 
be no quarrel. However, he was not content to let·the matter rest 
there and in the other assertions opens himself to the fallacy of 
reification. In the first assertion he asserts that the natural 
boundaries have an independence not found in the formal boundaries. 
The natural boundaries are more real, and exhibit more accurately 
the underlying forces of which people are compelled to take note -
they would seem to be "out there" in a manner in which the formal 
boundaries are not.· The nub of the matter is that he implies that 
the formal and political barriers are "artificial" without stating 
the criteria for either naturalness or artificiality. Gettys (1940; 
1961:102) in commenting upon the C.H.E.s usage of "natural" appeals 
for the right of an experimental phenomenon as being "worthy of 
scientific investigation in its own right." The arbitrary assigning 
of naturalness to some things as flora and fauna and not to other 
things such as persons and attitudes and political barriers however 
formally or informally maintained, is to introduce into the sciences -
and into this particular context a fallacious bifurcation. 
We are presented here ";:ith a strange paradox. On the one hand there 
are the designed actions of men who seriously set formal and political 





there are the natural forces which shape natural boundaries and compel 
men to pay attention to them, though some apparently do not. 
The question is whether in fact the paradox holds or not. We must 
examine the basis on which Park could claim a greater reality for 
the natural boundaries. 
c) BASES ON WHICH THE ADEQUACY OF THE CONCEPT IS TESTED . 
The two passages and the derived points continue to be relevant here. 
We pick-up the assertion that the natural boundaries are "more or less" 
independent of the limits imposed upon it for political or administrative 
purposes. The question is on what basis is reality attributed to the 
natural area. 
There is at least one occasion (1929;1952:182) when the reality of 
the natural areas, and as a matter of course this would include the 
boundaries as well, was justified on grounds of its "visibility": II 
·the fact that the community is a visible object. One can point it out, 
define its territorial limits." This, as Park puts it, is "one reason 
why sociological research may very properly begin with the community." 
Certainly the visibility of the city cannot be gain said. Gist and 
Fava (1964:95) tell us that "The high visibility both of the city and 
of the diversity within it makes it hardly surprising that one of the 
earliest and most widely-used approaches to understanding the city 
has been in terms of the interplay between physical and social conditions." 
Reissman's comment (1964:98-99) is even more pertinent: "The city 
evidently met the boundary requirement exceptionally well, w·hich was, 
perhaps, why Park believed that an ecological study of the city held 
forth such promise for sociology. 11 Reissman goes on to remind us that 
the physical and social limits of the city were more pronounced in his 
day than in our own. This is not denied, but it is one thing to claim 
that one's concepts have empirical backing, it is quite another to 
assume that on these grounds alone, one's own concept has more reality 
than another. Could not the political and formal boundaries, at least 
in some cases, be equally well attested on these grounds, say in the 
case of a river or a ~oQntain range? 
Again, if it is to economic and cultural dominance that Park appeals, 
f. 
how are these excluded from the formal and political boundaries? 
Here it could be easily pointed out that the political and official 
boundaries could also be seen as a manifestation of the said internal 
tendencies. On what grounds does Park exclude the political decisions 
from these inherent tendencies - we are not told. 
The point is not that Park's concepts do not have an empirical referent-
but whether on this basis it is sufficient to claim so much for one's 
concept. There would seem to be, possibly, some hesitancy in Park's 
"one reason" (cf. Reissman, where the more qualified word "perhaps" 
is introduced) for making this the basis for his claims. And yet 
if it is not on empirical grounds that Park derives his certainty -
and it is a strong certainty - from what source is it derived? 
d) THE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS. 
Here we return to the point from which we started - to the notion 
of Descartes' clear and distinct ideas, to the concept of the natural 
area as an example of this - and therefore to the two steps of intuition 
and deduction, upon which its reality is founded. The point that needs 
emphasising is that the certainty with which Park asserted the reality 
of the urban community concept was one and the same as the certainty 
with which he intuited the features of the natural area concept. 
That others agreed with this intuition meant a greater confidence. 








C: THE ZONAL CONCEPT 
a}·THE POSITION SO FAR. 
What is clear so far is that the fallacy of reification was committed 
when visibility and naturalness was attributed to one set of concepts 
(Park's) but not to others (i.e. the official administrative boundaries) 
while offering no explanation for doing so. Also the certainty with 
which Park claimed reality (or a greater reality) for his own concepts 
lay not entirely on his claim to their empirical veracity. The degree 
of consensus he and his colleagues shared with regard to the mathematical 
assumptions upon which the natural area concept was based, as well as 
the deductive type of logic which proceeded from these assumptions, is 
of crucial importance in accounting for the confidence which Park had 
in his concept of the natural area - and ~ith its identification with 
the city. However, the focus upon natural boundaries (shaped as they 
were by natural forces operative within the said natural boundaries) 
was not confined to the city. As they were applied to other concepts 
of smaller scale the nature of their reality must be further elaborated. 
b) CONTROVERSY OVER THE ZONAL CONCEPT AS A MATHEMATICAL OBJECT. 
A consideration of the implications of these assumptions extended to 
the ~onal concept by Ernest Burgess (1924,1925) in his famous article, 
The Growth of the City : an Introduction to a Research Project, can 
bring us nearer towards gaining clarification in this matter. A good 
place to start though is with a quotation by Park (1929;1952:182) 
referred to earlier, but this time we conclude the sentence and add 
another: "A more practical reason why sociological research begins 
with the community is the fact that the community is a visible object. 
One can point it out, define its territorial limits, and plot its 
constituent elements, its population, and its institutions on maps. 
Its characteristics are susceptible to statistical treatment." The 
excitement of being able to plot objects of observation on maps became 
something of a fetish (cf. Weber,l958:29). The point is that in using 
a map the Chicago sociologists were implicitly claiming something 
important about their data. Again this leads us back to the Cartesian 
notion of clear and distinct ideas. Burgess in fact describes the 
Zonal Concept as an "ideal" and as such could be expressed in an 
amazingly simple "chart." Some confusion and misleading contr;oversy 
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arose as to what was claimed and what was not claimed in the "zonal 
hypothesis" as it frequently is termed. Much of the controversy is 
focused on the basic element, the circle. The circle drawn with a 
compass is a representation of a mathematical concept. Maurice Davie 
(1938;1961:92) was the first to voice a strong criticism of the zonal 
hypothesis. After discussing a number of the Chicago.monographs in 
some detail, and after a painstaking study of his own in which he 
concluded that the Burgess hypothesis "clearly does not apply to 
New Haven," he maintained that both the studies of the Chicago 
sociologists and his own (New Haven) demonstrated a number of "natural 
areas" (so defined by their homogeneity) which did not form themselves 
into concentric circular zones. Burgess had anticipated this type of 
criticism right from the start for he had pointed out in the original 
document that the chart was an ideal construction. Not only was it 
not to be expected that the chart would perfectly fit every city 
but it was carefully noted tha~ Chicago itself, which was heavily 
used for illustration purposes, did not fit the chart due to a number 
of factors among which was for instance a lake front, and a river. 
It is obvious, as Quinn (1950;133) points out that Burgess' hypothesis 
does not depend on strict linear distance in the delimitation of the 
formal research zones. In fact, had a time-cost criterion been employed 
rather than lineal distance, ~he essentials of the circular pattern 
could be retained. What Quinn is saying on Burgess' behalf is this 
the "hypothesis" does not fall to the ground on the criterion of 
perfect circularity. The fact that a compass was used was incidental -
it was an instrument of convenience. Given a more sophisticated 
instrument, lines would still be drawn. True, they would not be 
perfectly circular- in this Davie's criticism is aknowledged but, 
nevertheless, they would still be drawn. The representation by 
chart would not be challenged. Circularity might not be a character-
istic of zones, but lines would do equally well, if not better; for 
lines are still representative of mathematical concepts. The clear 
and distinct notion of the zonal boundary is in essence not affected. 
If one looks for a definition of the zonal concept the specific 
elements which seem to constitute it are, in the first place boundaries 
and, in the second pla~e the tend~ncy.due to forces within the zone, 
to overflow. In this latter idea an advance upon the city concept 
was made. So far we seem to have come no further than the position 
we arrived at in the last section. There is, however, one advance 
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which had great appeal. Given the notion that zones could be delimited 
by mathematical objects - for convenience by circles - the next step 
. was to assume that they could serve as an index for measuring the 
forces of movement within the boundaries; or for that matter in their 
overflowing thereof. Once one has a sharply delineated cosmos 
(derived as they are from axiomatic clear and distinct type of ideas) 
then other features deduced from or dependent upon it will automatically 
have an equivalent specificity, and consequently, measurability. 
So far we know that there are limits or boundaries, and within them, 
or overflowing them, there are forces. These two features are related 
in such a way that they may be mathematically represented. They have 
equal specificity. For the moment we .focus our attention more specifi-
cally on the forces - ?!though these two features are so interdependent 
that the one always presupposes the other. 
c) THERE ARE T\vO QUESTIONS: 
(i) What is measured? Burgess is careful to distinguish between what 
he calls routine movements and mobility. Routine movements are 
unchanging motions, whereas"mobility"are movements. which are indicative 
of more significant changes. The latter are measured by a number of 
items. Most important, it would seem, are land values for i;h~y provide 
"one of the most sensitive indexes of mobility." Others mentioned are 
of a more complex nature. Mention is made of numbers of rides in 
vehicles of different kinds per given time period, and numbers of 
telephones. More importance, however, is attached to the number of 
telephone .calls made. These items are significant only where a higher 
ratio obtains than would be indicated by a calculation based upon mere 
population increase. 
(ii) What interpretation or inference is made from these measurements? 
On the basis of readings based on such factors we are told a number 
of items of information can be gained. Mentioned specifically are 
the degree of attachment of the person to his family or group; a 
person's wishes; and whether the persons acts integrally with his 
'whole personality, or segmentally. This latter is another way of 
saying pathologically .. In this context we are told the specific 
criterion upon which the inference is made; it is "where the mobility 
is greatest" that one discovers persons who are demoralized, delinquent, 





crimes, abandon their infants, etc. are to be found. In short, both 
the number and the kind of contacts a person may have, as well as the 
state of his or her moral life may be inferred. 
d) FOUR MORE QUESTIONS; 
Not surprisingly, there are some queries as to the procedure and the 
validity of the argument: (i) If a given area is noted as having rapid 
movements, or mobility, does this mean that all the persons living in 
that area are to be regarded as so characterized? . Do all participate 
in "vice"? (ii) Is there a one-for-one correlation between movement 
and, say, degree of pathology in a person? (iii) Are all features 
or events to be so accounted for or are there some features or events 
which are not to be accounted for in terms of the movement of forces? 
(iv) What degree of generality can be inferred from the evidence? 
The questions are discussed in order: 
(i) The question cif homogeneity. A convenient spokesman for the first 
question is Konig. He draws attention first of all to the distressing 
looseness with which the C.H.E.s used terms. "Community," "zones," 
"quarter," "natural area" and "neighbourhood" it would seem are used 
as equivalent words meaning more or less the same concept (Konig,l968:6l-62). 
In the following comment Konig's (1968:64) remarks are directed in 
this instance to the problems which arise in terms of zones or quarters; 
his comment is largely based on an original study of his own: 
In an investigation of Zurich, the first town quarter ... was first 
of all divided up into 132 sub-districts averaging thirteen 
building~ each. As these districts were too small to produce 
useful results in any classification of the residential popu-
lation, a second analysis combined them into "zones" each 
having a structure as uniform as possible. Naturally, these 
zones did not have the same homogeneous traits as the groups 
of buildings from which they were formed, but nevertheless 
their structure was surprisingly uniform. But precisely here 
there were such great deviations, both up and down, of certain 
statistical averages that they could no longer be explained by 
the usual statistical variations. 
Konig's point is that apparent (visible) homogeneity of zones may be 
misleading. He maintains that as soon as a micro-analysis is under-
taken house by house, street by street, block by block, then the 
statistically recorded ·homogeneity disappears. This criticism 
corresponds very closely to that of Davie's mentioned earlier. The 
main difference lies in the focus. Davie was concerned about the 
... 
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"fit" with regard to the concentric zones and KHnig is concerned 
with the assumed homogeneity of the "forces" within the specified area. 
(ii) Is there a one-to-one correlation between n1ovement and, say, 
degree of pathology in a person? There are really two problems of 
inference here - and both questions reflect choice of unit considered 
to be reflected in the measured features. 
First, Burgess refers indifferently to persons, areas, and populations. 
This as we shall see is questionable. Alihan points out the problem 
by focusing on the manner in which a cut-off point for a given area 
or zone, supposed to be either homogeneous or at least distinguishable 
from other areas or zones, is made. She points out that in actual 
fact the readings presented in the Chicago monographs are all gradients~!) 
For instance, some elements are more mobile than others, and it is 
the degree of mobility that is measured. Similarly land values too are 
gradients - they decrease in value from the centre to the periphery. 
But if the gradients, as the .term implies, are continuous, then the 
zonal cut-off points could be drawn at any radius from the centre. 
It would be as logical to have twenty zones as five. (Cf. Gist and 
Fava,l964:112). In other words the zones established by Burgess are 
arbitrary or at any rate have an important element of subjectivity 
attached to them. The problem is that if such significant findings 
as those Burgess supposed could be "measured'J are to.be .inferre.d, ,then 
at least there should be some discernible difference in quality reflected 
in the measurable elements. Where it is a matter of degree of mobility 
or of land values we deal with eleme'nts of the same kind. Zones 
thus are not of different kinds: "The zone can have significance only 
if it marks a distinction of gradients or between gradients."(Alihan, 
1938:225- my emphasis). Besides this, there is the point that 
different criteria will show different gradients of phenomena within 
the urban area -no single system of composite zones will suffice for 
all purposes. (Cf. Quinn,l950:135). 
If Alihan's criticism holds water, then the claim that Burgess can, 
on the basis of measuring external visible features of the urban 
population in gradients, discern between persons who act integrally 
with their whole personality and those who act segmentally is far-
fetched- for such differences in action are, one imagines, not merely 
(1) The concept of gradient refers to the regular rate of increase or 




a matter of degree but a matter of difference in quality. At any 
rate where such a claim is made explicitness with regard to criteria 
upon which such a judgement is made is essential: degree in "mobility" 
would not seem to be a sufficient basis upon which such judgements 
could be made. This point is picked up again later on in another 
context. (See Chapter Three, Section Band c). 
Second, the point is further clarified by Robinson (1950,Theodorson,l961) 
who drew attention to the difference between individual correlations 
which are based upon persons as units, and ecological correlations 
which are made on the basis of groups of persons as a unit. Menzel 
(1950, cf. Theodorson,l961), a commentator, illustrates the point 
made and is used here for convenience. Briefly, the point is that 
some correlations made in terms of a population or an area are mean-
ingless when applied to persons. For instance, it would be erroneous 
on the basis of a population analysis in which there was a high 
correlation between number of arrests and number of divorces to argue 
that individuals, in that population, who were arrested were particularly 
prone to divorces. Nevertheless, though agreeing with Robinson that 
ecological and individual correlations should not be confused, Menzel 
maintains that ecological correlations still have a great value. He 
does not say what the value is. Another recent discussion in which 
Robinson's "ecological fallacy" is referred to is to be found in 
Bell and Newby (1971:32-35,99). In their opinion the practice of 
relating "community structure" to geographic and spatial variables 
while providing "a truly impressive amount of factual detail on Chicago" 
did "little else." The theoretical advances were "slight." 
(iii) The question of a residual category. If there is some query 
about the process of arguing from ecological variables to persons 
the next question to ask is whether Burgess made any allowances for 
.exceptions- phenomena which his hypothesis was not expected to account 
for. While, after mentioning a number of items which he claimed as 
elements "entering into" mobility, a global claim is made in the words, 
"All these factors may be expressed numerically" (1925:60), he does 
create what may be termed a residual category which as we have seen 
he used to beneficial effect: it effectively provided immunity from 





the items mentioned occur two which are non-physical: historical 
factors in the location of industry, and the relative degree of the 
resistence of communities to invasion. With the introduction of these 
factors in this residual capacity - i.e. operating, as it were, 
independently of the forces identified as significant in the hypothesis -
it becomes evident that there are alternative explanations; also the 
attribution of primacy to one set of "independent variables" becomes 
a matter of subjective judgement. Firey's (1945,Theodorson,l96l) 
article in fact is a strong argument for giving primacy to cultural 
factors. What he demonstrates in terms of the impact of symbol-
sentiment upon land use in Boston as independent variables should, 
he says, not be regarded as "mere ecological 'sports'." Many other 
American cities present similar locational characteristics, and this 
means that a different order of concepts from those prevailing in 
ecology need to be used. 
With this criticism we have pinpointed an issue which at a more 
implicit level provided the essential dynamic to the Classical Human 
Ecologists. Basically, and especially irr Park's writings, we see 
how two commitments are juxtaposed. On the one hand the commitment 
to ecological concepts in providing an explanatory model or theory; 
and on the other a commitment to sociology, and therefore to what is 
unique about man his ability to create a culture with the aid of 
which he could act voluntarily .. While they were not wholly consistent, 
and argued on occasion for the primacy of .the cultural factor, the 
bulk of their writings exhibit a marked preference for the ecological 
factors as primary. The manner in which these two commitments were 
balanced is worked out with some delicacy, and we will be considering 
this further when we deal with the Natural Area concept. A more 
direct treatment of dichotomous concepts will be made in Chapter Four. 
(iv) A question of generality. So far our questions and discussion 
follows more or less the Belmore (Hauser and Schnore,l965:355-356) 
summary of broad types of criticism of both newer and older issues 
with regard to the Burgess zonal hypothesis. The first three with 
which we have dealt so far were described as closely related, and 





Of concepts in sociology few have fared as well as the Zonal Concept· 
of Ernest Burgess. Having been reproduced in many general textbooks 
(though of late the reproduction has been relegated to the more 
specialized textbooks), the five-zone diagram, complete with river 
cutting through the centre, has become not merely familiar - it has 
become a badge or symbol of the Classical school. Recently (Timms, 
1971) it appeared in the attractive form of a cover design for a 
book. It would seem that the diagram itself carries some self-
authentication, almost as though it had a life of its own~l) The 
sheer success of this concept is impressive. But, it is asked, upon 
-what is it based? If we examine the original document we see that 
Burgess says, "If this chart is applied to Chicago" (my emphasis) 
meaning that the idea is to use Chicago for purely illustrative pur-
poses. Nevertheless the point does arise that while l;te~puts forward 
a-general theory it is to Chicago alone that he seems to appeal. 
Shortly after the publication of the article Zorbaugh suggested a 
restriction in the application of the concept to the modern American 
commercial and industrial city. This was later accepted by Burgess 
(1930) himself. (Quoted by Schnore in Hauser ·and Schnore,l965:353). 
Similarly, so far .as the Classical Human Ecology monographs are 
concerned - those mentioned, for instance in the footnote below, 
Gettys (194.0;1961:101) was of the opinion that "their values ... are 
derived from concrete studies too narrowly confined to a single and 
somewhat unique area, namely, the large American city." Bell and 
(1) This was not surprising when one considers the use to which the 
concept has been put. Some of the earlier classics connected with 
the Classical school may be listed as follows: E.R. Mowrer's Family 
Disorganization,l927; F.M. Thrasher's The Gang : A Study of 1313 
Gangs in Chicago;l927; C. Shaw's Delinquency Areas : A Study of 
the Geographic Distribution of School Truants, Juvenile Delinquents, 
and Adult Offenders in Chicago,l929; W.C. Reckless's "The Distribu-
tion of Couunercialized Vice in the City : A Sociological Analysis" 
Publications of the American Sociological Society,July,l926; 
H.W. Zorbaugh's The Gold Coast and the City Slum,l929; E.F. Frazier's 
The Negro Family in Chicago,l932; R.E.L. Faris and H.\v. Dunham's 
Hental Disorders in Urban Areas : An Ecolo ical Study of Schizo hrenia 
and Other Psychoses,l939; etc. All these Quinn,l950:126 "accepted 
the hypothesis more-or-less uncri tic.ally and have used it as an aid 
in interpreting the sp~tial distributions of various types of human 
phenomena." These studies mark only a beginning. Schnore (Hauser rud 
Schnore,l965:356) tells us that "Even restricting attention to the 
American sociological literature, one can find an account of the 'ecology' 




Newby (1971:92) draw out the criticism, seen from an English vantage 
point: "This (?nified approach] is both the schools greatest strength, 
for their data is wonderfully rich, and its greatest weakness for all 
their data is on one city at one time~ Despite their historical 
investigations like many other American community studies they can 
be charged with 'localism', with having a curios local ethnocentricity 
notwithstanding the fact that they were the most cosmopolitan and 
worldly-wise of men." (For further detail see Quinn,l950:l20-l23) . 
What is of interest here, especially in the light of the previous 
discussion with regard to the "urban community" concept of Park, 
is that Burgess lived long enough to react to the criticism. He took 
care to point out that his concept had no claim to having a greater 
reality to that of competing concepts. In 1953, following the 
continued usage of the concentric,zone hypothesis,despite the criti-
cism (though not without reference to qualifications such as those 
suggested by Homer and Hoyt, cf. Mann,l965,1968:95-96; Nottridge, 
1972:31), Burgess {quoted by Schnore in Hauser and Schnore,l965:352) 
made a reply to his critics as follows: "At no time in advancing this 
ideal construct of the effect of radial growth have I denied the 
existence of other possible factors which might also be regarded as 
ideal constructs." The points made earlier (p.23) may be reproduced 
here. The question of its reality, and the causal relations presupposed 
in it (i.e. from an expansion from the city centre giving rise to a 
concentric zonal pattern of growth), derive not so much from the 
empirical evidence, as from the degree of consensus among sociologists 
as to its usefulness or suggestiveness on the one hand, and on the 
other from the nature of the concept itself based as it was upon the 
(mathematical) natural area concept originally championed by Parle 
While Reissman (1964:105) regards the Burgess hypothesis as a "high 
point of ecological argument" it is argued here (see p .14) that an 






D: THE NATURAL AREA CONCEPT 
a) ZORBAUGH'S CONTRIBUTION. 
Burgess (1964:7) recently reviewing the history of the C.H.E.s tells 
us that one of their most important contributions lay in their 
assumption 11 that the city had a characteristic organization ... composed 
of natural areas, each having a particular function in the whole 
economy and the life of the city, each area having its distinctive 
institutions, groups, and personalities . 11 Barely two years had 
passed since the publication of Burgess• original paper before Zorbaugh 
proposed a major qualification. Describing the 11 generalized zones 11 
as 11 gross 11 he suggested that in actual fact physical factors, someaf 
which were mentioned by Burgess in what we suggested was a residual 
capacity, broke the city up into numerous smaller areas, which he 
termed 11 natural areas. 11 (1926;196l;l!6)(l) Gathering support from 
historians (Ibid:47) who are regarded in general as being of the 
opinion that· 11 state lines were not drawn with reference to natural 
groupings of population and natural geographic units 11 -an obvious 
harping back to Park's method of argument- he applies the same logic 
to the smaller administrative areas in the city, i.e. areas or 11wards 11 
used for convenience by education, police, and medical bodies. These 
he found were deficient in a number of respects. They were regarded 
as equals when in fact the underlying natural areas, not taken note 
of, showed differential adaptive·capacity; furthermore wards cut 
right across natural areas and produced a stalemate in local voting 
patterns- consequently 11 the real issues •.. that make up the city 
rarely get into politics 11 (Ibid:48). The point is that no allowance 
was made for the existence of distinct and natural areas within the 
city, and the efforts of the community organizers who had set out to 
remedy the situation by substituting one administrative area for 
another - totally oblivious of the existence and significance of the 
natural areas- were doomed to failure. Rather than expecting that 
the neighbourliness of the Golden Age of the village should miraculously 
emerge within administrative areas they should have paid attention to 
the natural areas - it is these that constituted the 11 real 11 units of 
the city: 11 They can be accurately deffned. Facts that have a position 





and can be plotted serve to characterize them" (Ibid:49). Zorbaugh 
built up to a magnificent conclusion. Pointing out the meaninglessness 
of the statistics based upon the administrative areas, he pointed 
to the "crying needs in planning for ... significant statistics ... based 
upon units that are actual factors in the process under examination." 
(Ibid). 
Zorbaugh's plea and argumentation did not go unheeded. In 1929 
Park (1929;195?:196-198) declared: 
The urban community turns out, upon closer scrutiny, to be a 
mosaic of minor communities, many of them strikingly different 
one from another, but all more or less typical ... 
They are the products of forces that are constantly at work to 
effect an orderly distribution of populations and functions 
within the urban complex. They are "natural" because they are 
not planned, and ... the order they display is not the result of 
design, but rather a manifestation of tendencies inherent in 
the urban situation ... 
Now, the fact of primary importance here is that social statistics 
-births and deaths, marriage and divorce, suicide and crime -
assume a new significance when they are collected and distributed 
in such ways as to characterize these natural areas ... 
Perhaps, [says Park wistfully:} not all but most facts that can 
be stated statistically once they have been plotted in this 
conceptual scheme, - this ecological frame of reference, -can 
be made the basis of general statements which may be eventually 
reduced to abstract formulae and scientific generalizations. 
b) THE NATURAL AREAS AS A "FRAME OF REFERENCE". 
Taken together then these natural areas were seen by the leaders of 
the C.H.E.s as constituting a "frame of reference" in which statistical 
facts would gain a new and more general significance. W11ile there 
is no need here to repeat in detail the kinds of criticism which were 
made with regard to the assumptions, such as those with regard to 
city boundaries and the homogeneous composition of specified areas, 
there is some point in showing the degree of commitment which was 
given to this final conceptual formulation. Bell and Newby (1971:98) 
highlight this when they point out "Their [ige. the C.H.E.s] concentra-
tion on 'natural areas' prevented them always from viewing the city 
as a whole. If they had stepped back a bit, as it were, it might 
have been possible for them to consider where those who were living 
in the rooming house district had come from and where they were moving 
to." This criticism would almost certainly have surprised the C.Iffi.s 
for their whole object was to understand the basic forces which moved 
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a discrete mass of individuals and institutions into the patterns 
they believed they could perceive. In short, because of their 
ecological commitment they took up a community perspective (cf. 
Janowitz,l969/70:xvii). Besides, arising out of the same commitment, 
with their concentration on "overflowing" and "expansion" and "invasion" 
the notion that they did not "consider where those ... in the rooming 
house district had come from or where they were moving to" is, while 
not altogether unjust, perhaps misleading (see Zorbaugh,l926;1961:47-48). 
Where the criticism would undoubtedly be fair is in the received and 
unquestioned treatment of the cultural factor. As in the case of Burgess' 
concept an important part depends upon the manner in which the boundaries 
are said to emerge. Zorbaugh (1926;1961:47) makes a token gesture 
when, after saying that "Land values, characterizing the various natural 
areas, tend to sift and sort the population," he adds, "Cultural factors 
also play a part in this segregation, creating repulsions and attractions." 
The point is that land values were seen to operate unconsciously and 
a_utomatically like the robot which goes its "own way indifferent to 
the will of its creator."(Ibid:45). Cultural values "and all social 
attitudes" on the other hand, belong among those "subtler phases of 
city life" (Ibid:49) and may usefully be studied "within the area" -
i~e. areas which are, as it were, ecologically "givens." 
There is a more basic point to the Bell and Newby criticism however, 
and that is that so often the C.H.E.s spoke of individuals and 
institutions and yet their sociologi~al or socio-psychological 
contribution is brought in through the back-door. Sirjamaki (1964:203) 
points out that "most" of the Chicago monographs in fact start off 
by locating certain groups using ecological principles, but then 
having done this, substitute a sociological analysis for an ecological 
one. He points out that an unintended consequence of these studies 
was that they demonstrated that the natural area concept ~as "hard 
to use in cities." While this explanation suggests a reason for the 
classical status accorded in sociological circles to many of these 
monographs, the importance and effect of one's starting point must 
be recognized. It not .only determines what comes second, but in fact 
colours the rest of the material. Thus the real point to Bell and 
Newby's remark lies in the inflexibility of approach. The high degree 
of consensus and co~nitment to their formulations made an impression 
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on others. It would seem though that the City Council's acceptance 
of their definitions for multi~purpose planning had the effect of 
fossilizing the concepts, and taking away the individuality of approach 
needed in the study of sub-communities. At any rate when Hatt 
( 1946; 1961: 108) says, "No obeisance need be made to the natural areas 
of a city" (author's emphasis) he is making a point against the reifica-
tion of concepts, for to reiterate a point made earlier on, the fallacy 
of.reification is committed where a concept, narrowly defined, is 
regarded as an exhaustive representation of an entity (the city) 
conceived in its broader sense. The point is that individuals must 
be allowed to "step back" and view the city continually afresh, using 
old concepts to be sure, but also deciding anew what the purposes 
of their individual studies are, and making alterations accordingly. 
We are now in a position to build on a point made earlier. Alihan 
pointed out that the concentric zones were arbitrary in that, because 
they were based on gradients, there was no reason why there could not 
as easily be twenty, or any nmnber for that matter, as the five 
specified by Burgess. What Hatt and Sirjamaki wish to stress with 
regard to the natural area concept, is that, in a similar fashion, 
the size of the natural area exists by virtue of the definition imposed 
on it by the investigator. Both the number and the size of natural 
areas as well as their location in the city varies with the scale 
chosen by the investigator (Sirjamaki,l964:20l.i:). And this in turn is 
dependent "entirely on the problem defined by the student"(Hatt,l9l.i:6; 
1961:107). Once this freedom of individual definition is taken away, 
once the student can no longer "step back" both from his own and other's 
concepts, the qoor is open to dogmatism, and objectivity is lost. 
Then the argument depends on prestige rather than upon criteria of 
scientific judgement. Such concepts have no great survival capacity 
in a university though, and Konig is right in his designation of it 
as the "questionable" natural area. Sirjamaki's (1964:203) remark 
forms a fitting conclusion: "By now ecologists have given up the 
concept of natural area." 
c) ZORBAUGII' S CONTRIBUTION AGAIN. 
In the light of the above discussion the question is not "Why was it 
necessary to develop the natural area framework"? but rather, "For 




natural area concept so soon after the Burgess hypothesis had been 
published, a clue, surely, will be found in the purposes of Zorbaugh. 
His monograph The Gold Coast and the City Slum, was published in 1929. 
The focus of the study is on two "communities" of contrast - the one 
marked by the highest residential land values, the other marked by 
the lowest. The Gold Coast was the lake side, and a few blocks away, 
behind, were "Little Italy" and "Little Sicily" - the slums. This 
interest can be traced back tQ the 1926 paper on which much of the 
discussion above was based - both the Gold Coast (p.48) and the Lower 
North Side (p.47) are sited as examples. Given this interest in 
smaller "communities" we have the key to the estimate of the Burgess 
zones as "gross.'' We have here an illustration of that freedom necessary 
for the advancement of science - the freedom to build on the conceptual 
advances of others, and to redefine their concepts if necessary for 
one's own particular purposes. No doubt in championing so strongly 
the cause of the natural area concept Zorbaugh did not mean to deny 
others the freedom he himself enjoyed. 
There is a point implicit in Zorbaugh's choice of the natural area 
concept which needs teasing out. On what basis did he decide upon 
the smaller units? No doubt the land values are suggestive. And yet, 
having begun with a physical description of the locality, Zorbaugh 
turns to his impressions gained of cultural and social contrasts. It 
is suggested that it is this latter quality which gives his monograph 
its survival capacity. The fact that social and cultural groupings 
are (and were) intermingled with one another (Hatt,l946;1961; Sirjamaki, 
1964:203; Konig,l968:62-63) is beside the point -for in this respect 
the contrasts chosen by Zorbaugh were at the same time extreme enough 
to be clearly definable, and yet compact enough for one researcher 
to handle on an impressionistic basis. Bell and Newby (1971:96) identify 
his method in the paragraphs which begin "As one walks .•. " and quote 
an instance as follows: "One has but to walk the streets of the Near 
North Side to sense the cultural isolation beneath these contrasts." 
One cannot escape the conclusion that Zorbaugh's prime interest lies 
here rather than in the land values - the point at which he started. 
It was these cultural and social facto.rs and the contrasts he perceived 
that created the fascination. In order to draw contrasts the areas 




register impressions. It is suggested that "the human scale" factor 
played a large if not critical part in the development of the natural 
area framework as it was conceived by the Classical Human Ecologists. 
E: REVIEWING THE "STRONG" POINTS 
Park started in the very beginning by identifying the urban community 
or the city with the natural area concept. This made room for the 
development of the zonal and natural area concepts. It was the latter 
which were to have the greatest success - yet the very success enjoyed 
by the concepts created a stumbling block of no mean proportion. 
Towards the end of his career Park (1952:118) wrote a paper (unpublished) 
criticizing a work of Thorndike's. This is one of the most interesting 
of Park's writings, for it not only contains the same kind of penetrating 
criticisms which were later directed at his own work, but it also tells 
us, by inference, what Park thought the strong points of Human Ecology 
were. A short resume therefore of this paper serves as an overview or 
summary of the main points. 
Thorndike (1939) compared 310 cities in the United States using various 
statistical readings. Based on the number of dentists, cigar stores, 
home ownerships, birthrate, etc. he developed a scale in which the 
general goodness or excellence of a city could be measured. 
There are four major criticisms Park brings to bear on i;he study: 
a) ARTIFICIALITY OF SCALE OF MEASUREMENT. 
The fundamental objection to this sort of procedure is, as it 
seems to me, that it necessitates the substitution of a frigid 
and artificial construction, a sort of logical artifact, like 
the economic man, for the actual living object in which \ve are 
interested. Such artificial constructions may, perhaps, serve 
the purposes of an administrative agency for whom the "goodness 
of life," and particularly collective life, has no mysteries. 
It cannot serve th~ purpose of a science that is not satisfied 
withaprecision that is gained by definition, merely, or with 
a procedure that substitutes correlations and logical relations 
for real causes. (1952:125) 
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b) STATISTICAL INFERENCE MISLEADING. 
The manipulation of statistical data by which such scales are 
contrived and applied has always impressed me a good deal like 
parlor magic. One is frequently startled by the results but 
is mainly interested to discover by.what sleight of hand the 
trick was turned. (1952:123-124) 
It is this that tends to give social studies based on statistics 
the character of a purely scholastic exercise in which the answers 
to all the questions are already implicit in the conceptions and 
assumptions with which the inquiry started. (1952:125) 
c) LACK OF PRACTICAL APPLICATION. 
What does he tell us finally? Does he tell us now just how, 
~ in view of the conditions under which this unequal, unwholesome 
and, I suspect uneconomic, distributions of peoples and the 
goods of life took place, how we could, if at all, change the 
.. 
situation? No... (1952:127) 
d) LACK OF UNIQUE INSIGHT. 
All that we seem to get out of all these ingenious statistics 
in which the author has contrived to put down with some ·show 
of precision, but not with any sort of completeness (is] what 
, we already in a general way know. (1952:127) 
We are now in a position to sum up on a basis of inference from above, 
what Park thought were the strong points of the concepts of Classical 
Human Ecology. First, he supposed that the concepts were,in some 
-
sense independent of their creators,real - or rather that they mediated 
reality in a way which other concepts did not. They in short, exposed 
real causes. Second, he valued the empirical basis of their work. 
He walked the streets as did Zorbaugh and the rest. Their approach 
was regarded as superior to a "purely scholastic" one. Third, because 
their work exposed the underlying forces, their concepts and statistics 
were policy producing. Reliable decisions could be based upon them -
problems could be tackled and perhaps solved. Fourth, their concepts 
led to unexpected results and new inferences. 
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F: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The above discussion forms the material from which a number of 
issues are identified. In defining the issues and referring in 
summary fashion to the above discussion, some additional comment 
is made. 
l. SUBJECTIVISM~!) See pages 19-23,30-31,36-38 
4:0 
Subjectivism, according to Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:4:24:) is 
"the philosophic view that our knowledge of reality is determined 
entirely by our subjective experience or mind." While Park would 
undoubtedly repudiate that he stood for such a doctrine, seeing that 
he gave a high priority to an empirical method in the search for 
knowledge, the two points of view are not really separable. Concepts 
act as blinkers, and the natural area concept which focused Park's 
view upon the boundaries of, and the forces within, the city, meant 
that at important stages the broader society and its part in shaping 
,, 
the city was disregarded. Park was not wholly unaware of these 
forces, the fact therefore that on critical occasions he could dis-
regard them entirely demonstrates the blinker effect of concepts. 
It is important to recognize the subjective element in cognition -
(l) NOTE ON -ISM. According to The Oxford Dictionary of English 
Etymology, 1966 the Greek root is -ismos, forming nouns of action for 
verbs. A frequent use of -ismos was to express the sense of acting 
like or adopting the habits of a' body of people, as Attikismos, which 
meant siding with Athenians, or Attic fashion or idiom ... on this model 
the medieval Latin usage was derived e.g. paganismus. 
There are four chief uses in English: 
(l) To form a noun of action naming the process, the completed action 
or its results, e.g. criticism, nepotism, ostracism; 
(2) with emphasis on conduct, habit, character, e.g. barbarism, despotism, 
heroism, etc. 
(3) forming the name of a system of theory or practice, based on the name 
of its subject or object, or on the founders name, e.g. Arianism, Epicureanism 
positivism; and by extension to designations of doctrines or principles e.g. 
agnosticism, altruism, deism, hedonism, romantism, universalism, etc. 
(4:) forming a term denoting a trait or peculiarity as of language, e.g. 
Americanism, Gallicism, Hellenism, Solecism. 
It would seem that these categories are not mutually exclusive. Of the 
sixteeen issues identified and discussed in this thesis the majority fall 
in (3), more particular.ly in the extension where the usage designates a 
doctrine or principle. There are three issues which possibly designate a 
behavioural trait (and therefore fall in (2) or (!1) viz. semnotism, 
pessimism and dogmatism, however, these traits are so closely linked 
with the system of theory propounded that the drawing of lines of this 
nature seems unimportant. 
•· 
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concepts are chosen. As in the case of Park's city concept, so too 
in the cases of both the zonal and natural area concepts, an important 
element in their establishment was subjective judgement. In itself 
there is no problem about this. The problem was the lack of recognition 
of this element. 
Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:424-425) tell us that "when a number 
of individuals agree that their separate subjective experiences coincide, 
then subjective experience becomes shared, culturally objective reality. 
Social agreement, of course, is not necessarily final truth or reality, 
but what is real is known to man only in terms of what other people 
agree is real. The objective is necessarily a truncation of the 
subjective experiences of many individuals, because it consists only 
of what a number of people share and can agree to be in common." 
A~ we have seen above the degree of consensus in which both the 
zonal concept and the natural area concept was held by the C.H.E.s 
was impressive. 
2. REALISM AND REIFICATION. See pages 17-18,21-22,34-36. 
According to Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:342) the "fallacy of 
reification" consists in "The error of regarding an abstraction as 
a real phenomenon~ The source of the error lies in the fact that 
in analysis it is necessary to simplify the complex phenomena of 
the real world, and in developing analytic concepts certain aspects 
of a given phenomenon must be ignored in order to focus on other 
aspects. There may be a deliberate exaggeration of certain 
characteristics in order to formulate a useful conceptual model ... " 
Of course, deliberate exaggeration of certain characteristics of a 
given object or phenomenon, in order to come to some understanding 
of it, is part and parcel of all scientific thinking. It is by a 
process of selection and emphasis of certain considered significant 
characteristics - and a corresponding de-emphasis of others considered 
unimportant or of no significance - that scientific thinking must needs 
take place. Of critical importance is the degree of deliberateness 
and of self-consciousness. As pointed out in the first chapter with 
regard to Classical Human Ecology it would seem that that fierceness 




because of this the C.H.E.s offer a fruitful bed in which the fallacy 
of reification can be demonstrated. 
If what I have said above is to be accepted then there is little fault 
with supposing, for the sake of argument, that a particular concept 
which indeed enables us to abstract significant features of a phenomenon, 
be regarded as real. Park (1929;1952:179) is surely speaking in a 
true scientific spirit when -he says: ~'Every science more or less 
creates its own objects out of events which are a part of the common 
experience of mankind. The first task of every science is to convert 
events into things, the particular things it proposes to study." In 
as much as he succeeded in (a) formulating concepts by which certain 
components of a complex phenomenon (the city) could be identified; 
(b) convincing others of their usefulness and appropriateness, Park 
can be said to have both rightly reified his concepts and advanced 
the process of science - i.e. if "reified" here means the regarding 
of his concepts as having "reality." 
While Park would undoubtedly repudiate the metaphysical doctrine of 
realism "that universals, or abstract concepts, have a real existence 
as entities" (Theodorson and Theodorson,l970:337) in favour of the 
opposing nominalist point of view, for his empiricism led him to view 
the city as consisting of particulars, the fact that he attributed a 
"naturalness" to his own concepts led him to claim that they had a 
real existence. Paul Hatt (1946;1961:107) sees this as a general 
problem in the works of Park, McKenzie, Hawley and Quinn: "These 
views of ecology seem to imply the- existence of a real kind of data, 
or a real series of forces, which then· produce real areas and other 
ecological phenomena. The conclusion suggested by analysis of the 
data in this paper, however, is that ecology consists in a way of 
looking at data without assuming any inherent qualities of those data." 
In that Park's concepts consist in "~way of looking at data" they 
can be said to rightly constitute~ reality. The problem arises when 
other alternatives are automatically excluded or regarded as artificial. 
3. DOGMATISM OR THE FOSSILIZATION OF CONCEPTS. See pages 35-36 
This issue is closely related to the above, and the last sentence can 
be seen as constituting a definition of it. There seems to be some 




as arising from axiomatic or self-evident presuppositions, whereas 
the fossilization of concepts, it is suggested, arose from their· 
official recognition by public authorities, and the notion that the 
natural areas identified by the C.H.E,s could serve multi-purpose 
planning. The point to be made is that each subject for research 
needs to be treated on its own merits. 
4. TRANSFERENCE FALLACY OR CONCEPT CONFUSION. See pages 17-18,22-23,26-27,34-36 
A key word in Theodorson and Theodorson's definition of Reification 
(above) is the word "phenomenon" (which in Park's terms corresponds 
with "event"). It would appear that Theodorson and Theodorson are 
saying that only phenomena (or "events") are "real." This is 
questionable. However, fallacy would arise where characteristics 
belonging to a larger entity are transferred incorrectly to a smaller, 
abstracted, but no less real, portion. Softness rightly belongs to 
oranges and can be transferred without too much violation to segments, 
but;not to pips. Perhaps reification, in this sense, is best 
described as a transference fallacy- i.e. a problem of identity. 
(Cf. Archibald,l970:4). 
This problem is noted originally by Alihan (1938:13) who points out 
that when technical meanings are given to everyday terms, such as 
community or t;trban community, "it is not easy to divorce them from 
their usual significance." When· Park extended the clear and distinct 
characteristics derived from the natural area concept to the urban 
community and regarded these as an adequate description of "the city," 
a confusion of concepts, or transference fallacy ~ay be said to have 
taken place. Bell and Newby (see p.3~ ) recommend that the scientist 
should be able to "step back" as it were from his concepts. This 
requires, of course, the prior commitment to doing so. 
5. POSITIVISM. See pages 22-27 
According to Theodorson and Theodorsori (1970:306) positivism is the 
"philosophical position holding that knowledge can be derived only 
from sensory experience." Janowitz speculates that had Park and his 
colleagues been alive today they would have participated in the efforts 
of contemporary sociologists in creating new formulations in sociology, 
"But they would not have abandoned their commitment to concrete and 
specific data." (Janowitz in Park and Burgess,l969/l970:xviii). There 
are two consequences of this commitment which are important here: 
(a) Method. "The methods of the physical sciences are regarded as 
the only accurate means of obtaining knowledge, and therefore the 
social sciences should be limited to the use of these methods and 
modeled after the physical sciences" (Theodorson and Theodorson 1970: 
306). Thus, the importance of demonstrating the importance in socio-
logy of the scientists' tools. "Too many of the charts, maps, overlay 
maps, diagrams, and statistical rates and ratios were present for 
their own sake" (Martindale in Weber,l958:29). A commitment to a 
specific method can also lead to fallacy. 
(b) This self-conscious attempt to gain recognition for sociology as 
a science (Park and Burgess,l92l;l969/70:Chapter l) answered another 
need, and that was to think about social problems and the city in 
objective and non-moralist terms. Park fE!lt that the "arm-chair 
moralists" ~nd "intellectuals" contributed very little to solving 
the problems. However, there was a pragmatist bfus to Park's writings 
which while not self-consciously asserted (cf. Alihan,l938:q-6; 
Coser,l97l:373), was nevertheless strongiy present in all his writings. 
"Park was not free from community being used as normative prescription 
for he clearly cherished a vision of a developed science of the 
community which could chart patterns of change so that men might finally 
fashion their social environment~ to conform more closely with their 
ideals" (Bell and Newby,l971:9q), Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:310) 
tell us that pragmatism is the doctrine "in which the empirically 
ascertainable consequences implied by an idea or statement are held 
to constitute the meaning of the statement and (in some forms of 
pragmatism) also to be the criterion for the truth of the statement." 
The truth of the matter was that Park was substituting one set of value 
judgements (anti-urbanist) with another in which utility was regarded 
as the chief criterion of value. 
The problem is not that these values should be held by a sociologist, 
but that they should be presented under the guise of empiricism (or . 
positivism) 
' 
6. THE "ECOLOGICAL FALLACY" See pages 28-29. 
Robinson has coined the term "ecological fallacy," which arises out 
.of the demand to give to statistical measurements some object which 
corresponds to the reading. Two fallacies were identified. First, 
the attribution of homogeneity to an area which looke-d at more 
closely turns out in fact not to have the supposed homogeneity. 
Second, the supposition that qualitative inference can be based on 
quantitative data; or the notion that statistical readings based 
on groups as units can be taken as giving accurate information about 
individuals. 
7. LOCALISM OR GENERALITY. See pages 30-32 
The problem here concerns the inductive method, which is "the process 
of reasoning from individual instances to general principles" (Theodorson 
and Theodorson,l970:199). The problem is that the C.H.E.s concentrated 
their attention on only one city, Chicago -yet they claimed a generality 
for their concepts. While the empirical base was weak, the degree 
of consensus was strong. Subsequently other empirical studies using 
the same concepts, more or less, have been used in examining many 
other cities. The point was made that provided no exclusive claims 
were made, other concepts explaining or focusing on elements either 
within the ambit of a given concept or adjacent to them, couid exist 
alongside one another both could be found useful in coming to grips 
with a given phenomenon or problem. It was suggested that the question 
of a concept's reality derives not so mcuh from the empirical evidence 
adduced in its favour, as from the degree of consensus among sociologists 
as to the usefulness or suggestiveness of the same. This should not 
be taken to mean that empirical evidence need not be used in determining 
the validity of a concept. 
8. MATERIALISM (OR BIOLOGISM). See pages 26,29-30,33-3lt,3lt-39. 
Materialism is taken to mean the notion that "all patterns are 
reducible to the primary pattern of the structure of inanimate bodies. 
The phenomena of life l,lnd mind are no different in kind from those of 
inanimate nature, and there is no need to posit any intervention from 
outside the mechanical .order to accour1t for phenomena like cathedrals. 
Matter has an inner tendency to tumble into complicated combinations 
like the human body, a restlessness which produces ever new systems 
·• 
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of equilibrium •.. 11 (Versveld, 1954:47) 
While it is recognized that the key C.H.E. theorists would undoubtedly 
repudiate a strict materialism, and while it is realized that not all 
were equally committed to the idea of attributing potency ~ 0 material 
or biological phenomena, enough was said for such a case to be made 
of their position. 
The point made in the above pages is basically as follows. It was 
noted that a marked preference was given to ecological terms. 
Park's initial commitment was to spatial factors. This level of 
analysis carried through and is evident in both the zonal and the 
natu:ral area concepts. This can be said to be a materialistic level 
of analysis and is evident in the concept "movement" or mobility,(a 
notion reminiscent of Hobbes' and Descartes' conceptions of the 
external world). Superimposed upon this and interwoven with it was 
an ecological commitment in terms of which human behaviour was 
interpreted. At this level a biologistic analysis could be said to 
be given primacy. The major problem with this is that institutional 
analysis is made to take a back seat. The social patterns detected 





THE E C 0 L 0 G I C A L CONCEPT 
ARGUMENT BY PLAN'!' AND 
ANIMAL ANALOGY 
A) Introduction. 
B) The Case of the Boll Weevil and the Voortrekker. 
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C) The Case of the Mindless Vegetable and the Vocationless Hobo. 
D) The Case of the Tall Pine and the Dominant C.B.D. 
E) Reviewing the Three Cases. 
F) Issues and Conclusion. 
A: INTRODUCTION 
a) PRELIMINARY REMARKS . 
As we have seen mathematical objects by their very purity and distinct-
ness have a very special appeal. They have one disadvantage though, 
they are quite abstract in quality. It would seem that Burgess and 
I 
McKenzie felt more at home with this type of concept. Park, perhaps 
because of his journalistic background, developed a rich repertoire 
of more concrete images. It is these which add colour to his writings, 
and it was through these images and concepts that he reached out to 
grasp that highly complex entity in which he was involved, the city. 
A great deal of the argumentation proceeds from these concrete analogies. 
Virtually every aspect of their thinking has its support from an analogy. 
It should be understood that the division introduced here between 
analogies based on mathematical type concepts - and those based on 
more concrete images taken from plant and animal ecology is a conceptual 
one. In the writings there is undoubtedly an interrelationship between 
the two types. The natural area concept for instance was, as we have 
suggested above, a mathematical type of concept -but it also had its 
more concrete illustrations, and the easy transference of qualities 
from one to the other, .as we may surmise from Park's treatment of 





What we will be concerned to show here is the logic behind the usage 
of the more concrete types of analogies: those based on plants and 
animals. The basic assumption upon which these analogies are built 
is that there is a common element in the animal (or p·lant )/environment 
relationship and in the man/environment relationship. There are certain 
basic ecological processes discernible in both sets of relationships 
or communities. So far as human society is concerned the ecological 
element is designated the biotic or sub-social aspect. 
It should be remembered that there was in Park's time much prestige 
attached to the "young" sciences of plant and animal ecology which 
. had become "fairly. well established." The frequent and prominent 
mention of this fact in the introductory paragraphs of a number of 
the C.H.E. articles is highly suggestive. There was a tacit acknow-
l~dgement among them that the biological model "seemed to hold the 
best promise as a guide f:or: sociology into the world of science" 
(Reissman,l964:96). No doubt a vicious circle phenomenon operated. 
The more analogies were drawn, the more authentic the argument by 
analogy seemed. \Vhat Park supplied, though, was not merely a series 
of well-chosen metaphors. His genius was to create out of a "suggestive 
analogy" a "socially relevant theory." "Park's purpose was to develop 
· a rationale that would simplify the study of organization and render 
it more amenable to analysis."(Reissman,l964:101). What we wish to 
do here is to expose this rationale. 
b) DEFINITION AND ILLUSTilATION OF THREE TYPES OF ANALOGOUS ARGUMENT. 
Thouless (1953;1958) distinguishes between three types or stages of 
analogous argument. These will be followed here. Thouless' definitions 
are illustrated here with examples from C.H.E. While the main purpose 
of this section is definitional, the examples illustrate the logic of 
the Classical Human Ecologists. 
First, there is the Metaphor or Illustrative Analogy. This is the 
type of argument in which an analogy is used more or less explicitly 
merely for illustrative purposes. Park does this on occasion, for 
instance when he says (~925:156): "the.human creature is a good deal 
of vegetable. This is evident in the invincible attachment of mankind 







to have a home •.• in which to live and vegetate." What he wishes to 
do here is to illustrate concretely man's attachment to specific 
places - and he does this, one imagines with a goodly portion of 
humour. No one (it is imagined) can seriously say "the human 
creature is a good deal of vegetable" without seeming to be making 
a joke. As we shall see, however, Park takes this analogy much further 
than this. 
While one can never be certain with Park, there does seem to be one 
instance at least where an analogy was used at a purely metaphorical 
level. Writing of the social origin of institutions, Park (1939;1952: 
245) held that "every institution may in turn be described as a move-
ment that was once active and eruptive, like a volcano, hut has since 
settled down to something like routine activity." What he wishes to 
do here is merely to illustrate concretely the way in which institutions 
have arisen. While analogy is used on this level there is little 
harm done -in fact, just the opposite, for it makes for entertainment 
and also for easier understanding. Pictures are more readily grasped 
than abstract concepts; and the argument about institutions arising 
from "emergencies" .,then becoming "movements" ~_?d finally "institutions" 
is made that much more easy to follow. Had the metaphor been taken a 
stage further; for instance if it was argued that because erupting 
volcanoes are harmful to human lives just so are "social movements" 
harmful, the analogy would have been pushed too far. Some social 
movements are harmful but a reference to an erupting volcano in this 
context would be grossly misleading. 
Generally there is a serious side to Park's analogies, for he was 
not only a journalist, but a social scientist. In otherwords there 
was more to it than mere entertainment and illustration - and this 
~leads us to consider the next stage. 
Second, Imperfect Analogy. In a sense all analogies are imperfect 
by nature, for as Chambers (1966:}11) has it, analogy means "an 
agreement or correspondence in certain respects between things other-
wise different." Involved in making an analogy is a reasoning from 







Let us follow Thouless' definition (1958:140): 
When .•. we,use a concrete illustration in order to deduce new 
conclusions, it is no longer a mere illustration, it is an 
argument by analogy .•. Reduced to its bare bones, it can be 
expressed as the argument that because N has properties 
~and£ which belong to M, it must have the property c 
which also belongs to M. Displayed like this, the argu-
ment does not sound a very convincing one. 
We have a good illustration of this stage or type of analogous 
argument in the vegetable analogy mentioned above. Man has on occasion 
the property "place stability." He has a home. There is nothing· 
spectacular about this. In this respect he can be likened to a carrot 
in a vegetable patch. To go on to say or imply that because the carrot 
did not consciously choose that particular vegetable patch, just so, 
in a similar mindless manner is a man attached to his home, is to draw· 
an inference which does not square with reality. Certainly, men have 
sometimes strong ambitions to have a home - and their actions in 
acquiring one may seem "irrational" - but men do not relate to homes 
in a mindless manner. A man may choose to live tn a particular place 
because that's where his friends stay. To those who wish to live in 
semi-isolation this may seem "irrational." He may even live in a 
particular place because his wife wishes to be near her mother - and 
there may be a general shaking of the heads of disapproval. If for 
argument's sake he has only one house to which he can go - even then 
his staying there will not be mindless. He might choose to stay there 
rather than sleep in the street or leave town - but the point is that 
he does have the choice. Similar points could be made in the case of 
the man who has a home and for various reasons refuses to leave. The 
main point is that the man has a choice in a way that the carrot does 
not. The carrot has a reciprocal relationship with the soil, it takes 
and, if it is not used in the cooking pot, it stays and dies - it gives. 
Man too takes and gives - and has a reciprocal relationship with his 
environment; but, unlike the carrot, he knows he does. "Human beings 
differ from plants and animals, not only in that they control their 
environment, but also in that they desire to conrol it and that with 
this desire they consciously seek and find the means to create a new 
environment."(Alihan,l938:87). 
Sometimes the argument by analogy has durability. Other times the 






seems to break down early. The point is that for the author it is 
not always easy to detect error. As we shall see Park stretched this 
analogy even further than this. 
Third, Forced Analogy. These Thouless (1958:148) tells us occur often 
in the course of public speeches when emotions are likely to be high -
under these circumstances there is a greater readiness to accept 
"immediately any vivid metaphorical or analogical presentation of a 
matter." In ordinary conversation their looseness of association is 
more likely to be challenged and exposed. 
There was one famous occasion when Park used a forced analogy in 
circumstances similar to those described above Park, well-known for 
his commitment to Negro civil rights, was once faced with a number of 
students who wished to take action against racial discrimination. 
Burgess (Coser,l971:372) relates how he "told them flatly that the 
world was full of ·crusaders. Their role instead was to be that of 
the calm, detached scientist who investigates race relations with 
the same objectivity and detachment with which the zoologist dissects 
the potato bug." Thouless(l958:146) tells us, and we can see how it 
operated here, that "The mere !"act that the argument is in the form 
of an analogy is often enough to force immediate irrational acceptance." 
It may be objected that the underlying factor which gave weight to 
Park's words lay in his well-known sympathy for the cause for which 
the students wished to take action. This is not denied.- \Vhat we are 
interested in is the manner in which this authority was conveyed. 
The point is that the use of analogy in this context of roused feelings 
was effective. The irrationality of the argument - the point that the 
way the zoologist studies the potato bug may have very little to do 
with the way a sociologist studies race relations does not seem to 
have been raised. It may well be that by objective thinking the 
sociologist is performing a vital role - this is not the point - the 
point is that the justification of such action by reference to the 
zoologist is not only unhelpful, it is misleading. The sociologist 
studying race relations. may feel, for .some reason, that intervention 
on his part in a given situation may be justified - the zoologist would 





One imagines that this particular analogy would carry little weight 
in todays campuses- for a variety of reasons not relevant here. 
There is little doubt though that "forced analogies" have taken their 
place in the service of other causes, and that they are found to be 
as effective. 
So much for an initial definition and illustration. It should be 
pointed out that Park and his colleagues hardly ever used analogies 
as, in the latter illustration, mainly for effect. In their academic 
work there is always a more serious intention - and a more elaborate 
one. We will have occasion to point out the use of this type of 
analogy in the more serious work, however. 
B: "TJ-IE CASE OF THE BOLL WEEVIL 
AND THE VOORTREiaillRS. 
It should be remembered that Park's basic concern was explaining the 
phenomenon of the modern city, particularly Chicago. And one of Chicago's 
most impressive features was its growth by immigration. We have already 
had call to mention Burgess' impressions of this (see p.l3); the title 
too of his 1924/1925 paper, The Growth of the City reflects this same 
concern. Park (1929;1952:184), gave expression to this same phenomenon 
of the growing city in the following words; 
In the great cities to which the tide of immigration, 
particularly in these later years, so irresistibly tends, 
great and revolutionary changes, not only in the form but 
in the content of our social life, are evidently taking 
place. 
It is really with this picture of a rapidly expanding Chicago at the 
back of his mind that Park views the historical scene in South Africa. 
It was as he contemplated the successive invasions and settlements, 
Bushmen, Hottentots, Bantu, Boers and English that a (to my mind) 
fanciful analogy occured to him. This analogy occurs in his perhaps 






The description is somewhat elaborate (l936;1952:lq9): 
The boll weevil crossed the Rio-Grand at Brownsville 
in the summer of 1892. ·~ 189q the pest had spread to 
a dozen countties in Texas ... by 1928 it had covered 
practically all the cotton producing area in the United 
States. 
Park (1936;1952:lq9) goes on to say, not, 9ne suspects, without some 
approval: 
(it brough~ destruction to the cotton and great losses 
to the planters •.. The consequences to agriculture were cata-
strophic but not wholly for the worse, since they served to 
give an impulse to changes in the organization of the industry 
long overdue. It also hastened the northward migration of the 
Negro tenant farmer. 
In terms of our formula for "argument by analogy" Park's logic can 
be represented as foll?ws: 
Because the boll weevil has properties: 
(a) movement: 
(b) speed: 
(-c) dominance : 
(d) numerical superiority: 
"(it] crossed the Rio-Grand at Brownsville ... 
Gn~ spread to a dozen countries in Texas" 
within a period of 28 years the boll weevil 
had "covered practically all the cotton 
producing area in the United States." 
"[it brough-f} destruction to the cotton ... 
the consequences to agriculture were 
catastrophic ... " 
"incidently multiplying its population to 
the limit of the territories and resources" 
(Ibid: 150). 




(d) numerical superiority: 
"[they trekked] out into the high veldt 
of the central South African plateau ... " 
" •.. within a period of one hundred years ... " 
"filling it ... with a population of their 
own descendants." 
(implied) ''filling it"; 
it follows that the impersonality and inexorability and disruption with 
which the boll weevil became dominant and populous in Texas also belongs 
("not unlike") to the Boers who settled at one stage in the central and 
northern parts of South Africa. But is this in fact so? 





(a) The inexorable movement imputed to the boll weevil as it "crossed" 
the Rio-Grand, etc. has, in fact, if one thinks about it, very little 
likeness to the Boers who "trekked" to the north in South Africa. In 
a general comment in the same paper introducing the section dealing 
with the boll weevil analogy we are told that (Ibid:ll18), "When the 
pressure of population upon natural resources of the habitat reaches 
a certain degree of intensity, something invariable happens ... the 
population may swarm and relieve the pressure of population by migration." 
No doubt this is an accurate description and explanation of why the 
boll weevil crossed the Rio-Grand - but there is nothing here which 
has any parallel with why the Boers trekked into the interior. It 
was by no means a matter of "pressure of population" that motivated 
the trekboers ·to move away from their easily acquired farms in the 
Cape. Rather it was a mixture of boredom with farming and frustration 
with the cussedness of the Company and its officials, as well as the 
promise of adventure that led them to discover new fields, or even to 
join in the commandos in promoting their interests in land and cattle. 
The causes behind the historic movement of the Voortrekkers which ended 
in their setting up Republics in the North are too well known to be 
mentioned in any great detail here. But by no stretch of the imagination 
was it a matter of "population pressure" - it was rather a matter of 
escaping British rule and a desire for independence and internal 
control of their own affairs. 
Just as it would be-absurd to reverse the analogy and argue that the 
boll weevil had Republican sentimentsP) so is it absurd to argue from 
the inexorability of "pressure of population" seen to be operative in 
the Mexican weevil. There is nothing inexorable about the attitudes 
of the Afrikaners at a particular stage in history - were they inexorable 
there could be no social change - nor could there be any hopes or regrets~ 2 ) 
(l) Park in a later essay (1939;1952:253-LJ:) says "Plant communities do not, 
of course, act collectively as animals do, but the associations they form ... 
do, by diminishing competition within and by resisting invasion from without, 
make more secure the life of the conununity and of the individuals of which 
it is composed." It would seem that Park argues both for and against himself 
here- this issue is pursued in "The Case of the Mindless Vegetable ... etc." 
(2) Park (cf. Turner irr Park,l967:xxxv.iii) shared this belief but does not 
apply it consistently: ''The fact that men can look back with regret to their 
past, and forward with lively expectation to their future, suggests that 
there is ... an amount of tension and sustained suspense which tends to break 





Cultural variability as well as the self-consciousness of a responsible 
act are part of the nature of man. The nature of the boll weevil is 
neither variable in the same manner nor are its acts self-conscious. 
(b) Impersonality. The speed with which the boll weevil moved in and 
took over the cotton fields of America is impressive. Nothing it 
seemed could stand in its way - nor - however much Park may have 
approved of some of the effects - is there any notion that the boll 
weevil concealed within its bosom any rejoicings or regrets at the 
"catastrophic" consequences wrought upon Texan agriculture. And yet 
if the impersonality of this "movement" of "forces" is not greatly 
explicit here it is certainly implicit. 
The notion that "social forces" "may be, and sometimes are, impersonal 
( 
in character" (1936;1952:135) is certainly one of the important beliefs 
of the Chicago school, and is seen in the more revealing analogies 
drawn by other coileagues. Thus Zorbaugh (1926;1961:45) for instance, 
likens the movement of the city to that of a robot which "goes its 
own way indifferent to the will of its creator." The fact that this 
is a forced analogy (for robots are by definition totally obedient 
to man's control - nothing could happen which was not pre-planned)·: 
only adds to the real point of the analogy, namely the mechanical 
and automatic action which is inherently impersonal. Zorbaugh (Ibid) 
tells us therefore, "Candid recognition of the tole of these persons 
and groups [in the city] led writers on social, political and economic 
questions to give them the impersonal designation of !:social forces'." 
Other analogies include, crystal growth (Ibid:42), theatre tickets 
(McKenzie,l926:3l-33), the magnet (McKenzie,l925:70,77)- all illustrate 
the impersonality of "social forces" especially that of growth. This 
search for impersonal law-like principles of course goes back to Malthus 
(Bowen,l954:87) and is in fact a corrollary of the first assumption, 
that of inexorability in the course of ~uman affairs. 
However much the Boers' trek to the N;orth may seem inevitable the 
designation of their actions as impersonal cannot be so easily made. 
For assumed in the argument that the Boers are "not unlike" the boll 
weevil is the inherent capacity of human beings to be reflective and 
rational. Were this not so the argument could not proceed - nor would 




of a contradiction therefore to argue from the inherent impersonal 
properties of the boll weevil to similar characteristics in any group 
of human beings - for the very argument by which it proceeds is its 
own disclaimer. It is not argued here that all men are equally self-
conscious or responsible but it is argued that any description of 
human action, whether corporate or individual, which axiomatically 
omits self-consciousness and therefore choice as a characteristic, 
is erroneous. 
Thus when Park (1936;1952:226) argues that there is an ecological 
"principle" "that the land eventually goes to the race or people 
that can get the most out of it" we have here an example of a commit-
ment to ecology pushed to a logical and absurd conclusion. _Similarly 
Park (Ibid:226) is surely sadly misled when he argues that "The thing 
which makes the settlement of South Africa relevant and significant, 
as an example of succession, is the fact that it seems to represent 
not a casual sequence of events but the consequences of an inexorable 
historical process." In the first place the real bite of the "principle" 
is taken away by the reference to the time factor: "eventually." 
Vagueness at this point contrasts sharply with the many precise references 
to dates and times when describing the advent of the boll weevil in 
Texas. The point is that vagueness here is the price of maintaining 
the principle. It takes away the conditions under which such a 
principle could be tested. If for instance it was argued, as it 
might be argued today (cf. Whisson,l971), that the !Kung bushmen get 
the most out of the land in the long run because of their policy of 
preservation, rather than the short term extractionist policies 
apparent in certain cases of modern industrialized man's activities 
and that therefore they will "eventually" inherit the earth, the 
absurdity of this is readily seen. If they have not possession of 
it now, is it only a matter of time? 
Secondly, while the sequence of events by which Europeans established 
themselves in South Africa may, correctly, not be described as "casual," 
commitment to the idea of colonization was by no means constant nor 
was it inexorable. Wer€ it so the anti-colonial policies recently 
pursued would be an axiomatic i1npossibility. The reference to the 






who "forced," cannot be adequately reduced to impersonal forces at 
the ecological level, for they are inherently personal. Pressed to 
.its logical conclusions the ecological explanation here illustrated 
is, to say the least, misleading. 
(c) Disruption. To return to a point made in the very beginning of 
this example, it must be remembered that while speaking about the 
boll weevil and South African history the real focus of attention 
was Chicago. A number of critics note that Park and his colleagues 
concentrated too heavily upon the forces of disorganization - forces 
which because they were natural were considered beyond the complete 
control of man. It was under impact of these "subversive" forces~l) 
seen in the continuous in-migrat1ons of group upon group of people 
that, for instance, family life was seen to be disrupted, neighbour-
hoods lacking in informal social controls were seen to give rise to 
crime, delinquency, etc., conflict between generations and the breaking 
down of age old traditions was seen to give rise to individualism, and 
so on. Writing about Juvenile Delinquency Park (1925:107) gave a 
heartfelt expression to this situation. 
We are living in such a period of individualization and 
social disorganization. Everything is in a state of 
agitation - everything seems to be undergoing a change. 
Society is, apparently, not much more than a congeries 
and constellation of social atoms. 
The question is whether, "the catastrophic theory of history" set 
forth in the analogy of the boll weevil and the Voortrekkers should 
be elevated to a universal law level: i.e. whether the particular 
sequences of conflicts and of invasion in South Africa has any 
universal status. Alihan, and we agree with her, (1938:181) thinks 
not: 
Whether the reversal of this type of sequence, such as the 
succession of Barbarians in ancient Rome or the Tartar 
invasion of Europe, could also be termed as part of an 
"orderly and irreversible series of events" and as "the 
consequences of an inexorable historical process," or 
whether these would lie outside the process of succession, 
we have no way of telling. No more reason is there to 
maintain that the order of sequence described above [i.e. 
referring to the South African sequence] is of universal 
validi t r. 
(1) Burgess (1925:47): "The profound and 'subversive' forces which 
have wrought these changes are measured in the physical growth and 






But whatever likenesses Park saw between the particular sequences in .. 
Texan agriculture, or in the succession of South African races, 
there is one thing which both phenomena had in common,which, one 
suspects, was a key feature in their attraction :£or Park. Both 
situations could be described by the word "catastrophy." It was the 
conflict and disruptive element which authenticated the analogy. 
One may query whether this focus, or this particular excercise, helped 
Park in coming to grips with Chicago's situation. Possibly it no more 
than reflects the assumptions and impressions Park made of the business 
and economic world; a world in which individualism and the profit 
motive were characteristic of this period. 
C : THE CASE OF THE MINDLESS VEGETABLE 
AND THE VOCATIONLESS HOBO. 
The case discussed above is by no means an exception. The impression 
is gained that analogies are paired so that the opposite case could 
be argued on the basis of another analogy. Thus, for instance, while 
the boll weevil can be used to illustrate mobility and action - the 
vegetable in the garden patch is used to illustrate stability and 
permanence. The present example is chosen because we have here a 
self-contained illustration, and the sequence of arguments by analogies 
is shown more clearly. Also in chosing to discuss it at this point 
it serves to illustrate the complementariness in analogies just noted. 
We have already introduced the preliminaries of this analogy (pp.S0-51) 
- its general structure - and have pointed out where it breaks down. 
We pick up the story from there - so far the argument is pitched at a 
general level. In fact the argument so far was a stepping stone to 
drawing inferences about the "mind of the Hobo" - a subject of one of 
their earliest C.H.E. monographs (Anderson,l923). After the intro-
duction in which it is asserted that man is attached by nature in a 
stable fashion to plac~s, particularly his home, Park (1925:156) goes 
• 
on to state: 
I mention these things merely to emphasize a single 
point, namely, mind is an incident of locomotion. The 
first and most convincing indication of mind is. not 
motion merely, but, as I have said, locomotion. The 
plants don't locomote, don't move through space ... 
And when they do move, they have no goal, no destina-
tion, and that is because they have no imagination. 
In terms of our formula for argument by analogy, Park's argument 
(Ibid:l57-158) proceeds as follows: 
Because vegetables have properties: 
59 
(a) mindlessness: "If the plants have minds, as some 
people assume they do, they must be 
of that brooding vegetative sort ... 
-absorbed in the contemplation of 
their own inner processes." 
(b) not a great deal to contribute: " ... like mystics who, quite 
forgetful of the active world ... " 
which also belong to some men, notably Hobos: 
(a) dullness of mind: 
(b) so little to contribute: 
"Why is it that with all the variety 
of his experiences he still has so 
many dull days? Why, with so much 
leisure, has he so little philosophy? 
"Why, with so wide an acquaintance 
with regions, with men •.• etc •.. has 
he been able to contribute so little 
to our actual knowledge of life?" 
it :follows that goallessness and the having of "no destination" in pla.nts 
is also characteristic of Hobos. But is this not going too far? 
Plants have no destination by virtue of the fact that they are "invincibly'' 
rooted in the soil. The fact is that by nature they cannot have 
destinations. But this tells us very little about the Hobo who has 
no destination not because he cannot, but because he "lacks a vocation." 
In fact the only reason why it is at all worth pointing out that the 
Hobo has no vocation or destination is by virtue of the fact that it 
is not impossible that he, by nature, should have these qualities. 
A basic problem arises because of an ambiguous definition of movement. 
Plants "move" (albeit purposelessly) but as Park pointed out "the most 
convincing indication of mind is not merely motion, but, locomotion." 
However, we are given no clear indication as to how we are to distinguish 
• 
•• 
these two types of movement. Later (1929;1952:189), Park was to 
acknowledge this problem: 
There is, of course, more than one 'vay in which mobility 
may be measured and interpreted. As a matter of fact, 
no wholly satisfactory units or formulas for describing 
these more complex population movements in quantitative 
terms has yet been devised. 
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The point is that P~rk, as well as the other C.H.E.s had committed 
themselves to the notion that movement was an index of social change 
(1925;1952:174). Just how so general a concept as "movement" could 
be used to differentiate qualitative distinctions necessarily involved 
in the analysis of human behaviour was the problem. The distinctions 
suggested by Burgess have already been discussed (cf.pp. 26-30). 
It was shown that the attempt to draw a distinction between "routine 
movements" and "mobility" broke down for lack of qualitative distinctions 
between variables. The same criticism, despite Park's confidence in 
the above quotation ("of course")' can be applied to Park Is attempt 
to draw a distinction between "motion" and "locomotion," as well as 
McKenzie's (1925) suggested distinction between "fluidity" and 
"mobility", the latter being dismissed by Park himself (1929;1952:189). 
In any event, with regard to Park's distinction between mobility and 
locomotion, the analogy drawn between the moving vegetable and the 
Hobo must fall to the ground, as Park seems to indicate himself, by 
pointing out so firmly that plants have no imagination, for only Hobos 
ha~ minds, and "mind is an incident of locomotion." 
Park had the wisdom not only to write the conditions for thi.s analogy's 
death warrant into the introductory formulations - for the ~nalogy 
is obviously a forced one - but he also had the wisdom not to press 
it that extra step further and assert a necessary connection between 
the manner in which the vegetable absorbs sustenance from its surroundings 
and the manner in which the Hobo relied on casual labour provided by 
modern industry. But it is significant that a new analogy is intro-
duced in place of this one at the close of the article: "Nothing could 
better express the spirit of the old frontier which, more than any 
other feature in American life, has served to characterize American 
institutions and American mores. The ·hobo is, in fact, merely a 
belated frontiersman, a frontiersman at a time and in a place whe.n 
the frontier is passing or no longe·r exists." 
I 
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Here the old analogy is discarded for a new one expressing the radically 
opposLte case. While it serves, possibly, as a fine literary conclusion, 
.it is ill-chosen, for while the Hobo and the frontiersman are marked, 
no doubt, by a common "restlessness" they differ in precisely the 
quality upon which Park focused in the previous analogy: vocation; 
for the frontiersman is characteristically a man with a vocation. 
His restlessness arises directly out of it. Had Park used the frontiers-
man as an analogy of the modern businessman he would have been nearer 
the mark. It is Alihan's (1938:6) opinion that "although the frontier 
had given way to a metropolitan economy, the pioneer spirit and tradition 
still persisted. It was a tradition of ... conquest." Attention is 
drawn here to the fact that the cultural heritage played an important 
part in defining the situation for the modern 9usinessman. The image 
of the cowboy is that of the violent self-regarding man. The fact 
that Park could attribute this to the Hobo bespeaks his misreading 
of that situation. 
The question is whether the analogies, especially the vegetable analogy 
with which he started and provided the platform for the discussion, in 
fact gave any new insights in the ways of the Hobo. There is an 
undoubted value at the metaphorical level of these analogies, although 
they are by; no means new ones. But the seriousness of tone and the 
manner in which they were used is in fact counter-productive. Because 
they are far-fetched, and because the unlikenesses are not mentioned, 
the elaboration in fact serves to obfuscate and confuse what understand-
ing he undoubtedly had concerning the Hobo. 
What is of interest in this example is the manner in which two analogies, 
which can be described as complementary, were used. When the first 
analogy no longer could be used to carry the subject matter any further, 
a new one was brought in to replace it. Argument by forced analogy 
in a way generates more of its own kind. 
- .,. 
D: THE CASE OF THE TALL PINE AND THE DOHINANT C . B.D. 
(Central Business District) 
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Unlike the previous two cases the argument based on· the ~nalogy of 
the tall pine - a convenient abbreviation for the plant community -
is spread throughout the writings 9f the C.H.E.s. In reproducing 
the argument therefore there is not only the danger that violence is 
done to the context in which various passages occur, but also the 
selection of passages can be subject to bias. Previous writers dealing 
with the C.H.E. approach have felt the same difficulty. Alihan (1938: 
xii), for instance, while testifying to a great difficulty in "seeking 
a coherence between the different concepts" nevertheless notes that 
because of generally shared assumptions that it was'"essential to 
deal with the school as a whole rather than with the individual 
contributions." There are various methods of coping with this. For 
instance, one can limit one's references to one author as I have 
tended to do here, although in doing so the representativeness of 
the solidarity with which a view was held suffers in consequence. 
Perhaps, it is worth noting, therefore, in parenthesis, that so far 
as this analogy was concerned, its impact can be felt in the references 
and the types of argument in other writers: e.g. McKenzie,l925;7q; 
Zorbaugh,l926;196l:q7. 
Another more important note must be made - in following the logical 
course we have set ourselves in which argume~t based on major theory 
generating concepts is traced, the argument shown here is artificially 
simplified. Following the ecological line of argument we have abstvacted 
one half of a complex presentation. In doing so we have followed . 
Hollingshead (l9q7, in Theodorson,l961:111) who noted that the "impersonal 
competitive relations as defined by classical ecologists .are so inter-
twined with personal cooperative ones it is only by abstraction that 
. l 
we are able to separate the one from the other." Furthermore, this 
separation is based on the dichotomous distinction Park himself drew 
between competition and the other social processes, conflict, accomo-
dation, and assimilation which were said to be culturally and consciously 
conditioned. Park is bewildering because at times he tries to say 
two things at the same "time. On the one hand he affirmed that 
competition could be equally discerned in plant and human communities, 
on the other he maintained that competition was always veiled by a 
~· 
cultural overlay (more particularly discerned in the other three 
social processes). For the moment though we follow the ecological 
line of argument in which impersonal competition, which was held to 
flourish in naked form in the plant community, was also seen to 
flourish 'in the city, more particularly in the economic sector. 
Much attention was given to this phenomenon and there is little 
difficulty in abstracting the argument -this suggests, possibly, 
that little, if any, injustice to the C.H.E.s is done in such a 
representation. 
The assertion of similarity between the plant and human communities 
is more or less tacitly assumed. Thus in the chapter on "Competition" 
in Park and Burgess I Introduction to the s·ocial Sciences' 1921; 1969/1970: 
185, we are told in the opening sentence in a matter of fact way that 
"Competition, as a universal phenomenon, was the first clearly conceived 
and adequately described by the biologists." Here again, (cf. p.}6 
above) it would seem that it is an argument by prestige. Upon this 
basis the inevitable consequences are merely observed - that the 
"struggle for·existence" formula has become a commonplace; and that 
the economists of the eighteenth century were the first to attempt 
to rationalize and justify a social order based on competition. 
Another step in the logic is at the same time implicitly argued -
and that is the association or identity between the competition 
of the economic theorists and the competition of the biologists. 
In the same chapter Park (Ibid:l88) can conclude a section in 
which the focus of attention has been on impersonal relations 
obtaining in the business world with these words: 
The plant community is the best illustration of the 
type of social organization that is created by competitive 
co-operation because in the plant community competition is 
unrestricted. 
So far our observations have been based on the 1921 chapter. That 
this was a view which Park maintained throughout his subsequent career 
can be judged from the following words taken from an article published 
nearly twenty years later: 
In fact one thing that makes the study of plant and animal 
associations interesting is that plant and animal conimunities 
so frequently exhibit, in strangely different contexts, forms 
of association that are fundamental! like those with which 





While the likeness suggested above is accomplished in remarkably 
short space the degree of detail concerning the features of the plant 
community and the business community is not skimped on. Passages 
from various writers, mostly biologists and economists are quoted 
at some length, exhibiting their views on competition and its 
functions. In an Appendix (l)the authors, and their works, and the 
manner in which they were classified is reproduced. It should be 
born in mind, in receiving an impression on this basis, that these 
"adaptations" are all taken from one chapter. Other chapters have 
a similar composition. Throughout Park's subs'equent writings 
particularly those published in the Thirties, reference is made to 
these authors and quotations from their wTitings is reproduced ~nd 
inco7porated into Park's thought in an even more integrated fashion. 
There are a number of grounds upon which a likeness between plant 
and human communities seem to suggest themselves. Had Park been more 
explicit about the basis of this analogy he might have been more 
hesitant in his argumentation. For instance, both the city and the 
plant community, especially the forest community, are apparently 
sharply bounded; again, both the city and the forest community are 
marked by various strata or layers or types: trees at the top and 
ferns growing beneath suggested, it would seem, the.same sort of 
superordinate-subordinate relationships between the "top dogs" of 
the business world, and the workers. 
The three passages below are chosen as being suggestive of the above 
interpretation. The first pass~ge is a more general reference - the 
following two are more particular. 
-The plant ecologist is aware of the· effect of the struggle 
for space, food, and light upon the nature of a plant 
formation, but the sociologist has failed to recognize 
that the same processes of competition and accomodation 
are at work determining the size and ecological 
o;rganization of the' human community. (McKenzie,l925:64) 
An explicit linkage should not be sought for in the two following 
passages; as we have mentioned this was largely assumed. These 
two passages are singled out for 1i1ention as they both focus on the 
(1) See Appendix on page 144. 
~· 
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importance of tallness. Reissman (1964:100) has summarized the 
association as follows: "The tallest trees .•. are the dominants in 
a biotic community. In the urban community, industry and commerce 
are dominants in much the same way." 
In a plant community this dominance [of one speciejV 
is ordinarily the result of struggle among the 
different species for light. In a climate which 
supports a forest the dominant species will 
invariably be trees ... "Light being the main necessity 
of plants, the dominant plant of a community is the 
tallest member, which can spread its green energy-
trap above the heads of others ... " (Park,l936;1961:25) 
There seems to be a very direct relation bet,.reen the.: size 
of the city and the area which it dominates,_ politically, 
culturally, or commercially. In fact, cities as well as 
the area of which they are the centers grow at the same 
time and in something like the same extent on the 
periph•:!ries and at the centers. Thus there is a very 
definite relation between the height of buildings at 
the business center and the limits of the surrounding 
suburban areas, between land values and trading areas. 
(Park,l936;1952:136). 
There is little doubt that Park welc.omed the "impersonal competition" 
which he identified with "the struggle for existence" doctrine 
suggested by Darwin as obtaining in plant and animals. Setting aside 
the qualification that competition was reduced by a cultural overlay, 
Park (1936;1952:228) explicitly states: "Economic competition, as 
one meets it in human society, is the struggle for existence, as 
Darwin conceived it, ... it is not different from competition as it 
exists in plant and animal communities." 
As Park saw it (1936;1952:25) competition gave rise to two principles, 
or functions - dominance and succession - and these operated to establish 
communal order. Park honoured each of these ecological processes 
with individual articles -both published in the Thirties. Reference 
to these processes are however found throughout his writings. 
Succession was the subject of the first case considered in this chapter, 
and we pass over it without further comment. Dominance, however, was 
more closely linked with the economic aspect of the industrialized 
city arid occupies our a.ttention in thi's case. The question is: what 
was it about dominance that Park found attractive? There are a 





everywhere the same. It is to stabilize, to maintain order, and 
permit the growth of structure in which that order and the corres-
,ponding functions are embodied"(l934;1952:162 see also 1934;1952:160). 
These may be conveniently reduced to two, and will be considered in 
reverse order: 
{a) The permitance of growth of structure: 
Perhaps the.most important feature which attracted Park lay on the 
other side of competition - the Darwinian doctrine. of natural selection. 
Because of the "struggle for existence" an adaptation took place 
whereby.any variation however small which had proved useful to j;he 
individual in this struggle against his fellows or the environment, 
was preserved in the line of evolution and passed on to its offspring. 
In short, it was the fittest that survived. Applied to the modern 
city this meant, because of the competition, a search for new forms, 
for better adaptations, could take place. Writing about juvenile 
delinquency ( 1925: l 09) and how it should be tackled he says: 
In order to meet and deal with the problems that have been 
created by the rapid changes of modern life, new organizations 
and agencies have sprung into existence. The older social 
agencies, the church, the school, and the courts, have not 
always been able to meet the problems which new conditions 
of life have created ... New agencies have been necessary to 
meet new conditions. Among these .•. are the juvenile courts, 
juvenile protective associations, parent-teachers' associa-
tions, Boy Scouts, Young Men's Christian Associations settle-
ments, boys' clubs of various sorts ..• playgrounds and play-
ground associat~ons ... Largely on the basis of the experiments 
which these new agencies are making, a new social science is 
coming into existence ... sociology is ceasing to be a mere 
philosophy and is assuming more and more the character of an 
empirical, if not an exact, science. 
The excitement, with which the biologist observed new forms emerging 
in a long line of evolution, was passed on to the sociologists. The 
idea that new agencies had "sprung into existence" to meet new 
conditions was certainly inspiring - and in this spirit of adventure 
Park made encouraging remarks with regard to the energies expended 
in the setting up of playgrounds. Reference is made to "experiments" 
which carries with it the notion of inventiveness - sociology in its 
emergence is seen as interrelated witli the other new forms. And yet, 
it may be asked, if these new forms sprung into existence as it were 
on its own steam, was it really necessary to experiment and research 
.. 
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and investigate? If the problem was one which had "its sources in 
conditions over which ... we have litte control"( Ibid: 110) what 
difference would increasing our "present knowledge" make? 
One's optimism or pessimism is no doubt a function of one's own experience. 
After all, Park was not (it is presumed) personally involved in running 
the playgrounds. He could pursue the logic of his premises more 
thoroughly (and devastatingly) in terms of the newspaper to which he 
had earlier committed himself in an idealistic fashion. There is 
the possibility that he subsequently thought better of an activist 
approach~!) It was in terms of the newspaper that he argued with 
admirable consistency on the basis of the plant and animal analogy 
that competition was a non-conscious process. 
The consequence of this belief led to adopting a passive stance with 
regard to the organization of economic structures - and, more broadly, 
city governmental organization. This contrasted strongly with his 
life style. Two things should be born in mind about this: 
(l) We are dealing here with only one ~alf -albeit a predominant half -
of his more complex overall stance; 
(2) His career actions, especially with regard to establishing sociology 
as an autonomous discipline with recognition in the academic and public 
worlds can hardly de described as passive! As so many authors testify, 
he took the bull by the horns. (Cf. Coser,l971:381~384). 
The manner in which the ecological commitment skewed Park's institutional 
analysis is well displayed in his analysis of the modern newspaper. 
He writes (1923;1925:80) as follows: 
The press, as it exists, is not, as our moralists sometimes 
seem to assume, the wilful product of any little group of 
living men. On the contrary, it is the outcome of a historic 
process in which many individuals participated without fore-
seeing what the ultimate product of their labours was to be. 
(1) Park (1921;1969/1970:47): "We have been seeking to reform human 
nature while at the same time we refused to reckon with it. It has been 
assumed that we could bring about social changes by merely formulating 
our wishes, that is, by 'arousing' public opinion and formulating legisla-
tion. This is the 'democratic' method of effecting reforms ... What 
reconciled men to it was that, like Christian Science, it frequently 
vorked." The point is that, as Burgess noted (p.ll above) it more 
frequently did not. See also the advice he gave to student would-be-





At face value he starts with what would appear to be a contradiction 
of what is obviously the case; and as an introductory statement, it 
has the merit of rousing interest. This is of course commendable 
provided that the initial "cognitive dissonance" is immediately 
dispelled. And this, in good journalistic style, is what Park appears 
to proceed to do. Having claimed that the newspaper is not the product 
of a group of living men, he goes on to qualify this by stating that 
it is, on the contrary, the outcome of a historical process. The 
reader would then conclude that the phrases "as it exists" and "living 
men" were meant to be taken in a specialized sense - and as such there 
is little to quarrel with. Certainly it would be generally accepted 
that the present product is in fact the result of a cumulative effort 
of generations of men - and that the status quo does not merely 
represent the achievement of those presently involved; for they did 
not build it up from scratch, but rather entered into a tradition. 
The reaction of the ordinary reader would possibly be - so what? 
But Park's intention is deeper than this, for, as one reads further, 
he appears to be saying that the newspaper is not the outcome of the 
conscious efforts of men, period. And it is this assumption that 
needs to be questioned. To be sure, "No one sought to make it what 
it is" (Ibid:80)(my emphasis), but this does not mean, necessarily, 
that no one did. It may indeed be true that not all involved knew 
what the "ultimate product" would be, but this does not necessarily 
mean that some men in previous generations did not have a vision 
of what the newspaper might one day become. It may be agreed that 
this vision, when it is boiled down to certain specific thinkers, 
only roughly approximates what now obtains, but this is no reason 
for dismissing what was surely an essential contribution to what 
came to be. Yet this is precisely what Park does: "In spite of 
all the efforts of individual men and generations of men to control 
it and to make it something after their own heart, it has continued 
to grow and change in its own incalculable ways."(Ibid:80). 
In :!larked contrast to the discussion: which emerged when thinking 
about playgrounds, we see what it really means when a new form or 
organization springs into existence. Instead of the emphasis falling 
• 
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on experimentation and innovation, we are told that the new form grows 
and changes in ways despite the control atten1pts of men. As Alihan 
(1938:86) remarks: "Even when ecologists do distinguish between the 
natural and the planned, it seems that the planned phenomena eventually 
take their natural course of development." It is plain that the C.H.E.s 
lost sight of the volitional aspect of human behaviour. 
(b) To maintain order and stability. 
So far we have seen how a commitment to Darwinian notions not only led 
Park to search for new structures, but it also led him away from a 
direct and conscious involvement in the creating of new institutional 
structures. We noted a similar orientation in the second chapter 
when dealing with natural areas. Park's ecological commitment led 
him to seek solutions to the political malfunctioning of city govern-
ment in the redefinition of voting areas - and not with the political 
institutional structures themselves. Apart from the intellectual 
commitment to ecology, there would seem to be a further reason why 
Park would only go "so far and no further" in his search for new 
structures. Mention has already been made with regard to the sense 
of alarm felt by tqe C.H.E.s (see p. 57) and their consequent focus 
on social disorganization. In the midst of a society in flux an 
appropriate response might well be to search for stability and order. 
Inventiveness and creativity would seem to require a certain security 
from which to launch out. What with the old traditions dying, or 
seeming to, a sudden death, and new social movements springing-up 
alongside like volcanoes, any search for new forms would require a 
prophet-like insight into.what of the old would endure -and what of 
the new would become institutionalized into the order of the future. 
This stability Park saw as emerging from the forces of competition 
and domination: 
Under the influence of an intensified competition, and the 
increased activity which competition involves, every 
individual and every species, each for itself, tends to 
discover the particular niche in the physical and living 
environment where it can survive and flourish with the 
greatest possible expansiveness consistent with its 
necessary dependence upon its neighbours. (1936;1961:27}. 
In other words, as Park (1939;1952:253) observed in terms of the plant 
community: "as each species finds its niche in the community, competition 




a "passive resistance" may be noted to operate so as to reinforce 
the structtire, "resisting invasion from without" and reinforcing 
the accommodative relationships established within. In plants we 
are told, this "limitation of competition" is "purely external." 
There are a number of passages in which this argument is extended 
by analogy: 
(a) to the city as a whole (1936;1961:25-26): 
The area of dominance in any community is usually the area 
of highest land values. Ordinarily there are in every 
large city two such positions of highest land value -
one in the central shopping district, the other in the 
central banking area. From these points land values 
decline at first precipitantly and then more gradually 
toward the periphery of the urban community. It is 
these land values that determine the location of social 
institutions and business enterprises ... 
The so-called natural or functional areas of a metropolitan 
community- for example, the slum, the rooming-house area, the 
central shopping section and the banking center - each 
and all owe their existence directly to the factor of 
dominance, and indirectly to competition. The struggle 
of industries and commercial institutions for a strategic 
location determines in the long run the main outlines of 
the urban community ... 
Thus the principle of dominance, operating within the limits 
imposed by the terrain and other natural features of the loca-
tion, tends to determine the general ecological pattern of 
the city and the functional relation of each of the different 
areas of the city to all others. 
(For further detail see 1929;1952:190-191; 1939,1952:119; 
McKenzie,l925:73-79; Park l939;1952:ll9f). 
(b) Not only were the locations of whole "natural areas" determined 
by this force but also "every individual member of the community is 
driven, as a result of competition with every other, to do the thing 
he can do rather than the thing he would like to do (1925;1952:67) 
(authors emphasis). In short, dominance operated across the whole 
macro-micro range. 
A p9ssible summary of the above argumentation might be as follows: 
The greater the competition, the greater (in the long run) the dominance; 
the greater the dominance, the greater (in the long run) the consequent 
order and stability. Assuming this summary to be accurate two rather 
interesting passages are explained. Writing in 1939 when there was 
considerable concern about the outbreak of World War II (it is presumed 
)t 
that this is the "turmoil" to which he refers) Park states: 
The human is not essentially different from the plant 
community. I should like to add, if the comment were not 
wholly irrelevant, that it is a comfort in these days of 
turmoil and strife to realize that society and human beings, 
when in repose, do retain and exhibit some of the dignity 
·and serenity of plants. (1939;1952:21±1). 
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In other words Park would appear to be arguing that inasmuch as the 
present turmoil is the result of "competition" comfort may be gained 
from the fact that in a well dominated organic community peace is 
always the .E;md result. A time of turmoil thus, when settled, leads 
to "dignity and serenity." 
Similarly, after noting that in the business world competition meant 
"interaction without social contact," he goes on to affirm that there 
is some substance in the popular sayings that one "must not mix 
business with sentiment" or that "business is business," or that 
"corporations are heartless." In fact "it is just because corporations 
are 'heartless' that is to say, impersonal, that they represent the 
most advanced, efficient, and responsible form of business organization." 
(1921;1969/1970:188). The linking of efficiency to responsibility is 
explained by the general approval Park gave to order. The greate·r the 
efficiency and therefore impersonal competition, the greater the 
resultant interdependent co-operation (symbiosis) or "common welfare." 
Four questions may be asked of the assumptions and argumentation 
in the above analogy. 
(1) Can the competition of the biologists be identified with the 
competition which obtains in human society particularly that noted 
to occur in commerce and industry? 
This question is usefully tackled in two stages: 
(a) Is the transference of the impersonality of relationship supposedly 
characteristic of pla~t and animal life to relationships among human 
beings in the economic sector of society, legitimate? The question 
of impersonality as an appropriate description of human action has 
already been discussed in this chapter (PP55-56 ) and the points raised 
there can be equally transferred to th'is case. What is new in this 
case is the specific reference to the business ~ector which has often 




a 9ommonplace that sociologists have drawn attention to the importance 
of informal and personal relationships in the most formal of structures • 
A background note is pertinentat this point. It should be remembered 
that in large part the theorizing of the C.H.E.s can be said to 
represent the confluence .of two streams of thought- Social Darwinism 
and Classical Economics. Both gained prominence in the nineteenth 
century, and both explain human actions in terms of impersonal 
competition {as Park himself indicated, see p.63). Darwinism provided 
the aspect of unrestrained fierceness in the competition, either among 
individuals of the same species, or between species, in the battle 
for survival in the face of scarce resources. Classical Economics 
provided a view of "economic man" in which individuals or groups of 
individuals sought always to maximize profits, and in doing so 
rationally by division of labour and specialization. Prominent 
also was the laissez-faire thesis, a belief that a stable equilibrium 
of social and economic interests would automatically arise - or that 
given the elimination of government or political interference a 
perfect equilibrium of power would develop. This was argued on the 
grounds of a belief that an interdependency among different parts 
would make for the benefit of the whole while at the same time allowing 
the individual parts to flourish. These two doctrines combined in 
the thinking of the C.H.E.s in such a way that an easy transference 
from ecological competition and dominance, to competition in commerce 
and industry, was made. 
A basic problem about this implied identity in the transference may 
be raised by conceding for the sake of argument that there may be 
a difference in degree in impersonal relationships going from plants 
to animals to humans in an ever increasing degree of complexity. 
But at ' ~me stage the question must be raised, would there not 
also be a difference in kind as well? Alihan (1938:87) points out 
that the Darwinist "absolutist assumption" is that "of a constant 
unchanging nature, where evolution is approached as a simple additive 
process ... Can reality," she asks, "social reality in particular, be 
reasonably interpreted .in terms of 'more' or 'less', especially if 
we seek to interpret the 'more' by the 'less' and not vice versa?" 




relations to those said to obtain in plants and animals is that it 
is reductionist, the more evolved aspect been seen as rooted in the 
less evolved. What is missed is that "cultural factors play a role 
in the point where impersonality makes its appearance in human 
affairs" (Martindale,l958:50). Even were it conceded that there may 
be a difference in degree, so far as "impersonal competition" was 
concerned, the total situation and not only the struggle, would be 
different. This means that impersonal or unconscious relationships 
at the animal or plant level when fused.with consciousness at the 
human level (at varying degrees) involves so great a transformation 
that the analogy becomes "worthless." Alihan's (1938:87) conclusion 
is worth quoting in full: 
The competition of plants for soil and water has no 
corresponding factual process in the competition of 
human beings within any physical area. Since any 
crowding is translated into conscious struggle in 
human groupings, where the very expression and 
methods of competition are not only conditioned 
and complicated by consciousness but also are 
actually determined by it, is it possible to speak 
of biotic competition among men? 
(b) Is it possible, on the basis of an analogy drawn from plant and 
animal life, to abstract certain common external manifestations .from 
human behaviour? In the first place the point must n~eds be made 
that there is no objection to this suggestion in principle though the 
difficulties involved would be great. Alihan's (1938:88) opinion is 
that were this to be done a "civilizational aspect of society as 
against its cultural facets" might be studied. V..'hether it would be 
possible to do this in such a way that the impersonal elements in a 
relationship be identified and the volitional aspects be left on 
one side is another question - and one which so far as the attempt 
made by the C.H.E.s are concerned, must be answered in the negative. 
(Cf. Alihan,l938:161). 
(2) Can any social institution arise despite "the efforts of individual 
men and generations of men to control it"? 
One's point of departure is crucial. ~f potency is given to non-conscious 
factors in explaining the emergence of social structures then as we 
saw in the previous chapter in the case of Zorbaugh (p. 35), Burgess 






of this position to assume either a weak ameliorative role or a purely 
dependent and passive one. The crucial consequence of this bias, 
which we see strongly put in Park's analysis of the.modern newspaper 
is that, as Janowitx (1969/1970:xvi) has it "they viewed these 
political elements as derivative or epiphenomenological. They could 
not see political institutions as having independent consequences." 
As we pointed out earlier, this view though was seldom expressed in 
pure form - hence the defensive remarks with regard to categorizing 
Park as a biological determinist. 
Coser's (1971:363) defence is perhaps the mildest. He merely points 
out that Park was fully aware "that while human communities exhibited 
an ecological or symbiotic order quite similar to that of nonhuman 
communities, they also participated in a social and moral order that 
had no counterpart on the nonhuman level." Reissman (1964.:95) states 
that "Park, turned to the biological sciences with cautious enthusiasm" 
and unlike some, the C.H.E.s were "never carried away completely by 
a view that social phenomena could be explained by biological concepts." 
This opinion is however qualified immediately afterwards by noting 
that while Park was not among ~hose who "became slaves" of a popular 
Darwinism - nevertheless "he came close to them at times in his 
ecological theory, and these instances were responsible for the final" 
weakness of his theory"(Ibid:96). What is evident in these remarks 
is a reluctance to make Park out to be a simple biologizer. The point 
is that it should not be denied, as Coser indicates, that Park or the 
C.H.E.s had an awareness of social and cultural phenomena -this point 
will be dealt with in the next chapter. But it is surely possible 
to have both a high awareness of social and cultural phenomena, and 
at the same time to give a primacy to ecological principles in their 
interpretation. Reissman's remark draws attention to the dilemma 
which the C.H.E.s faced as being sociologists committed to ecological 
principles. At any rate there is little doubt that they regarded 
the ecological aspect as an excellent starting-off point. The point 
is that this can make all the difference - for it is difficult to 
see how, once potency is given to non-cultural or non-consensus 
elements' a biological ·determinis~ can be avoided; 
~It is no~ easy to see how the ecologists can avoid the 
trap of biological determinism. So long as the ecologist 




the same principles that guide organization in plant and 
animal aggregates, he confronts the same choice he has always 
faced: either he must be content to use ecology as a method 
subsidiary to a more sociologically based theory, or he must 
revert to some form of biological determinism. The dilemma 
cannot be avoided, given the primary assumptions upon which 
ecology depends for its identity. (Reissman,l96q:ll9). 
(3) Does efficiency in competition and domination always mean responsible 
action? 
Writing about the modern ("as it exists") newspaper Park maintains 
that it is the "outcome of a historic process in which many individuals 
participated without foreseeing what the ultimate product would be." 
The question to be asked here is whether the modern newspaper - as it 
exists - is the "ultimate product"? Should this be answered in the 
affirmative, the question would then be - in what sense is it "ultimate"? 
Has it stopped developing? Has it reached perfection? Has it reached 
an all time ~igh? If the answer is answered in the negative, the 
question then is by what criteria will the "ultimate product" be judged? 
The reason why these questions are asked is that it would seem that 
what we are presented with here is a doctrine of progress which was 
popular in the nineteenth century and can be closely related with 
Darwinism - the notion that what comes later in time is necessarily 
better. The unsatisfactoriness of this type of proposition may be 
judged from the fact that despite the increasing efficiency of the 
newspaper ("Humanly speaking the present newspapers are about as 
good as they can be."l925:97) -Park decided to leave. In Burgess' 
(1964;1967:3) words: "Dr. Park found that, while newspaper publicity 
aroused a great deal of interest and stirred the emotions of the 
public, it did not lead to constructive action. He decided that some-
·thing more than news was needed." His break with newspaper reporting 
led eventually to a successful academic career. Unfortunately 
"constructive action" apart from suggesting efficiency (!) is not 
very enlightening, but one is left with the impression that it was 
not merely on grounds of efficiency alone that the modern newspaper 
was being judged. 
The problem about this position is that instead of tackling head-on 
the problem of where the process is progressing to, process itself 
is absolutized. Had this problem been tackled more weight might have 
I 
been attached to the visions, however paltry, of earlier generations 
and the power they exercised in terms of prophesy fulfilment. Just 
.as it is impossible to tell whether progress or r.etrogress is being 
made without a fixed point of reference or an end in terms of which 
advancement can be reckoned, so it is with responsibility. Apart 
from a nostalgic looking-back to the past in which the village 
newspaper served the function of gossip and therefore the building up 
of ~ommunity, we are not given any idea of what in the present circum-
stances the newspaper might become. There is the vague reference to 
the effect that "if the newspapers are to be improved, it will come 
through the education of the people and the organization of political 
information and intelligence" (1925:97). However, this point is left 
hanging in the air. It is thus that he ends 'on a defeatist note: 
"What then is the remedy for the existing condition of the newspapers? 
There is no remedy;'·' (Ibid). It would seem that efficient progress 
by competition was questioned, yet there seems to be no reas,on why 
experiments and inventors which had marked the history of the news-
paper for two centuries (of which Park had given an admirable account 
in this very article) should suddenly come to an end. 
(4) Does it make sense to speak of plants being in "passive resistence"? 
Does it make sense to describe what is by definition an imperso~l force 
as "responsible"? 
The strength of the Darwinian influence is not to be underestimated, 
nor the potency attached to the "competition" concept~ Schnore (1965:10) 
defending Durkheim (who was seen to occupy a similar position to that 
of Park as a macro-sociologist) queries whether, in Durkheim's reference 
to competition as a vital mechanism in the process of differentiation, 
there is any substance in the allegation that he was guilty of "biological 
reductionism." The defence is most enlightening: 
This question can be answered best by recalling the explanatory 
concepts that he employed (i.e. dynamic density and competition). 
Both refer to interaction and can hardly be called intrinsically 
biological constructs without stretching the meaning of "bio-
logical" to the point where it loses all discriminatory value. 
If anything, these are clearly sociological concepts. 
If Schnore can defend Durkheim with such an argument in 1965 then how 





In what is often taken to be Park's most authorative statement on 
"Human Ecology"(l936) he speaks of "competitive co-operation" as being 
a "sociological principle." Thus for Darwin this sociological principle 
constituted the "first clue to the formulation of his theory of 
evolution':; 1;1nd Thompson is quoted as saying, "He [Darwir0 projected 
on organic life a sociological idea ... thus vindicated the relevancy 
~nd utility of a sociological idea within the biological realm" (1936; 
1961:23). In a section headed The Web of Life he uses Darwin's illustra-
tion of the cats and clover to give substance to the interlinkedness 
(co-operation) and the "struggle-for-existence" (competition) therein 
discerned. And it is within this context that he claims these 
principles to be "sociological." 
A possible explanation of this extension of the term sociological to 
biological referents lies in the notion of evolution wherein all reality 
is reduced to an amorphous flow - and what applies to one stage applies 
to all. Should this be the case then ~hat is indicated is a possible 
extension of the discussion arising out of the third question above. 
What, it may be asked, are the criteria used in establishing the 
progression of evolution? If plant and animal relationships can be 
described as "social" then in what way can the emergence of man (for 
instance) be said to mark an advancement? Alihan (1938:80-81) spells 
out the confusion and inconsistency with which Park employed the term 
"social." 
Our formula for argument by analogy can be employed here for purposes 
of clarification. It would seem that the argument proceeds as follows: 
(a) Because the human community has properties 
(1) interdependence · 
(2) mutual benefit of individual units 
through interaction, 
also to be found in plants and animals, it therefore follows that 
responsible action, and self-conscious reaction such as passive 
resistence, found in huamn communities, can also be extended to plant 
and animal communities. 
Before raising objections let us note that what is not being objected 
to is the fact that such a term should be extended in this way. For 





interdependency meant a sharing of community spirit. The fact that 
a given species while taking from the web-of-life, which constitutes 
.its environment, sustenance which allows it to grow to full potentiality, 
yet at the same time in one way or another, contributes to the sustenance 
of other organisms in the food cycle, and promotes the increase in the 
energy flow and complexity, may well be seen as a "community." 
Furthermore the analogy once extended may be reversed so that an 
argument as such may develop: 
(b) Because plant and animal communities which are seen to flourish 
have properties 
e qui li bri urn 
domination, 
which are also noted to occur in human communities, it follows that 
peace, dignity and tranquility found in plant communities can also 
be found to emerge in human communities in the same way. Again, it 
needs to be said that, while the reverse extension of the concept 
from plant to human communities may be more suspect, there is in 
principle no objection to this argument. 
While there is no objection to argument by analogy in principle there 
is always the danger of fallacy and the following objections may be 
raised against Park's usage: 
(i) Gettys (1940;1961:100) accuses Park of a "crude anthropomorphism." 
Here he objects to the first of the arguments from humans to plants. 
The point he makes is that in the borrowing process the concept is 
"stripped down unti 1 it remains barren of all those qualities 
considered as social": 
Piercing together fragmentary definitions we are led to 
conclude that "community" is essentially a population, 
territorially distributed and arranged, "rooted in the 
soil," and having its individual units living in a 
symbiotic relationship (state of mutual interdependence) 
with each other. Paradoxically, it is devoid of communi-
cation and consensus. It is characterized by competition 
on the level of struggle for existence, very much as it 
is found in the plant and animal level. 
It may well be true that the greater the complexity in plant communities 
the greater its survival capacity- but to argue that the members of 
which it is composed exhibit "passive resistence" when under attack 




depending on the circumstances and the personalities involved, whereas 
feedback systems operate automatically in plant communities. 
Similarly in the use of the term "community." It may well be that 
interdependency and mutual benefit between certain species may occur -
but to argue that plants and animals in such relationships have 
shared values and "consensus" is to loose sight of what is involved 
in these terms at the human level. As Gettys points out the plant 
community is devoid of communication - at least, let it be said, the 
type of symbolic verbal communication ordinarily presupposed as 
necessarily involved in reaching consensus based upon shared values. 
Fallacy arises, not at the point where the term is used within a specific 
discipline, but when the term is used indiscriminately and interchangeably. 
(ii) Similar objections may be raised against the reverse argument in 
which a concept having been altered in its essential meaning in an 
initial borrowing is used to throw light on the original image. Thus 
in the case of the "equilibrium" noted to arise as a consequence of 
"dominance" in plant communities it may well be appropriate, because 
of the increased energy flow and the consequent "flourishing" of the 
participating members, to speak of "peace" and "dignity" and "tran-
quility"; applied to human communities such thinking is suspect. 
Certainly it will not be denied that where "dominance" occurs in 
human society there may well be a stable order; but to go on to speak 
of peace, tranquility, and dignity may well be anathema. In human 
communities great disproportions of power may lead to efficiency, to 
"increased energy flow" and complexity, as in the slave economy in the 
old American South (or in the system of migratory labour in our own 
country); but such a community may also be said to be unjust. Such 
a term could hardly be used in terms of the plant community. Could 
the tall pines by "hogging" the major portion of the sunlight, be 
said to be perpetrating an injustice on the ferns below? 
Again, while it may be desirable in plant communities to "manage" an 
equilibrium, nothing equivalent to democracy could ever be said to take 
place - for democracy is a self-conscious act. No plant community could 
ever be said to have worked out a constitution so as to prevent tyranny, 
• 
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to work towards a balance of powers so as to promote peace, or to 
work out a system of incorporation so thatall its members might have 
dignity. In human communities, unlike plant communities, such 
political devices could never emerge unself-consciously; in short, 
humans are, unlike plants, political creatures • 
E: REVIEWING THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE THREE CASES 
However fanciful the analogies may seem to us, they do have metaphoric 
value. Reissman (1964:93) bears witness to this in the opening words 
of his critical chapter: "Human ecologists, by the productivity of 
their research and by the caliber of their theoretical essays, have 
contributed much to our understanding of the city._ In spite of its 
errors, ecology still is the closest we have come to a systematic 
theory of the city. So potent and so pervasive was the ecological 
point of view that it is fair to say that urban sociology in America 
really began with the ecologists." 
Three positive aspects might be enumberated as follows: 
(a) It aided Park and his fellow C.H.E.s to articulate their ideas 
about the city in which they lived. However clumsy the articulation 
it marked an essential beginning point. 
(b) The ecological framework was not only popular, ~ut it provided 
the vehicle for objective thinking - or at least the desire or goal 
of thinking objectively. The notion that there were basic underlying 
laws which needed only to be discovered leant an enthusiasm to their 
strivings. Another positive aspect of this approach was the deter-
mination not to lapse into mere moralism. 
(c) The ecological framework provided a context within which research 
workers from many diverse backgrounds could work and share points of 
view. It provided, in .otherwords, a language of discourse. 
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F: ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 
The above discussion forms the material from which a number of issues 
are identified. In defining the issues and referring in summary fashion 
to the above discussion, some additional comment is made. The numerical 
order follows on from the previous chapter. 
9. SEMNOTISM(l) (OR SERIOUSNESS) See pages 49,52,61. 
There are a number of indications that Park as a scientist needed to 
have, not only the ability to excogitate concepts and to think system-
atically, but also the ability to be highly reflexive about his 
thinking, so that where the system lost touch with reality it could be 
broken down and built up again on a surer foundation. Thus Coser 
(1971:357) explains that Park was included among the masters because 
h~ was a systematic thinker - and yet quotes Everett Hughes' estimation 
that "[Park] had no desire to form a system." System building for 
its own sake was not Park's goal. Rather we are presented with a man 
who in constant dialogue with his students created concepts for that 
particular job: "There are often very considerable differences between 
early and late formulations, which can be accounted for by the fact 
that Park rarely set out deliberately to write a theoretical essay. 
It was rather his custom to think about a conceptual issue in terms 
of concrete research problems raised by his students in those long 
sessions when he plotted out their areas of research and helped them 
devise the theoretical tools they needed for accomplishing their task." 
(Coser,l971:382). We are presented here with a dynamic figure always 
(1) Semnotism. For the sake of consistency an attempt was made to 
discover an appropriate word ending in -ism designating the trait 
serious. There are a number of synonums - solemnity, grave, earnestness 
none of which lent themselves to this usage. The word Semnotism was 
derived from the~eek adjective semnos, which means august, venerable 
honourable, reputable, grave, serious, dignified. The noun, semnotes, 
means majesty, gravity, dignity. Semnotism as used here denotes an 
attitude, or behavioural trait, or set of behavioural traits described 
by the words serious, grave, solemn, dignified. A biblical example in 
which semnos is used is as follows: "Deacons in like manner must be 
grave, not double-tongued, not given to much wine, not greedy 9f filthy 
lucre." (I Tim.3:8). · . 
In establishing this lack in the English language I wish to thank 
especially the Rev. I.H. Eve. Thanks also to him, and to Mrs. H. Batson 
for assuring me that there was no such word (semnotism) in the English 
language. 
reaching out to grasp new concepts and "ever open to grasp novel 
experience." 
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.Again, we are told of a typical reaction of Park's, - in the face of 
a concept which in his opinion did not sift the significant from the 
insignificant -was to proclaim that it was "not worth a damn." An 
\ 
important part of the scientist's work consists also in knocking 
down a system of thought in which the situation it sought to explain 
was explained away. 
Furthermore, we are told how impressed Park had been by an essay 
William James once read to his class "On a Certain Blindness in 
Human Beings." James we are told spoke of a "personal secret" that 
makes life boring to one person and full of zest to another. As Park 
saw it: "What sociologists most need to know is what goes on behind 
the faces of men, what it is that makes life for each of us either 
dull or thrilling." (Quoted in Coser, 1971:368). 
Despite this high value placed on reflexiveness it·would seem, as 
Shils (cf.p.8) has pointed out, that Park shared a certain blindness 
with his contemporaries, as far as Darwinism is concerned- nowhere 
is this more evident than in the seriousness with which the arguments 
by analogy were developed. It is not merely in the degree of elaboration 
in which the argument was pursued but in the uncritical belief that 
it was via this process that truth was to ~e found - to the point where 
the assertion of the argument was itself a denial of the truth. In 
this respect Reissman's (1964:113) observation that "Park's own denial, 
in a 1939 review of Alihan's critical book, Social Ecology, that he 
and the other ecologists were even attempting to construct a theory" 
as being "tragic" deserves a comment. What was not tragic in this 
denial was the assertion that their attempt at theory construction 
was never meant to be final - possibly the tragic element lay in the 
non-recognition of those moments of "blindness" in which it was imagined 
that "explanation" had been achieved. 
10. PESSIMISM See pages 57-58,67-68,75-76 
Chamber's Dictionary ( 1966:811) define·s this as "the doctrine that 
the world is bad rather than good: a temper of mind that looks on 
the dark side of things." Certainly, Park's view of the city was not 
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one of total darkness, for there was a value shared by all the C.H.E.s 
in the freedom gained by the individual in the city. Yet the stress 
on the disruptive aspect is noted as characteristic. As suggested 
the key attraction in the. linkage of the boll weevil to the history 
of South Africa lies in the catastrophic elements. Whether this 
served to promote understanding of the social disruptions in Chicago 
may be queried. A possible negative effect would be the reinforcing 
of a pessimistic view of things. This is suggested in the raising 
of the particular sequences of conflicts in South Africa to a universal 
level. 
In the elaboration of the natural history of the newspaper a defeatist 
note isstruck; but the outlook is not purely negative. The Darwinian 
commdtment led Park to search for new forms, but also led him to adopt 
a-passive stance in terms of the emergence of these forms which were 
seen to arise out of the ecological forces automatically. The phrase 
"so far but no further'' is suggested as descriptive of this stance. 
What is of interest here is the explicit repudiation of moralism 
{cf. Turner;l967:xvii). It would seem that gains in one direction 
(thinking in objective terms) were offset by losses in another. The 
necessity of "moralizing" and the taking of active steps in reforming 
the present are not necessarily two separate activities. 
11. REDUCTIONISM OR OVERSIMPLIFICATION. See pages 50,~6-57,59-60,72-73,79-80. 
If it is legitimate, for the sake of argument, to treat one's concepts, 
and the objects they identify as real (see discussion in Realism and 
Reification, Issue 2, p.41) then it is also part of the scientist's 
task to simplify. Theodorson and Theodnrson (1970:342) do tell us 
though, so far as the fallacy of reification is concerned, that "The 
source of the error lies in the fact that in analysis it is necessary 
to simplify the complex phenomena of the real world." Setting aside 
the problem of what is meant by "the complex phenomena ·of·. the real 
world," the question to be discussed here is when does simplification, 
a legitimate scientific activity, become "oversimplification" - or 
when does this activity: become fallaciousness? 
Hollingshead (1947;1961:110) is surely correct when is speaking of 
-"oversimplified abstraction" he speaks of the selecting of an assumption 
.. 
and elevating it "into a universal, all-pervading arbiter." Martindale 
(1958:29) in a similar fashion complains of the "unnecessary 'primitivism'" 
of C.H.E.s. crucial concepts. 
difficulty was that it [civic 
differentiated in those terms. 
Elaborating on this he says: "The 
social lif~could not be sufficiently 
They could account as easily for rural 
life as for city life. They could apply to social life in the past 
or the present. They could apply to non-human animal life as well 
as to man's life; or to plant life as well as to animal life." 
Reissman (1964:98), on the other hand spells out why in terms of human 
nature the ecological concept is an oversimplification: "Questions 
of purpose, motivation or human will could, in a sense, be set aside," 
yet (1964:109) it was "the facts of culture and human volition [that]· 
transformed man's relationship to his environment." Such a strategy 
was suspect: "The ecologists wanted to find a scientific excuse to 
avoid the obstacle of studying 'the complexity of culture. Park's 
contention that cultural forces find their way into the more primitive 
ecological level may be true, but~the relationshipwas too muddy to 
be understood."(Ibid). 
What is objected to above is not mere simplification, for this ts 
an inherent property of all concepts, but the absolutist reference in 
Hollingshead for example, or the implications of exhaustiveness of 
explanation in Martindale and Reissman. Nottridge (1972:29) has the 
opinion that "The analogy was too tempting to resist." It is not 
that concepts or arguments should not be "tempting" or "tantalizing" 
(cf. Reissman,l964:95) -indeed scientists are legitimately and 
desirably moved by such, but an unreserved commitment, or an overwhelmed 
intellect must needs be challenged in the academic setting. 
12. ANTHROPOHORPHISM. See pages 76-80. 
This is what Park ( 1923; 1952: 104) identifies "as the 'pathetic fallacy' , 
the mistake of attributing ... to physical nature and to things alive 
· and dead, the sentiments and the motives which they inspire in him." 
Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:14) more simply defined anthropomorphism 
as "The attribution of human characteristics to that which is not human." 
Anthropomorphism it is evident is a special type of fallacious argument 
by analogy. In a sense anthropomorphfsm arises out of the conditions 
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of human knowledge - all arguments originate from man and from their 
experience (this statement assumes that human knowledge originates 
in sense experience) of the world. "Man is the measure of all things." 
It is easy to see how this conditioning can lead to the assumption 
that man occupies, in the universe of his experience, a plac'e of ~entral 
importance. 
In as muph as Darwinism showed that man could be no exception to the 
rule that different species had arisen by natural evolutionary develop-
ment the place of man's position as central in the natural order was 
questioned. On this basis Darwin argued that there was only a 
quantitative difference between man and beast both physically and 
psychically. "There is a far greater gulf, he maintains, between the 
mental capacities of one of the lowest vertebrate animals (the eel 
or river-lamprey) and those of the highest ape, than between'the 
intellectual endowment of the ape and man. And he points out how 
... ~ 
difficult it is to draw a line between mere instinct and reason proper. 
The fact that animals can learn by experience suffices to show that 
we cannot altogether deny them reason." (Hoffding,l900:446). Here we 
have the original justification for collapsing the gulf between the 
human and the non-human9 A discussion of this argument need not be 
repeated here (cf. p.24). What we wish to draw attention to is the 
fact that Park was much taken with Darwinism and 'the notion that much 
could be gained from a study of plants and animals in the understanding 
of human behaviour (cf.p.65 etc.). 
The chief difficulties with this assumption are: 
(a) the tendency to simplify human nature, and to dismiss the cultural 
complexities within which man operates (cf.p.70f.). 
(b) the tendency to attribute human characteristics to plant and animal 
actions (cf.p. 73-80). 
It is in terms ~f this latter of which Gettys accuses Park of "crude 
anthropomorphism," It is necessary to point out that there is in itself 
nothing wrong with an anthropomorphic argument provided due recognition 
is given to the nature .of the argument· when it is used. Inasmuch as 
Park did not clarify his usage of key terms such as "community" and 
"social" and the various senses in which they were used - or confused 
(cf.p. 77) -Gettys criticism is correct. 
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13. DETERMINISM. See pages 55-57,73-75. 
Bell and Newby (1971:92-93) offer the following summary of C.H.E. 
theory: "Here is a central paradox in the formulations of the Chicago 
school: they stress the freedom that results from living in large, 
dense, socially hetrogeneous and anonymous cities ... and yet also posit 
a rather narrow determinism that is too crude f&r. geograph~rs let 
alone sociologists. They most certainly relate types of social behaviour 
in communities to a precise and specific ecology .•. " 
Determinism Theodorson and Theodorson (1970: llO) tell us is ·"The theory 
or doctrine that all human behavior is determined by antecedent conditions 
and events. Determinism is based upon the conception of cause and effect. 
All events, including all human actions, are seen as the result of a 
preceding cause or causes. Since effect invariably follows the cause, 
al.l the events of nature, including those involving man, are ~n invariable 
series of consequences, each resulting from the preceding and inevitably 
leading to the following. Man's behavior is determrried by the events of 
the past which resulted in his biological heredity and social and cultural 
environment." 
What should be observed, both in Bell and Newby's statement above, and 
the Reissman st~tement (cf. p~4-75) is that it is not. determinism 
which is itself as such attacked but rather a specific type of determinism, 
in the one case a "narrow" type, and in the other a "biological" type. 
Generally speaking, from the sociological point of view, a purely 
biological determinism is regarded as narrow. 
! general problem with any deterministic theory would arise where 
claims to exhaustiveness in explanation are made. 
In a purely biological determinism for instance the assumption is that 
the biological basis for conditioning the behaviour of human beings is 
exhaustively fathomed. As we have seen (p.73) it is precisely in the 
ability to specify the biological aspect that the chief difficulty lies. 
This is the first difficulty with a bi.ological determinism. The 
second arises in a stage beyond this - and that lies in the assumption 
that biological factors should be given a priority in explanatory value. 
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There is no causal reason why preference should be given to biological 
factors (cf.p.55), though there is no objection, in principle, to the . 
. conceptual basis upon which such an argument proceeds. 
The only legitimate objection lies in any claims to exhaustiveness 
or absoluteness in explanation. A socio-cultural determinism 
would possibly be preferred by a sociologist, though here again any 





THE SOCIO-CULTURAL CONCEPT ARGUMENT BY DICHOTOMY 
A) Introduction. 
B) Park's Reaction to Mannheim's Challenge. 
C) Wirth's Reaction to Mannheim's Challenge. 
D) Two Comments. 
E) Reviewing the Dichotomies. 
F) Issues and Conclusion. 
A: INTRODUCTION 
a) THE DICHOTOMY. 
Gettys (1940;1961:99), in a rather scathing article has provided a 
fairly extensive catalogue of the dichotomies employed in C.H.E.s 
,writings: 
~ In an apparent attempt to effect some sort of reconciliation 
between man, the animal, and man as a human being and the 
possessor of culture, the "human" ecologists adopted a 
familiar device, namely, the dichotomy. Dichotomizing 
is not unique, of course, with the biologists and the 
ecologists; it is a common affliction of the social sciences. 
Illustrative of the dichotomies employed extensively by the 
ecologists [i.e. the C.H.E.i) are those of "community" and 
"society," "individual" and "person," "natural" and "cultural," 
"biotic" and."social," "ecological order" and "social order," 
"ecological (competitive) interaction" and "social interaction." 
Let us begin by defining what we mean by "the dichotomy." This we 
define as an argument which proceeds by drawing a polar distinction 
between two points of reference regarded as antithetical or mutually 
exclusive, Whether or not "dichotomizing" can legitimately be described 
as an "affliction" is a matter of debate. As a technique in logical 
thinking it is neither good nor bad; it has been used fruitfully in 
the past. The manner in which it has been employed in a particular 
case though needs to be weighed. Gettys' statement is surely not 
against the usage of the technique itself - were this the case the 
argument that binary distinctions are too simple for the analysis 




However, when he argues that the usage of the dichotomy was made 
in an "apparent attempt to effect some sort of reconciliation between 
man, the animal, and man, as a human being and the possessor of 
culture" (my emphasis) it would seem that the criticis~ is directed 
against the misuse of the technique of dichotomizing. While some 
of the misuses (viz. looseness in usage of terminology; reductionism) 
of the dichotomous classification are pointed out this remains a 
secondary concern of this chapter. It is a necessary one, however, 
and important to our more fundamental interest: reaction to the 
Mannheimian challenge . 
b) A COMMENT ABOUT OUR ANALYSIS OF DICHOTOMIES. 
(i) The major point : Mannheim. The discussion does not pretend to 
be exhaustive - indeed such an undertaking would be superfluous, for 
A~ihan has already performed this service. Hatt's (1946;1961:107-108) 
remark is-pertinent: 
The "orthodox"· ecologists, by reification, set for themselves 
the task of delimiting human interaction into levels that are 
mutually exclusive; traditionally, community and society, 
and the s~nbiotic and the social. This series of distinctions 
was convincingly demolished by Alihan's work ..• It should be 
unnecessary here after Alihan's careful work to point out the 
difficulties inherent in this dichotomy. 
Rather what we are interested in doing here is to present only those 
parts of the argument, and the criticism, insofar as they bear upon 
our major point, which is that the third and final stage, is marked 
by a reaction to Mannheim's challenge to a greater self-reflection. 
(ii) The relation of the third to the previous two "stages". 
The previous two chapters mark two definite stages in the development 
of Classical Human Ecology (cf. Turner,l967:xxvi). So far as 
beginnings are concerned definite dates can be fixed to their entrance 
on to the scene. Thus the 1915 "bench mark" essay of Park's marks 
the first stage in which the "natural area" as a spatial and geographic 
concept was applied to the city.· Important related concepts were 
distribution and mobility. Following this, in the 1921 "magnum opus", 
the "green bible" by Park and Burgess marks the second stage in which 
ecological concepts (particularly pronrinent were competition and 
symbiosis) were used in the furthe~ elucidation of the urban community. 
We argue that a third stage in which attention was given to the problems 
of a bifocal approach was reached in the latter half of the 1930's. 
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This .arose by reason of the desire to attribute to the socio-cultural 
half of the dichotomy a greater autonomy. The 1939 article, "Symbiosis 
and Socialization" by Park is pointed to as marking this stage, together 
with Wirth's famous 1938 article, "Urbanism as a Way of Life." The 
important 1936 paper "Human Ecology" by Park ends with a section titled: 
"Symbiosis and Society" and we discern here the beginnings of this 
last stage. 
It must again be pointed out that a neat dividing line between the 
three stag~s should not be looked for - in all there is not only 
overlapping but also an interdependency and interweaving of concepts. 
The third stage is possibly more dependent on the previous two stages 
for its existence. And references to the argument by dichotomy noted 
earlier in the discussion can now be usefully recalled. First, in 
Chapter Two it was noted (PP·29-30) in dealing with the Zonal concept 
that a Residual category arose into which cultural elements were 
relegated~!) Again, in dealing with the Natural Area concept as 
expounded by Zorbaugh_, it was noted (PP·34-36) that despite the 
initial usage of ecological concepts, socio-cultural elements in fact 
enjoyed the focus of attention. Second, in Chapter Three, it will 
be recalled that an ecological line of argument was pursued as opposed 
to a socio-cultural one (p62 ). It was pointed out that this division 
was based upon a dichotomous line drawn by Park between the four social· 
processes, competition being singled out as ecological while the other 
three were regarded as being influenced culturally, that is, at the 
human level. In other words what should be evident is that in the 
application of either a more mathematical concept, as in the case of 
the Natural Area concept, or in the application of ecological concept, 
a line of demarcation is made between what is specified by that concept 
and the residue. In the case of human behaviour the "residue" was 
difficult, if not impossible to dispose of, for in it was contained that 
which more particularly distinguished the nature of man. Given the 
sociological interest in human behaviour (and an ecological committment) 
a bifocal approach was bound to develop. 
While this third stage i.s heavily dependent upon the previous two stages, 
(1) Not only cultural elements in this case. 
.. 
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there is an extraneous factor which gives it a character of its own, 
viz. the reaction to Mannheim. In this way all three stages then 
can be seen as being growth points in theory development, the 
stimulation in each case derivingfrom outside the discipline: Geography, 
Ecology (or Biology) and last of all, "Sociology of Knowledge." 
(ii) The nature of Mannheim's challenge. 
Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia, 1936, was edited and translated 
by Louis Wirth ~nd Edward Shils. Louis Wirth was possibly Park's best 
. pupil. The challenge, as we see it, is spelled out by Wirth in the 
introductory editorial to Mannheim's work. The long editorial or 
"Preface" ends with a direct reference to "intellectuals": 
Finally, and in all of. its aspects, the sociology of knowledge 
is concerned with the persons who are the bearers of intellectual 
activity, namely the intellectuals. In every society there are 
individuals \\hose special function it is to accumulate, preserve, 
reformulate, and disseminate the intellectual heritage of the 
group. The composition of this group, their social derivation 
and the method by which they are recruited, their organization, 
their class affiliation, the rewards and prestige they receive, 
their participation in other spheres of social life, constitute 
some of the more crucial questions to which the sociology of 
knowledge seeks answers. 
One of the primary obligations of the sociology of knowledge 
consists, therefore, in a systematic analysis of the 
institutional organization within the framework of which 
intellectual activity is carried on. (Reiss (ed),l964:145) 
In other words Mannheim, as Coser (1971:429) tell us, "was concerned in 
all phases of his work with considering ideas in relation to structures 
in which they are variously embedded .•. he stressed that thinking was 
an activity that must be related to other social activity within a 
structural frame." 
In other words it was a challenge to trace out the social origins in 
which the C.H.E.s came to exist as a "school," the social origins 
of the leading thinkers, the values they used in selecting models 
of explanation, the social origins of their students, the particular 
position of.sociology relative to the other departments in the university, 
the position of the department of Sociology in Chicago relative to 
the community in general, etc. 
As we noted in dealing with the semnotic (Issue 9, p8l ) aspect of 
Park's character, there were certain values which were simply assumed as 
basic unquestionable "facts." The point which Mannheim challenges is the 
• 
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the idea that "facts," or the models of explanation in terms of which 
the facts are derived, can exist, without a prior social history. In 
other words "truth" is moulded by the value system in terms of which 
_models of explanation are chosen or questions asked and therefore 
answers received. While this challenge was not taken up directly 
some response to Mannheim was needed. The response was, as we shall 
see, to expand the socio-cultural aspect, as against the ecological, 
and hence the focus upon the dichotomy in this final stage of C.H.E. 
B: PARK'S REACTION TO MANNHEIH' S CHALLENGE. 
a) FOCUS ON "SYMBIOSIS AND SOCIALIZATION", 1939. 
We refer· here, more specifically, though not exclusively, to the 1939 
paper mentioned above in which Mannheim's contribution to sociology 
is discussed by Park. Basically, Park is seen here to react by 
reaffirming and defending his basic assumptions; 
extending, within the ecological framework, more attention to the 
"social" (societal) or "socio-cultural," "cultural" or "moral" (all 
taken as equivalent terms as opposed to the "ecological': "sub-social," 
"communal") aspect. 
_b) REAFFIRMING THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS. 
Park took care to prepare his ground carefully. Three closely related 
points needed to be made before Mannheim could be safely brought on to 
the stage: 
(i) A dichotomy between the ecological and cultural aspects had to be 
reaffirmed. Thus the article is introduced by a brief rehearsal of 
the "point of view of human ecology." It opens (1939;1952:240) with 
a firm statement in the belief that to the "disinterested observer" 
human society presents itself in two divergent aspects. While there 
may be many divergent aspects it is obvious that at least one aspect, 
the ecological, could be singled out. On this basis the dichotomy 
is used to sort out what is from what is not: "Society is obviously 
a collection of individuals living together, like plants and animals 
within the limits of a common habitat, and it is, of course, something 
more" (i.e. my emphasised section= what is not). This line of argument 








disarmed his readers by saying that he began by viewing things from 
the "ordinary" (1915;1925:2) point of view of the "casual observer" 
(1928;1952:100). It is not suggested here that Park was a sly 
character, trying to deceive his readers by a clever· trick of logic, 
for he was, on the contrary, a man of robust honesty (cf. Coser). 
But these remarks do serve to point out Park's unquestioned starting 
point: the externalities of the urban environment. It was upon 
this basis that in his earliest (1915;1925:1) essay a neat line was 
drawn between the city as "a state of mind, a body of customs and 
traditions, and of the organized attitudes and sentiments that 
inhere in these customs" and the non-human or physical aspects of 
the city'.· which seen "from the point of view of its geography," 
included, "transportation and communication, tramways, and telephones, 
newspapers and advertizing, steel construction and elevators ... ", and 
his last essay on the subject reflected exactly the same approach. 
(ii) The primacy of the ecological aspect needed to be asserted. This 
is done in a rather roundabout way. Sumner (1939;1952:246-247) is 
referred to as maintaining that "property, marriage, and religion are 
still almost entirely in the mores." With this in mind it is argued 
that "implicit, in every institution is a concept and a philosophy" 
which like an iceberg "remain [s) more or less completely submerged in 
the 'collective unconscious," whatever that is." (My emphasis). 
Furthermore, the sentiments beneath the surface of every institution 
are spoken of in terms of a "philosophy" or "what might be described 
as the institution's apologia pro vita sua." This, as he saw it, 
"may take the form of a rationalization or justification for the 
institution's existence." Having reduced the "mores," "sentiments," 
etc. underpining institutions to "rationalizations" he was on familiar 
ground, for he was able to argue that "mankind has never been completely 
rational in either its behavior or its thinking as was once supposed." 
In other words something more important than the "rational" element 
must be taken into consideration in explaining human behaviour. In 
this way the ecological aspect is safeguarded. 
(iii) The corollary, of the above, the. dependent or lesser role of 
the cultural aspect needed to be reiterated: This point is made 
simultaneously with the above - for in the distinction between rational 
, 
r 
and non"-rational behaviour the more "traditional" dichotomous line 
between conscious and non-conscious behaviour is affirmed. Institu-
.tions and collective behaviour thus are held to arise from "movements" 
which in turn originate in the realm of the non-conscious: "the 
pressure of some necessity- a flood, a famine, a war- anything 
which makes collective action urgent." This, of course, is where 
the sheer struggle for existence, or "competition" is given supreme 
potency. The rational actions are those which emerge immediately 
above this level, (cf.l939;1952:258) i.e. the economic and political 
sectors: "Sociology ..• is primarily concerned with the nature and 
natural history of institutions; with the processes by which 
institutions develop and eventually evolve the specific and stable 
forms in which we know them. But customary cultural and moral 
relations are notoriously dependent on, and responsive to, political,· 
economic, and, ultimately, those more elementary associations brought 
about by' the sheer struggle for existence." (1939;1952:2qq)(my emphasis). 
Having set the background scenery in position Mannheim can be brought 
on to the stage. Park is now ready to cross swords with him over 
the question of the origin of social institutions. All that is required 
is that he should be slotted-in to the cultural half (or the social 
aspect i.e. as opposed to the ecological) of the dichotomy for him 
to remain quite harmless. And this is done with the opening sentence 
(l939;1952:2q7), in which he is represented as "one of the recent 
extensions of the realm of the social. •. " Having done this Park can 
generously present the essence of his position as follows: '''The 
principle thesis of a sociology of knowledge is,' as Mannheim has 
stated it, 'that there are modes of thought which cannot be adequately 
understood as long as their social origins remain obscured.' This 
means that ..• the ideology of a society or of a social group is, like 
its customs and its folkways, an integral part of its social structure." 
Park could concede that the cultural (social) aspect was "integral,," 
for this in no way posed a threat to the attribution of primacy to 
an ecological interpretation. Certainly the social/cultural aspect 




c) EXTENDING, WITHIN THE ECOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK, MORE ATTENTION TO THE 
"SOCIAL" OR "SOCIO-CULTURAL" OR "MORAL" ASPECT • 
(i) The bulk of the article is, as one would expect from a defensive 
position, taken up with the question of attributing primacy to the 
ecological while trying to concede as much as possible to the social. 
This is what Hollingshead (1947;1961:109) terms Park's "philosophical" 
attempt to connect the "ecological" and the "social" by "his version 
of the timeworn concept of a hierarchy of orders- the ecological, 
the economic, the political, and the moral." While the double bibe 
against the hierarchy-of-orders concept as being "philosophical" and 
"timeworn" may be disregarded as irrelevant, the point that Park could 
attribute with equinimity primacy to the ecological order, and relegate 
the social/cultural order to an epiphenomenological status as a 
"superstructure" may be taken. Reissman's (1964:102) comment is more 
to the point. He points out that the "recognition" on Park's part 
that the~e was a relationship between the said orders was not sufficient 
in itself: "The relationship had to be specified, but that was really 
as difficult as studying the cultural level itself." 
It should come as not too much of a surprise when even in the final 
section of the 1939 paper, titled "Socialization," Park is still concerned 
with the relationship between the various l~vels (or orders) rather 
than with a purely socio-cultural or institutional analysis. While 
there is a gesture of equivalence in the statement (1939:258) that 
"socialization.and social organization seem at any rate to be brought 
a.bout by the co-:operation of two fundamental types of interaction," 
a point Turner .(l967:xxiv) emphasized, nevertheless (a) it is the 
ecological which is seen as initiating the "new type of solidarity"; 
(b) this solidarity is seen emerging in a dependent fashion upon 
ecological forces once a "relatively stable equilibrium" is achieved 
in both animal and human societies. In human societies the new type 
of solidarity is "more intimate" because it is based on "communication, 
consensus, and custom." 
It remains to be pointed out that the attention given to socialization 
is in fact very slight. This can be located in the penultimate paragraph, 
potently in one sentence: "The process of individuation ordinarily 





and economic association." This is, of· course, an extremely vague 
reference compared with that which Mannheim's challenge might have 
stimulated. 
{ii) It shquld be remembered that the point over which Park takes up 
the cudgels with Mannheim is in the accounting for the emergence 
of social institutions. He was convinced that one must resort in 
final analysis to the ecological processes as fundamental. It would 
be tedious to examine in detail how Park proceeds to do this. Suffice 
it to say that the elaborate milling-herd analogy which he resorts to 
follows the basic pattern as elaborated in Chapter Three {cf. The 
Case of the Boll Weevil and the'Voortrekkers). The same impersonal 
an inexorable laws are appealed to - the sheer visibility and 
destructiveness implicit in the {cattle) stampede is overwhelming. 
(iii) Four points need to be made about the milling-herd analogy. 
{a) The sheer forcefulness of the metaphor is surely a pointed polemic 
against the more "ethereal" concerns of Mannheim. 
{b) The time factor is a crucial element in the argument {cf.p.56 above; 
also for earlier examples cf. Burgess,l925:l48; Park,l915;1925:6) 
for it provides a loophole for any questioning of the reality of the 
potentiality and non-potentiality, of the ecological and cultural 
forces respectively. Should there, for instance, be a case where 
boundaries between neighbourhoods were hazy or unsettled, or which 
did not conform to ecological theory, the cause for the "abberation" 
could always be laid at the door of "time." Thus in the conclusion 
to the milling herd analogy Park (1939;1952:258) can end by saying: 
"Institutions, however, .seem to be, finally, the product of the 
type of dialectical or rational communication which is the peculiar 
characteristic of human beings."(my emphasis). The qualifying 
phrase "seem to be" possibly indicates the lack of definiteness 
appropriate in the face of the more ephemeral social aspects. 
(c) Another point already made but which could bear with repeating 
is the fact that the reality of the ecological variables rests to 
a large extent on their visibility - the "look and see" appeal of 
the "ordinary" man. Th.e appeal is to a criterion of testibility 
supposedly employed in the physical and biological sciences. Only 






could be attributed to non-visible phenomena, and thata scientifi-
cally disciplined inquiry could be valid where the testing was 
indirect, as must needs be in the case of values sentiments and 
ideologies hidden below the surface of things, was not easily 
countenanced. But the call to do this, and to move away from a 
narrowing empiricism, was a part of the Mannheimian challenge as 
spelled out by Wirth: "some aspects of all social events ..• can be 
viewed externally as if they were things ... this should not lead to 
the inference that only those manifestations of social life which 
find expression in material things are real. It would be a very 
narr·ow conception of social science to limit it to those concrete 
things which are externally perceivable and measureable." (196q:l3q) 
(my emphasis). So far as Park was concerned, however, the bite to 
this challenge did not make an impression, for as he had stated 
e~rlier (1921;1969/1970:15): "there is no indication that science 
has beguh to exhaust the sources or significance of concrete 
experience"; the field was wide open! 
The real question of Mannheim's challenge was entirely missed. The 
question was not merely, as Martindale (in Weber,l958:29) observed 
with appropriate disapproval, that the C.H.E.s venture "started analysis 
off on the wrong track by orienting it to the geo-physical aspects 
of the city rather than to its social life," or as Alihan (1938:6) 
observed that having fixed their attention on the "salient mani-
festations, such as.the growth of the cities, the spread of industry, 
the extension of railways and highways ..• etc .•. their universe of 
discourse became limited to externalities, and the interpretation of 
social life hinged upon its most concrete asperits," but the further 
question implicit in the appeal to a common sense empiricism, viz . 
the assumption of a rigid separation between the observer and the thing 
observed. In the last chapter we mentioned as an example of a forced 
analogy Park's comparison between the zoologist and the social scientist 
(cf. Chapter Three, p.5l). We pointed out that the sociologist must 
needs relate to his "object" of study in a different manner to that 
of the zoologist in relation to his object of study. The point is that 
unlike the zoologist, the sociologist's point of view enters irrevocably 
into the observation he makes - the very process of observation affects, 
or is liable to affect, what is being observed (as well as the 
observer). It is not, as was presupposed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, merely a matter of the impact of data upon 
t 
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a passive consciousness. Mannheim's sociology of knowledge is a direct 
challenge to this. Far from setting the subject and object sharply 
apart, the sociologist must needs acquire knowledge by being involved 
in an interrelationship in which both the subject and the object 
are involved. Trre recognition of the processes of interrelation 
and interaction between "facts" and values means the foregoing of 
absolute certainty in knowledge or the claim to be in a position to 
settle all disputed issues once and for all~l) 
In short, the "look and see" method of testibility which Park assumed 
would appeal to t'he "ordinary" man was not only narrowing, as Wirth 
pointed out, for only the simplest kind of statements ~bout reality 
can be absolutely true for all time, but also basically, especially 
so far as social science is concerned, misleading, 
(d) ' The point that the C.H.E.s lived through a period of rapid social 
change needs to be rehearsed. It is against the background of deep 
impressions of the unco-ordinatedness of the events of the day that 
the milling-herd analogy is to be understood. Its most notable 
feature, milling, points to the underlying concern of Park - the question 
of social control.. The milling phenomenon which invariably precedes 
a stampede was likened to the ceremonial war dance of "primitive man" 
which invariably mobilizes the fighting forces to action: "By reviving 
the memories of an earlier war, it mobilizes the warriors for a new 
one" (1969/1970:3n) .. Unlike cattle though who having been triggered 
offby their "primitive form" of the dance or ceremony, humans react 
in collective behaviour or by forming institutions. Park's voicing 
of surprise ("The milling herd is in so many respects lik~ the 
organized crowd .•. that one w·onders that it does not, as in the case 
of a mob, express its excitement in a collective act" 1939,1952:256) 
at the cattle, having performed their "ritual ceremony" of milling, 
not producing institutionalized acts, would seem to indicate, possibly, 
a disappoint1nent in not being able to apply the analogy as far as he 
would have liked. 
The point is that the ±:ormation of institutions did not happen 
automatically- for, as he had pointed out (1921;1969/1970:34) earlier, 
(1) I am indebted to E.H. Carr, What is History? 1961 for some of the 




"men in a state of panic ..• although equally under the influence of 
the mass excitement, act not corporately but individually, each 
individual wildly seeking to save his own skin. Men in a state of 
panic have like purposes but no common purpose." Social controls 
were necessary if the fierce, individualistic, and disorganized 
forces (cf. Chapter Three, p.57) were to be brought into any 
coherence. 
It may be recalled that a prime motivation in Park's life (cf. Burgess, 
1964;1967:3; Chapter One, p. 11) was a concern with exposing and 
rectifying public corruption or graft~!) Martindale (1958:42-44) puts 
forward the view that the American commitment to democratic principles, 
applied as they were to city governments (an innovation in terms of 
European history), led to the "tolerance of almost unbelievable quan-
tities of graft." Park (1969/1970:186) himself noted in 1921 that 
"'unfair competition' is an expression that is heard at the present 
time with increasing frequency." 
Here we must point out an internal contradiction in Park's thinking: 
This concern with unrestrained individualistic assertion focused upon 
competition, particularly in the economic sector. As we have seen 
this lined up with an explicit ecological interest. This in turn led 
in a direction in which competition was seen to give rise to a symbiosis, 
a differentiated structure and interacting organization which automatically 
produced an equilibrium or a "diminished competition" or peace itself. 
(Cf. Chapter Three, p. 71 ). The fact that Park could argue a positive 
outcome in the face of "heartless competition" is some testimony to 
his objectivity, and to his ideological commitment. (Cf. Issue 9 p.81). 
However, no doubt under pressure from the point of-view of the ordinary 
man (Martindale,Ibid : "the popular attitude toward the city in America 
was marked by the serious concern with current problems of urban 
corruption") Park resorted to the other half of the dichotomy, the 
socio-cultural aspect. Reaction to the graft - as opposed to the 
"he~rtless competition" - led to the development of the notion of 
social control. Social control was linked to the main purpose of 
(l) Graft is an American term signifying profit made illicitly by 
corrupt means, especially in public life . 
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society(l)which was corporate action, i~e. as opposed to unrestrained 
individual competitive action: "One might, perhaps, say that the 
function of society was everywhere to restrict competition and by so 
doing bring about a more effective co-operation of the organic units 
of which society was composed (1936;1952:157). That this general 
statement in fact arose from a more particular city experience can 
be discerned from the following statement: "The social problem is 
fundamentally a city problem ... of achieving in the freedom of the 
city a social order and a social control equivalent to that which 
grew up naturally in the family, the clan, and the tribe" (1929;1952:74). 
The point was that for Park the "freedom in the city" had to be 
controlled, and the controls were provided by "culture" i.e. "this 
freedom of the individual to compete i.s restricted by conventions, 
understandings, and law" (1936;1952:157). 
The question is how can "hea:tless competition" on the one hand, following 
an ecological line or argument, lead to 
of structure (cf. Chapter Three, p. 71 
following a cultural line of argument, 
peace, stability and growth 
); and on the other hand 
be controlled or muted so 
as to promote corporate and co-operative action? It is necessary to 
know that the dichotomy drawn so far between the ecological and 
cultural orders was elaborated in two similar concepts, "community" 
and "society" respectively. A key distinguishing feature was 
"competition" which was often held to characterize "community." 
The point is that the C.H.E.s used this concept so inconsistently 
{cf. Alihan,l938:29-40)( 2)that Alihan (1938:36-37) can conclude in 
tha following terms: 
Since human ecologists regard and treat competition as the central 
process in the ecological "organization," its comprehension is 
of utmost importance. The very validity of the distinction between 
(1) For purposes of clarification the concepts society, culture, control 
may be regarded as a set, as opposed to community, competition, freedom. 
(2) The det~il of the argument is not necessary to reproduce. The basic 
point is this: Park often identified biotic and economic competition 
(as we have seen in Chapter Three pp. 72f. ) . The basic que~tion hinges 
around the impersonal, and unconsciousness aspect of economic competition. 
Alihan demonstrates at .great length the inconsistencies in this assumption. 







"community" and "society" and the delimitation of the scope 
of human ecology depend upon the definition of this process. 
It is evident, however, that the ecologists have not formed a 
full understanding of the concept. of competition. They have 
not uniformly differentiated between biotic and economic 
competition, and they have not satisfactorily indicated the 
relation of the two processes either to "community" or to 
"society." What puts a particular difficulty in the path 
of the reader is the loose use of the term competition ... 
To cite only one example, Park and Burgess state in the 
same text that (a) "competition among men ••• has been very 
largely converted into rivalry and conflict, 11 or "competi- . 
tion has been restricted by custom, tradition, and law"; 
and (b) "the freedom which commerce sought and gained upon 
~he principle of laissez faire has enormously extended the 
area of competition and in doing so has created a world-
economy where previously there were only local markets." 
These two statements can only be reconciled if we assume that 
the term comp~tition has a different meaning in each of the 
two contexts. (Alihan's emphasis). 
Earlier, Alihan (1938:13), in a more summary fashion, had pointed 
out that "the economic organizations comprise the ecological 'no man's 
land' between 'community' and 'society,' so that they are at once part 
of the 'community,' (and] constituent parts of 'society'." 
This discussion and conclusion serves to illustrate that again the 
"argument by dichotomy" broke down, this time by a looseness in 
terminology. A logical interpretation would be along the lines of 
the following formula: a basic requirement in the setting up and 
maintenance of any dichotomous classification is the observance of 
the "law of the excluded middle" which states that A is either B or 
not B. It is unnecessary after the long quotation from Alihan's 




C: WIRTH'S REACTION TO THE CHALLENGE OF MANlillEIM 
a) FOCUS ON "URBANISM AS A WAY OF LIFE", 1938. 
While this paucity of institutional (socio-cultural) analysis is to 9e 
generaily discerned in the C.H.E.'s writing~l) Louis Wirth's (1938) 
attempt deserves special mention. 
Wirth's article has been described as the flower of Classical Human 
Ecology. A recent tribute to the merits of this article is to be 
found in Bell and'Newby's (1971:91) comment that Louis Wirth was "the 
author of arguably the single most famous paper ever written in sociology." 
Without wishing to argue for or against the matter here, it is worth 
noting that what Wirth has to say in this article may be regarded in 
many respects as a summary of the C.H.E. position. 
! 
Thus the three key concepts, Size, Density and Heterogeneity may be seen 
to follow the conceptual stages outlined in the three chapters of this 
thesis. But it is not a mere summary, for not only is it a definite 
selection, but it is conceived, by and large, on a more generalized 
j 
level. Furthermore, it may be seen to mark the beginnings of a new 
stage in the theoretical development of Human Ecology, what Reissman 
had dubbed Neo-Ecology (a development dating from the 1950's)~ 2 ) 
b) WIRTH NOT ESSENTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM PARK. 
The above remarks, however, should not be taken as indicative of any 
abrupt change. Wirth's position in fact is essentially the same as Park's 
( l) For general comments cf.: Alihan, 1938, Dh. 9; Martindale in \veber, 1958: 
28-30,39; Reissman,l964:109-ll0; Bell and Newby,l971:99. For references 
in which such a neglect may be discerned cf.: Park,l936;1952:230-23l; 
McKenzie,l925:73; also 1926:35; Burgess,l925:53; Zorbaugh,l926:46; etc. 
The point is either mentioned or implied in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. 
However, see also; despite this lack, the remarks made by Sirjamaki referred 
to on p.35 above. 
(2) A consideration of the recent refinements of the basic C.H.E. position 
is beyond the scope of this thesis. Reissman (1964:111-121) interestingly 
enough regards the modern statements as having (a) withdrawn to defend 
a smaller area of Human Ecology, and/o_r (b) "simply rephrased" the C.H.E. 
position (with possibly more delicacy). In any event, "The criticisms 
that were once made are still valid today." For a summary treatment 
see Chapter 5, pp. 125-126. 
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in "Symbiosis and Socialization" just dealt with, excepting that 
(1) Wirth pointedly debunks the achievements of C.H.E. whereas Park, 
as we noted, takes up a rather defensive and "traditional" stance. 
Both Martindale (1958:1~1) and Reissman (196~:113-11~) are of the 
opinion that in this article Wirth was attempting, not so much to 
make a new beginning, as to "correct the simple-minded physics of 
ecological theory," or, at least to be "more cautious ... in keeping 
ecology in bounds"; (2) \virth' s attention to institutional analysis 
is grea·.jer in substance than in Park's~l) Wirth's s·,ijarting point 
helped here·, for he emphatically declared that. ecological theory 
(C.H.E.) was lacking in sociological orientation (cf. Martindale, 
1958:38-39; Reissman,l96~:139). TI1e conscious aim of the article is 
as follows: "The central problem of the sociologist of the city is 
to discover the forms of social action and organization that typically 
emerge in relatively permanent, compact settlements of large numbers 
of heterogeneous individuals" ( 1938; 1964:68). 
c) THE FOlK-URBAN POLAR-TYPES MODEL. 
The elaboration of an institutional analysis of the citY, was facilitated 
' by adopting a Folk-Urban Polar-types model: "the city and the country 
may be regarded as two poles, in reference to one or the other of which 
all human settlements tend to arrange themselves" (1938;196~:62). 
Attention thus was drawn to differenttypes of social structures and 
the contrast between them. 
d) CONCLUSION. 
Despite what has been said in favour of Wirth's article it must be 
noted that he followed the traditional reductionist solution in that 
size and density, (ecological variables) were seen as independent 
variables. True, heterogeneity is brought into the picture on the 
grounds that the other two variables could not wholly account for the 
socio-cultural variation adequately. Nevertheless, as Reissman (196~: 
140) points out, "heterogeneity does not really qualify as an assumption 
as do'size and density, inasmuch as it can itself be deduced as a 
consequence of the latter two." 
(1) The uniqueness lay in the seriousness with which Wirth elaborated 
the socio-cultural dimension within an ecological "framework of knowledge" 
(cf.l945:76). The Folk-Urban polarity was well known. Park (1923;1952:108) 
for instance, had noted "The culture of modern man is characteristically 
urban, as distinguished from the folk culture, which rests on personal 
relations and direct participation in the common life of the family, 
tribe, and the village community." 
D: TWO COMMENTS. 
a) AN AHISTORICAL STANDARD. 
One of the important criticisms (cf. Mann,l965:4-5)· with regard to 
this Folk-Urban device is that it tends to be employed in an ahistorical 
fashion. The result has been a rather romanticized version of a folk 
settlement in terms of which the modern city is seen as instable and 
disorganized. Bell and Newby (1971:100) state: "If sociologists 
approach the study of community with an ideal typical community in 
mind, it can but only be always disintegrating •.• It is not helpful 
to identify a particular way of life with a particular ecological 
space." 
Apart from a connection between romanticism and pessimism which may 
be traced to the f~lk society concept, the idealized version of the 
folk society itself is subject to the influence of a particular social 
and cultural viewpoint. Unless this is recognized the very ahistoricism 
of ~he concept lends itself to a dogmaticism which we noted previously 
as connected with the positing of a belief in ahistorical ecological 
laws (Chapter Two, p.42). While credit must be given to Wirth for 
a richer base institutional analysis, it is only one step nearer to a 
fuller sociological analysis. With the positing of a static framework 
(the folk society} the challenge to analysing the genesis of new ideas 
and new syntheses in terms of which the society of the future would be 
organized is escaped. 
b) AN INDIVIDUALIST RATHER THAN SOCIAL INTERPRETATION. 
While the C.H.E.s cherished the positive aspects of city life - it 
contributed to ~uman dignity in giving greater individual freedom, 
more interdependence, a greater tolerance for divergent ways of other 
persons or groups, etc. -at the same time there is very little idea 
that the mass of individual working men could really gain economic 
and social freedom. Wirth (1938;1964:73) comes nearest to this view 
when he notes that "Typically in the city, interests are made effective 
through representation .•• the voice of the representative is heard with 
a deference roughly proportional to th.e numbers for whom he speaks." 
However his remarks (Ib.id:82) with regard to "organizations" being able 
to really serve the interests of the masses, are pessimistic. They are 
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subject to corruption and bossism: "Self-government either in the 
economic, or political, or the cultural realm is under these circum-
stances reduced to a mere figure of speech." In effect the C.H.E.s 
saw the mass of working men as poor, exploited, and at the mercy of 
the captains of commerce and industry and city politics. The only 
solution to the superordinate-subordinate relationship seemed to lie 
in controlling and curtailing the exploitative drives of those in 
power, for they in biotic-like fashion pressed their advantage to the 
utmost. True, it was in the city that "man was compelled to live by 
his wits" as Park put it, but this was conceived of chiefly at the 
individual level (cf. Park,l929;1952:74). The idea that the sub-
ordinate members of industrial society would unite and exert a counter 
pressure so as to gain a balance of power and thus a measure of greater 
freedom in the structures of commerce and ~ndustry, does not seem to 
have been considered as a historical possibility. On the contrary, 
'furner (1967:xiii) tells us, it is when "Park leaves the abstract 
treatment of social control to examine concrete problems': that he 
writes "bitterly" about man who seems to be "so ill-adapted •.. to the 
social order into which he is born" and to "the demands which society 
imposes" that his "recreations will very likely turn out to be some 
sort of vacation and escape from this same social order to which 
he has finally learned to accommodate." This is a very pessimistic 
view, that of ~n individualistic search for freedom only during 
vacation time. Such a view, however, should not be taken as typical. 
A more general C.H.E. response though was the demand for a redefinition 
of the electoral '\vards along "natural area" boundaries. This was 
undoubtedly a move to give more power to the working masses and to 
minority groups. While attention to divisions was not unimportant 
the real issue, the idea of the workers ~iscovering a new identity 
and of exerting a counter-pressure was it seems, not seen. 
This means that in fact there were two "social movements" afoot during 
this time which went unperceived. 
First, it would seem that the C.H.E.s were unaware that they were 
part of a general refo~m movement which Dentler (1968:50) has dated 
as being alive during the period 1870 to 1935. Despite Park's anti-
moralist stance ( cf. p.l2 and p. 44 above) the fact that he stressed 
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the need for social control in coping with unfair competition (cf.p.99) 
meant that he was part of a movement which led to the "depoliticalization" 
(Dentler Ibid) of city governments. One of the new forms which gets 
no mention at all, possibly because it occured in places beyond Chicago's 
boundaries, is the commission form of government (started in 1902 
in Galveston, Texas). A more professionalized version of this was 
the City Management Plan (started in Dayton, Ohio in 1913). By 1932 
Dentler (1968:51) tells us there were 800 cities using this new form 
of city management. 
Second, following Warner (1963;1972:62f), the rise in the early decades 
of the century of the craft and apprenticeship unions which finally 
were ·superceded by large industrial unions "with tens and hundreds of 
thousands of workers throughout the country combining t~eir strength 
to assert their interests against management." Far from seeking freedom 
only in vacation time on an individualistic basis, new corporate identities 
were evolved and the subordinate members of the industrial society 
mounted a successful counter-pressure· to gain greater freedom within 
the structures of the commercial and industrial worlds. This movement 
which has been such a distinguishing landmark in American history is 
either passed over very lightly (Wirth) or not mentioned at all. Possibly, 
despite Warner's focus on a city, the national dimension to labour 
bargaining made possible by state democracy, was a critical feature, 
and a more localized vision would ~o doubt be more liable to pass it by. 
In short, both Park's emphasis of ecological laws and Wirth's positing 
of an ideal folk society are both ahistorical. This led in each case 
to a passive analysis of society - the challenge of Mannheim was to the 
realization of a dynamic analytic model of analysis in which not only 
a mobile society may be measured, but in which the measuring framework 
itself is seen as being shaped constantly by the social and cultural 
environment. A new alertness is demanded, not only to what is 
happening "out there" but also to what effect one's own presuppositions 




E: REVIEWING THE DICHOTOMIES . 
As Gettys (1940;1961:99) pointed out Park hoped to effect some sort 
of reconciliation between man, the animal, and man the human being, 
by means of the dichotomy. 
The dilemma provoked by Mannheim consisted in acknowledging the 
socio-cultural component as independent of ecological laws. But 
if the ecological laws were sufficient in explanatory value was it 
not inevitable that the socio-cultural component would be immediately 
subsumed under these laws? 
The dilemma can be pinpointed in the concept rationality. If the 
ecological laws are taken as having fundamental explanatory value, 
then they must be by definition, rational. A logical consequence of 
this is that cultural factors not subsumed under the ecological laws, 
because of their supposed independence, are, thus, irrational. On 
the other hand, if the socio-cultural rationalizations or ideologies 
are taken as "rational" (Park,l939;1952:258) then, reversing the 
argument, the ecological "laws" are irrational. A solution seemed 
to lie in trying to embrace both aspects in a larger theory - but 
it is at this point that Classical Human Ecology for various reasons 
fails to cope. 
Mannheim's challenge was to break down the subject-object divide 
pre-supposed in the empiricism upon which this dichotomous thinking 
was based. However, the idea of questioning the explanatory value 
of ecological laws by exploring the subjective and social aspects 
of all cognition, including their own, seemed to be asking too 
much. The laws taken as absolutes (cf. p.96 above); besides these 




F: ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 
·The above discussion forms the material from which a number of issues . 
are identified. In defining and referring in summary fashion to the 
above discussion, some additional comment is made. The numerical 
order follows on from the previous chapter. 
14. ROMANTICISM See pages 100,103-104,106, Chapter 3,76~ 
A dictionary (Oxford, Pocket,l924;1946:708) definition of romanticism 
refers to the following terms: imagination, visionary, fantastic. 
Mann (1965:5) draws attention to what are often implicit value judgements 
in many writers on urban themes - these may be described briefly as 
1'anti-urban," and "pro-rural." "By i;his we mean that in comparing 
village and city there is a glorification of rural life which at 
times is based purely on sentiment." Bell and Newby (1971:100) suggest 
that an important dimension to C.H.E. thinking lay in an anti-urbanist 
approach stimulated by the fact (or supposition) that they "were 
presiding over the total eclipse of some past rural community." It 
was in the light of a rather romantic view of the rural community (in 
which the past by its very remoteness became glamorous) that the 
urban world came to be estimated. 
Both Par~1 ) ( cf. Coser, 1971:366) and \virth ( cf. Marvick in Reiss ( ed), 
1964:333) grew up in rural areas (cf. Stein,l960:l5). Martindale 
(1958:36-38) points~out the dependency of Park on Spengler who, it 
is suggested, recast Simmel's description of the city within a frame 
of agrarian mysticism. Interestingly, despite his village background, 
Wirth rejected this interpretation and returned to Simmel for a less 
idealistic viewpoint. The indication is that Park's view, because of 
his dependence upon Spengler (cf.l915;1925:1), is more romantic than 
Wirth's. Despite this estimation the very fact that Wirth took as 
one of his key points of reference, the folk society- not the rural 
village either of :feudal or industrial society - a note of romanticism 
was introduced. The subsequent stress on segmented and predatory 
(1) Red \Ving (the city ·in which Park grew up) is on the Mississippi 
River situated in a rich agricultural region, and is an important 
market for wheat. There is only one high school. In 1956 it had a 




relationships and the view of the city as unstable is all of a piece. 
15. AHISTORICISM. See pages 104-106. 
Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:187) describe historicism as a 
theoretical approach that emphasizes the importance of the historical 
context in the understanding of social and cultural phenomena. 
Ahistoricism therefore is taken here to indicate an approach which 
neglects the importance of the historical context in the understanding 
of ~ocial and cultural phenomena. 
Bringing the charge of ahistoricism against Park must be done with 
extreme caution. It is necessary to pay tribute to his interest in 
"natural" histories. Not only did he stimulate such an interest in 
his students but, as Coser (1971:362-363) tells us, "The notion of 
'natural history' conceived as a sequence of stages is central not 
only to Park's account of the rise of social movements but to many 
other of his analyses as well." However, there were a number of 
limiting features in Park's orientation and it is these which predominate: 
First, it was believed that ecological laws were the object of cognitive 
endeavour - and historical events as such were unimportant: "As far 
as sociology and history are concerned the differences may be summed 
up in a word. Both history and sociology are concerned with the life 
of man as man. History, however, seeks to reproduce and interpret 
concrete events as they actually occured in time and space. Sociology, 
on the otherhand, seeks to arrive at natural laws and generalizations 
in regard to human nature and society, irrespective of time and of 
place." (Park,l92l;l969/l970,ll). 
Second, in line with the above point, we noted in Park's "natural l;l.istory" 
of the newspaper (Chapter Three, pp.75-76) the adoption of a passive 
stance supposing, it seems, that new forms emerged automatically (Chapter 
Three, pp.69-70). There is a gulf in Park's thought between a holistic 
and individualistic interpretation of human behaviour which led to a 
pessimism in both counts (cf. Chapter Three,p.82; Chapter Four,p. 104). 
Third, the requirement that the research endeavours of their students 
be empirical, in keeping with the ecological approach meant that their 
work needed to be limited to the local scene (Chapter Two, p.J6-38) 
The consequence was an intensive focus on the city of Chicago itself -





In the case of Wirth the ahistorical nature of the Folk-Urban frame-
work lies in its static conception. Hann's (1956:4-5) analysis of 
the pitfalls implicit in this concept are referred to: "Such an 
argument, ignoring the time factor, must be suspect, since the writer 
is admitting by implication that a change has taken place in the 
village and we cannot be sure just where in time he is basing his 
statements." As we noted the ahistoricism of the folk (or village) 
concept gives rise to a romantic version in terms of which urban life 
is seen as problematic- or pathological(l)(cf. Turner,l967:xvi). 
16. CONSERVATI·SM. See pages 98-101, Chapter 3,69-71. 
Theodorson and Theodorson (1970:73) define conservatism as an 
"ideological orientation that opposes social change, especially change 
away from traditional cultural values and mores, and justifies its 
a~tions and values 9n the basis of the presumed accumulated wisdom 
of the past inherent in traditional forms." 
Again, it is with caution that a charge of conservatism is brought 
against Park (and the C.H.E.s), ~nd it must be emphasized that this 
judgement is made with qualification. As we have already mentioned 
(cf. Chapter Three, p.81 ) Park was an innovative thinker, and Coser 
(1971:372) draws an inspiring picture of him as "Perpetually curious 
and ever op€fia~g/novel experience." Yet, if our reasoning in the 
above two issues and the discussion from which they are drawn, is 
correct, it follows that where an ahistorical folk society concept 
is used in weighing urban society, "traditional cultural values and 
mores" will be appealed to. We draw attention here to the strong 
reaction against graft and the view that social control was necessary 
in combating a rampant individualism in the competitive business 
(1) While a reference to an idealized version of folk society is more 
explicit in \virth, it may be traced also in Park: "The culture of 
the modern man is characteristically urban, as distinguished from 
the folk culture, which rests on personal relations and direct parti-
cipation in the common life of the family, the tribe, and the village 
community" (1923;1952:108). It was this notion of the folk society 
which became the norm of a "natural" s.ocial order in terms of which 





world (Chapter Four,99-100 ). Not that the reference to the necessity 
of social control necessarily implies a "return to the good old days" 
approach. In some respects Park was forward looking (Chapter Three., p.83) 
At the same time the belief in the automatic emergence of new forms, 
as we have mentioned (Ibid), led to a passive stance- and the fact 
that two significant "movements" of the day seemed to go 1fnobserved 
is further evidence of a conservatism. (Cf. Chapter Five, p .123) 




AN APPLICATION TO MODERN ECOLOGY 
A) Introduction. 
B) Defining Modern Ecology. 
C) Arguments for the Relevance of the Classical Human Ecologists. 
D) Notes on the Applicability of the Issues to Modern Ecology. 
E) A Brief Comparison between Classical Human Ecology and Modern Ecology. 
A: INTRODUCTION 
a) THE PRESENT NEED FOR TRADITIONAL CONSTRAINTS. 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue, somewhat tentatively, the 
,usefulness of the ·classical Human Ecology tradition, and the criticisms 
and discussion which emerged in the decade 1938-1948, for the contempo-
rary debate. A convenient starting point is Philip Rieff's(l)(Urban, 
1971:44f.) polemic against the "barbarism" in the general orientation 
of the present "technological ethos" in which there is a "loss of the 
past" or a lack of "historic memory." As he sees it, "It means a 
systematic rejection of the past and of the constraints of the past, 
the constant opening up of new opportunities ••• " These two activities, 
of rejection of the past, and of opening up of the new, would seem to 
hang together - for if the constraints which arise from previous follies 
and mistakes are rejected, then the present can be attacked with little 
inhibition. In this "\vay the sciences could become more and more 
differentiate~ without ever fathoming the depths of a particular theory 
of causation. 
b) THE CATALOGL~ OF ISSUES - TOWARDS AN ALERTING DEVICE. 
It is hoped that this thesis will make some contribution towards 
fathoming the depths of ecological theory, and reviving "historic memory" 
for the purposes of the present. The manner in which it arose and passed 
(1) Philip Rieff is the Benjamin Franklin professqr of Sociology at 
the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
• 
113 
from the scene, so far as sociology is concerned, may prove of some 
value in building up a framework in which constraints, noted in the 
criticisms of the past, may facilitate contemporary discussion. The 
purpose behind the cataloging of issues at the end of each chapter 
is in the building up of an alerting device to possible pitfalls in 
argument when an ecological commitment is made in thinking about 
human behaviour. 
B: DEFINING MODERN ECOLOGY. 
a) A PRELIMINARY REMARK. 
Apart from the fact that Modern Ecology is very new and therefore 
difficult to describe in essence, it is also very widespread and 
rather amorphous. Nevertheless as some comparisons are being made 
here between C.H.E. and Modern Ecology some precision is desirable. 
As we have seen (Issue 9) the "blind spots" are the crucial ones in 
that they often mark, in a pervasive manner, the rest of the material. 
So important are these latent assumptions that it is in fact in terms 
of them, that a discipline may be defined. It is upon this assumption 
that the following discussion proceeds~!) 
b) THE IDEOLOGICAL OVERBURDEN. 
The following analysis is taken exclusively from Gerald Suttle's (1972) 
contribution. He draws attention to the significant fact that within a period 
of two years, 1966~1967, three books~ 2 ) offering " a holistic account 
(1) For a more direct approach to the definition of Modern Ecology we 
refer to Detwyler's (1971:4) discussion: "Ecology has many advocates 
as the science of man-environment. Certainly the most common definition 
of the field would make it appear to be so: 'The study of relationships 
between organisms and their environments.' In practice, however, ecology 
has conformed much more closely to Pierre Dansereau's narrower definition 
as 'The study of the reaction of plants and animals to their immediate 
environment, to their habitat' (Dansereau,l957,p.323) •.. Furthermore, 
man's place in the eco&ystem has been ·of scarce concern, although applied 
ecology and human ecology now appear to be developing." 
(2) Robert Ardrey: The Territorial Imperative.l966.Atheneum.New York. 
Konrad Lorenz: On Aggression.l966.Uarcourt,Brace & Ward,New York. 




of man, territoriality, animals, and aggression," were published, 
destined to become extremely popular. Written by scientists who had 
a gift of popularizing their views these books have become widely quoted 
in mass media. What interests us about this is the inference Suttles(l) 
draws from the popularity they, and a host of other "more technical 
and restrained considerations," stimulated. Pointing out the "mass of 
criticism" to which these books have fallen prey, Suttles (l972:ll2) 
asks the question, "If these works are as full of flaws as the critics 
suggest, why have they become so popular, and why is there such a 
convergence among their points of view?" In his opinion (Ibid:l35) 
what we have here is an overreaction to "sociological ideology": 
"In large part the ideological overburden in the works of Ardrey, 
Lorenz, and Morris can be seen as a reaction to a contrary ideological 
overburden in some recent sociological works. The view that the social 
order is a mere contrivance of arbitrarily selected rules is at least 
implicit in some recent and popular sociological writings .•. " Dennis 
Wrong's famous 1961 article, "The Oversocialized Concept of Man" is 
cited as corroboration of this view. The view which laymen have received 
is that of a society in which cultural rules and organizational forms 
are purely arbitrary (Ibid:llq-115): 
Taken to its extran:e form, this sociological point of view 
suggests that society exists only in the minds of individuals 
and that those who by accident or circumstance happen to be the 
more powerful will force their views down the throats of those 
less forceful. Social distinctions su~h as those represented 
in.the division of labour or the primordial ties of race, kinship, 
ethnicity, and residence become mere conventions, either as 
atavistic (appearance of ancestral, as distinguished from paren-
tal, characteristics: reversion to a more primitive type] 
survivals or asdeceits practiced by self-interested and powerful 
groups ... 
If man truly makes himself, then he might as well make himself 
well as ill ... All that is required are the right names and 
labels for people and situations .•. It is this fanciful (also 
"arbitrary," "threadbare," "ethereal"] world of words and 
social fictions that Ardrey, Lorenz, and Morris are challenging. 
(though without footnotes; i.e. they are reacting generally 
to a widespread viewJ 
Of particular interest, with regard to this "new ideology," Suttles 
(Ibid.:ll8) observes: "As a traditional field of inquiry it comes 






closest to fitting into what is called human ecology." (My emphasis). 
A number of points are mentioned as giving some validity to this 
statement, though, it will be noted, only a rough correspondence between 
C.H.E. and the "new ideology" may be inferred from them: 
(1) The"sheer~ range" to which the concept is extended is mentioned (Ibid). 
(2) The technique of "gross extrapolation" (Ibid 119) from nonhuman 
organisms to human beings "with very little conceptual or empirical 
justification." 
(3) The underplaying of the cultural dimension (Ibid): "A central aim 
of their work is to establish that man is 'just another animal' whose 
culture and social organization only gloss over the primitive impulses 
and instincts which guide 'all animal behavior.' They may be right ... 
But each author has tried to demonstrate his argun1ent only by showing 
how generalizations drawn from studies of nonhuman organisms can be 
selectively applied to some incidents among humans. Such incidental 
parallels between man and animal do not prove their general comparability 
but assume such comparability." 
(4) There is the stress on empiricism and materialism. 
(5) The idea that the "adaptive mechanisms" should produce orderly 
relationships (Ibid 121). 
(6) But with man the stress, by contrast, is on disorganization: "Thus 
we have in rather clear and self-conscious form a restatement of the 
aged doctrine of original sin" (Ibid: 122 ). 
(7) Absolutist (monistic) claims are made: "A persistent theme of 
all three books, then, starts with the connection between territoriality 
and aggresion and proceeds from there-to explain all aggression as a 
consequence of territoriality" (Ibid:l28; my emphasis). 
A concluding statement (Ibid:l24): "Thus, their works are popularly 
received because they boil things down to a single alternative. The 
simplistic way in which they have made their arguments is appealing 
because the practical decisions which face us are equally simple and 
come down to the primary response of 'Yes' or 'No!.!' 
(8) This links up with another similarity - the preponderance of 
attention to non-human behaviour. "Ardrey devotes roughly six chapters 
to describing animal behavior and three more to saying that humans are 







While some of these points offer a suggestive parallel between the 
said "movements" attention is drawn to the terms "overburden" and 
"ideology" (by which Suttles (Ibid:l30) means "a practical theory 
of society Gvhic€] must bring its doctrines to the point where 
decisions can be seen in terms of binary or practical alternatives'?. 
It would seem that, unlike in the case with the C.H.E.s (cf.p.74 above) 
there is no hesitation here in describing these theorists as "biologizers": 
"Ardrey, Lorenz, and Horri s ... are bent on a much more ~han human 
ecologyjl) reductionist statement which goes beyond mere environ-
mentalism to the more indestructible elements of man's biogenetic 
past. Their views, then, go well past the usual claims of environ-
mentalism implicit in some forms of human ecology to place man's 
abiding characteristics in a universal framework which he shares 
with_ all other animals irrespective of his environment, much less 
his culture , 11 (lbidi.ll8). 
We may note in drawing to a close this discussion of Suttles/ 
contribution, that his discussion of this "new ideology" is peppered 
with many of the "isms" we have identified in the earlier criticisms 
of Classical Hu1nan Ecology: determinism, reductionism, empiricism, 
materialism, positivism, dogmatism, oversimplification, conservatism. 
Both "argument by ecological analogy" and "argument by dichotomy" 
are discussed (cf. Ibid:ll8,136). \ve end with the following 
citation (Ibid:ll5): The message they bear is ess~ntially a call 
for a return to a more simple biological determinism. It is a 
message which reemphasizes the harshness of competition and aggression, 
the sacrifices of group life, and the enduring biogenetic bases of 
social differentiation." It would seem that the view of man as at 
base "competitive" is again enjoying attention. 
To summarize, then, we may point out that a "movement," both popular 
and scholarly, in which interest in a biological view of man was 
expressed, is characteristic of the late sixties. In some of the more 
popular works an extreme biologism is noted. Of interest is the 
inference of Suttles that what we have here is an over-reaction to 
a "sociological ideology." 
(1) Or Classical Human Ecology presumably . 
-
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c) MODFJRN ECOLOGY. 
It would seem not unreasonable to suggest that both the popular and 
more scholarly interest in ecology (a high point was reached in 1969-1971) 
is not unrelated to that described by Suttles, and that the similarities 
noted there with regard to C.H.E .. and the 11 new ideology" may be 
paralleled with a similar similarity in the case of the more popular 
versions of Modern Ecology. 
A suggestive linkage between Suttles' "new ideology" and Modern Ecology, 
apart from their proximity in time, lies in the fact that the leading 
figures in both "movements" are biologists. In Modern Ecology the 
name of Rachel Carson, a biologist, is frequently mentioned as "pointing 
the way" (cf. Newsweek,l970 (Jan.26):25). Her book Silent Spring, 1962, 
seems to have been the spark, not only to an American, but also to 
a.world wide "movement." In America certain biologists or ecologists 
can be pointed to as "leading lights." Time magazine (l970,(Feb.2):40) 
mentions specifically the following names: Rene Dobos (Rockefeller 
University), LaMont C~ Cole (Cornell), Eugene P. Odum (University of Georgia), 
Paul R. Ehrlich (Stanford University), Kenneth E.F. Watt (University 
of California at Davis). Important English names are Lord Ritchie-Calder 
and ./Sir Frank Frazer Dar ling. 
Arguing from the predominance of Biologists/Ecologists ·in both popular 
and serious writings in Modern Ecology it may be suggested that a 
characteristic of Modern Ecology lies in the shared assumption (among 
modern ·~e~co)ogists broadly conceived) of the primary importance of 
the biological view of man. 
But Modern Ecology is not confined to these. There are contributors 
of many disciplines in magazines, journals, newspapers, etc., of various 
sorts. John Barr (editor of The Environmental Handbook : Action Guide 
for the UK. 1971) has listed some 50 national (i.e. mostly English) 
and international conservation bodies. The recent "Friends of the 
Earth" (1969/1970) organization has an international membership. New 
journals e.g. "Your Environment," "The Environment This Month" have 
appeared. Comment has ,come from a wide range of specialists. Much 
of the more popular material lacks the usual constraints of academic 
thinking, and much of it is said to be "emotional" (l1rof. Fuggel) or 
"humanistic" (Prof. Versveld). 
• 
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While there is an obvious, and no doubt undisputed, gap between 
thinkers who have achieved a recognized scientific reputation like 
Professor Athelstan Spilhaus(l) and those who he has dubbed "eco-maniacs"· 
("whose knees jerk at the mention of the word 'pollution', who wish 
to turn away from the industrial, technological revolution and the 
rewards it has brought. Nobody in his right mind would say 'stop 
industry' because of pollution - that would be like cutting off your 
head because you've got a headache."), there is also a gap between 
the more conservative members of the ecological profession and writers 
like Spilhaus. In a response to an appeal: "help us live our lives 
more intelligently .•• Let people know the impact' of their everyday 
lives on the environment" (Ecology,l970,Vol.51:363), Edward So Deevey 
(Ibid) writing on behalf of professional ecologists, scrys, "Ecologists 
are both flattered by these official expressions of interest, and 
m[;tde apprehensive by them ... Ecology has much to contribute to \the 
'""' 
training of environment manager~' .•. but an ecologist is no more 
qualified for managerial decisions about environment than a physicist 
is qualified to build a bridge." 
In conclusion it may be remarked that while ecology is fairly easy 
to define, modern ecology is not. Southwick's (1972:xii) definition 
is as follows: "Ecology is the scientific study of the relationships 
of living organisms with each other and with their environment." He 
goes on to say that such "definitions seem simple enough, but their 
full ramifications for human health and welfare are infinitely complex 
and by no means fully understood." It would be misleading to describe 
Modern Ecology as Darwinist (in the way in which the C.H.E.s were 
described as such), nevertheless, there seems to be some evidence in 
suggesting a wide spread commitment to the i1nportance of a biological 
. (or ecological) view point. It is vpon this possibility that we go 
on. to suggest that similar dilemmas as those which we observed in 
C.H.E. may still be operative. 
(l) Athelstan Spilhaus is Professor of Geophysics at the University 
9f Minnesota and chairman of the American Association for the 
Advancement of Science .. He is known for his writings on "The Experimental 
City." The bracketed comment was personally noted in a lecture he 





C : ARGUMENTS FOR THE RELEVANCE OF 
THE CLASSICAL HUHAN ECOLOGISTS 
It was suggested in the first chapter that one of .the best contributions 
sociology could make to the present debate with regard to modern ecology 
was to dig up its own past. What will be attempted here is a justifica-
tion of this statement. 
a) THE PAUCITY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION. 
Barry Commoner (Time, Jan.ll,l97l) made this appeal two years ago: 
"A start~l)he said, is to define crucial social issues in a way that 
emphasizes man's present disruption of nature's fundamental benevolence. 
Then it's up to the economist, and social scientist to figure out how 
we can change social habits. I have no idea how it can be done, but 
it ha13 to be." 
The service nature of Ecology to social scientists (and economists) 
suggested here is not dissimilar to the role Park, in the end, suggested 
for C.H.E. (cf. Wirth,l945;l96l:72). What is interesting in this 
case, however, is that it is not a sociologist or a human ecologist 
(in the traditional sense) who is making f,he point. And this is 
just what is so mysterious. It is not merely that ten years and more 
have passed by since the new upsurge of interest in ecology started 
without a "Sociology of Pollution" being written, for there is, it 
seems, a "sociology'' of nearly everything else, but the fact that 
sociologists have had ready-to-hand a whole academic tradition in 
C.H.E. from which to draw, yet have not chosen to do so. Like the 
.proverbial skeleton in the cupboard C.H.E. seems well locked away 
in the sociological locker! 
Of. course, there is an explanation for this and Detwyler(2 )(l97l:3) makes 
(1) With regard to this quotation we may note here another example 
of the possibility of an implicit claim to absolutist thinking. The 
assumption is that ecology will be responsible for defining "crucial" 
issues as a "start." Btit it is only from a particular point of view 
that certain issues become "crucial." As we noted earlier (p.35) it is 
the start which makes all the difference,for it is in the start, that a 
particularistic view is adopted, and, once accepted, "colours" the 
rest of the vision. For Barry Corrunoner see p. 138~elow. 





a probing remark when he says "man-environment research has been 
neglected since the 1930's, when the flaws of 'environmental determinism' 
became widely recognized ... The important point is here that ... reaction 
to environmental determinism ... dampened all kinds of environmental 
investigation including that of physical geography." (Cf. Issue 13 
for remarks made by Bell and Newby). This is to skate very lightly 
over the criticism which "mounted up" against the Classical Human Ecologists. 
\ 
Thus after a period of thirty years or more ecology is back in the 
centre of the stage. It would seem that for some, as the late Louis 
Armand (cf. Urban,l971:135) noted, Modern Ecology has some innate 
claim to be regarded as man's moral guide. In this respect (i.e. of 
looking toward ecology as a "moral guide") Detwyler (1971:3) is mistaken 
in suggesting that it is now for the first time that men are turning 
tbeir attention to ecology: "No single scientific movement has yet 
in~e~rated these features, and hence there is no_explanatory or 
predictive environmental science." By these features Detwyler means 
{a) the processes of environmental interaction; (b) the interdisciplinary 
repercussions; (c) man's actions. These are, surely, the very features 
which Park and his colleagues worked with, and with which the neo-
ecologists are still working~l) Even if by this omission it was implied 
that C .H .E. 'vas a "write-off" courtesy would demand at least a footnoted 
reference to a former brave attempt. It would seem that the whole 
movement having passed from the focus of present interest has been 
consigned to limbo. 
At any rate there is an ,. uildoubted enthusiasm for Modern Ecology. What · 
is of interest to the sociologist is the ready drawing-in of sociology 
into the ecological net: "The message of Ecology is one of synthesis ... 
it attempts to join biology and sociology."(Southwick,l972:xiii)~2 ) 
(1) The Neo-ecologists generally observe what they have termed the 
"ecological complex" (cf. Sjoberg in Hauser and Schnore,l964:165-168). 
The four classes of variables specified are population, social organi-
zation, environment, and technology. Nor is the dynamic element, 
mentioned by Det,vyler, neglected by the Neo-ecologists. Reissman( 19M,: 244) 
makes the following interesting conm1ent, "Rossi correctly chastizes 
them for a 'distressing tendency inward intellectual "imperialism." The 
ecological perspective is so loosely defined that it can be stretched 
to include what is regarded as praiseworthy .•. and contracted to avoid 
the apparently faulty' . " 
(2) Charles H. Southwick is an ecologist at the John Hopkins University, 
. Baltimore, Maryland. 
I 
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Far from objecting to this synthetic approach it is (I believe) to be 
welcomed. What a disappointment, therefore, to find, after one's 
expectations had been aroused by the ntention of such an aim in the 
introductory overview, what amounts to virtually no sociological 
material whatsoever. Of the 17 chapters of Southwick's book three 
have titles which suggest a possible sociological reference. Contentwise 
how·ever, these chapters are very disappointing to the sociologist. 
While it is not necessarily a prerequisite for good sociology, there 
is possibly some inference to be dra"h'Il from the fact that not one 
recognizable sociologist is mentioned in the three chapters, nor for 
that matter in the book as a whole. Wl1at makes the ommission more 
glaring is the list at the end of the book in which over 400 authors 
are mentioned. The inference that needs I think to be drawn is not 
that Southwick has not made a worthwhile attempt, although the reference 
to sociology in the introduction is undoubtedly misleading, l;mt that 
there are no substantial sociological contributions to the modern 
ecological debate from which to draw. 
This conclusion, on the basis of the examinatio.n of one book, is no 
doubt made too hastily, though it must be pointed out that the book 
explicitly wishes to introduce ecology to beginner students and 
stimulate a wider-than-traditionally-defined debate. Southwick, however, 
is riot the only writer with such aims and a further survey of literature 
is called for. No claims are made here to an exhaustive search, though, 
unfortunately, ther~ is nothing that.the author has come across in 
Cape Town's book stores, or the university libraries which has given 
a~y cause to alter his opinion~l) 
The admirable book by Barbara Ward( 2 )and Rene DubosP) Only One Earth, 1972 
bears the economic and ecological stamp of its authors. While the 
book has an obvious sociological interest, it cannot be classed under 
(1) 'l'he publishers Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. have informed me 
that such a book ~s in preparation by a sociologist, Michael Michlin, 
of 'l'exas. The title is to be "Environment, Population and Social 
Organization : Current Issues in Huma~ Ecology." However, see Postscript. 
(2) Barbara Ward (Lady Jackson) is the Schweitzer Professor of Inter-
national Economic Development at Columbia University. 
(3) Rene Dubos is an eminent biologist, he is Professor of Pathology 
at the Rockefeller University. 
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this category. One can, possibly, gain some idea of the relative 
strengths in representation of disciplines by examining the list 
of 11 corresponding consultants. 11 The book was written with reference 
to manuscripts prepared by the consultants though obviously the work 
is a product of the authors. Of the 152 listed consultants a third 
of the number fall roughly into a biological/agricultural category. 
This is the largest division. Next are the geographers, economists, 
industrialists, and physical scientists with about te1n each. These 
are followed by an under five division of architects, journalists, 
philosophers, educationalists, lawyers, nutritionalists, medical 
and health experts, social anthropologists and sociologists. The 
same sort of divisions is born out in an examination of the Claude 
Gill Books Catalogue on Environmental Sciences. 
T~ere are may readers on environmental and ecological subjects. Of 
the half dozen mentioned here~l) while no claim is made with regard 
to their representativeness, it is possibly suggestive that oniy one 
(the first in the list) has articles by sociologist~ and these are _ 
population theorists. 
The best representation of sociological thinking, it is suggested 
here, is in Urban,G.R.(Ed): Can \ve Survive Our Future?,l97l. Radio 
interviews on Radio Free Europe are reproduced in dialogue style. 
Of the twenty-three interviewed four were sociologists by profession 
and two were trained in sociology and occupy non-academic posts. Even 
so, interesting as these contributions are, they do not amount to a 
very weighty contribution. 
So the opinion that the sociological contribution is virtually non-
existent remains. The accusation j:,.i1at sociologists are still too 
( 1) Holdren ,<J.P. and P .H. Ehrlich (eds ): Global Ecology, Readings 
Towards a Rational Strateo-r for Man. 1971. 
Barr ,J. ed : ~fhe Environmental Handbook : Action Guide for the UK. 1971. 
Odum et.al.: 'l'he Crisis of Survival. 1970. 
Disch,H.: The Ecolo ical Conscience, Values for Survival. 1970. 
Barbour, I.G. ed . : Earth Hight b~ Fair. 1972. 
Kay,D.A. and E.B. Skolnikoff (eds).: World Eco-Crisis. 1972. 
Warner,A.W. and D. Morse and T.E. Cooney (eds).: 'l'he Environment 
of Change. 1969. (One article is by an anthropologist). 
··:. 
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preoccupied with pure scientific methodological procedure to turn 
their minds to policy matters, or too abstract and removed from the 
world of mundane reality to be concerned about pollution and environ-
mental disassters, is based on a sterootype which, it is hoped, isoo 
out-of-date as to be untrue. Shils (1934;1961:1434-5) informs us 
that even when there was a belief among sociologists that they, as 
scientists, had best keep their hands clean of evaluative problems 
in any way, in fact there was no uniformity about this, and even among 
those who professed this doctrine, their conduct did not always match 
up to it: "Social scientists did, nonetheless, serve on government 
commissions, testify before congressional co1nmittees, and participate 
in various political reform movements," though the fact that.they 
were exceptions to the "mood" of their professions is duly acknowledged. 
But those times are past: "Today governments, political parties, 
military, private business, civic, and economic,organizations compete 
with universities and endowed research institutes as employers of 
social scientists. Naturally, the process has gone further in the 
United States than elsewhere." 
If Shils is correct in his reading of the situation, then the seeming 
reticence with which sociologists have been accused may have a possibly 
more serious explanation. Thus to the suggestion (Bowen, in Dialogue, 
1970:16) that "The social sciences would benefit greatly ... by borrowing 
from t~e ecologists ... their habit of sustained, open-eyed observation 
of what actually goes on, 11 the sociologist may well be justified in 
querying this as a fruitful approach., Perhaps they could answer that 
they are suspicious of the empiricism (cf. Issue 5) and the claim 
to cognitive certainty, (cf. Issue 2) implied in the statement. Perhaps 
the weariness of sociologists, if such there be, comes from a lesson 
learned by experience. 
b) THE QUICK RISE TO FA1'1E AND THE !\TEED FOR REFLEXIVENESS. 
In 1971 the late Louis Armand(l)(Urban,l97l:l32-l36) expressed himself 
as follows: "Only ten or fifteen years ago one talked of pollution r 
and protection of nature at the risk of being made to look silly and . 




ridiculous. In less than five years all that has changed. Today 
anyone who does not utter the word .\ecology~ ten times a day isnit 
up to date." Particularly is the popularity of biology or ecology(l) 
with regard to pollution to be regarded with caution: "the fallacy 
is especially insidious because it is so terribly misleading. If 
the technician of the internal combustion engine were to claim that 
some combination of his particular skills should furnish society 
with its ethical ·standards , we would not take him very seriously. 
But when a claim of that sort comes from biology, '"e tend to listen. 
And there lies the danger." 
It would seem according to this analysis (as Gerald Suttles has 
suggested above), what we're faced with, is another swing of the 
pendulum in the Western dualistic tradition associated, for exampl~, 
with the names of Descartes and Kant. Details of a historic nature 
cannot be gone into here, although it may be said in passing that the 
controversy between Malthus and Godwin (cf. Bm.,ren,l954, Chapter Four) 
would be suggestive as a parallel between the rampant (contemporary) 
biologism described by Suttles and the popular "sociological ideology 11 
as described by, say, Wrong (cf. p.ll4 above). Similarly the manner 
in which Malthus qualified his doctrine in the cut and thrust of 
debate suggests a parallel with the qualifications made by the 
Neo-ecologists (as defined by Reissman). However, as mentioned in 
the beginning of the thesis, the focus is upon C.H.E. (and Modern 
Ecology) -the line has to be drawn somewhere. 
The point which we wish to argue here is a simple one. Insofar as 
Hodern Ecology is to be explained in terms of a reference to a historical 
pendulum swing or reactionary "movement," to. that .extent it suffers 
from a lack of reflexiveness, which as noted in the case of Park (Issue 9), 
proved to be his undoing. Suttles' (1972:117) attempt to bring the 
unrecognized assumptions and reactions to i;he surface is heartily 
endorsed. It is suggested that short-cuts in the formulation of modern 
theory are to be avoided where possible. The criticisms of the past, 
where they are relevant, are to be used even if this means that the way 
(l) Biology is the more inclusive science. Ecology is subsumed as 




forward is the long way round: the taking of one or two steps backward. 
Possibly the rehearsing of the criticisms brought against C.H.E. will 
prove valuable in identifying issues in the "head-on collision between 
ideological views" ("sociological" and "biological" or ecological 
in this context) which marks.the modern debate. At the very least 
their recalling will serve a balancing function; though hopefully, 
also an important service in the building up of a more general and 
acceptable theory. This is not to suggest that Modern Ecology does 
not raise new ques.tions or problems. 
c) Tlill NEO"-ECOLOGIST'S POSI'l'ION. 
A detailed treatment of the Neo-ecologists lies outside the scope 
of this thesis (cf.footnote 2,p.l02). However, in order to place 
ourselves in the position so as to argue a point, a summary treatment 
n~eds to be considered. Here we rely upon the opinions of two 
writers - Reissman (196~:115-121) and Sjoberg (1965 in Hauser and Schnore, 
165-168). 
The point may be taken that the Neo-ecologists, following Wirth 
(cf.p.l02) have been concerned to show the importance of social 
structure - organizations and social institutions are draW11 into 
the picture. 
Reissman (196~:118) is more explicit in his generalization that little 
or no movement, so far as the fundamentals are concerned, has been made: 
In its fundamentals, neo-ecology is not discernibly different 
from the earlier ecology. Duncan, Schnore, and Hawley have 
proceeded from the same assumption as Park, that man's 
biological character is primary, in that he must first 
sustain himself physiologically before he can proceed to 
the development of cultural components. Culture, the 
ecologist then as nmv argues, can be considered simply as 
another element in man's adaptation to his environment. 
True, culture gives man greater control than plants and animals 
possess, but this difference is primarily one of degree rather 
than kind. Hence, culture, . society, and personality take their 
places in ecological theory, as adaptations, much by the same 
principle that animals adapt to meet their environment ... Social 
organization is by this view but a primary means of adaptation 
by human populations to the environment, aided by culture or 
technology ... if I read neo-ecology correctly, it has more than 






Sjoberg's analysis is along similar lines. He notes in the~r thinking, 
assumptions taken over from Classical economics •• Criticisms mentioned 
are in essence the same as those brought against C.H.E.: materialism; 
"sponginess of concepts"; and reductionism ( "Dunca·ri and Schnore seem 
to introduce values and other cultural criteria without formally 
acknowledging this deviation from their theoretical model" """' Ibid)., 
Interestingly, so far as Hodern Ecology is concerned, a critique 
of the "Gibbs-Martin" study is included. It is one which emphasizes 
sustenance activities rather than the "ecological complex" (cf. Duncan 
and Schnore). But, again, this marks no real change from the C.H.E. 
position: "Gibbs and Martin, like Duncan and Schnore, have used their 
so-called ecological approach to organize an impressive amount of 
empirical data into some meaningful whole. But they falter when they 
attem~t to theorize concerning their framework, especially in the matter 
of va1ues ... the as(3umption that the division of labour can be entirely 
dissociated from values has not been demonsttated either theoretically 
or empirically. 11 (Ibid). As in the case of Duncan and Schnore, Gibbs 
and Martin include in their formulations a number of implicit assumptions 
about "economic man" taken over from Classical economics. 
We are in a position now to argue a simple point. If the criticism 
brought against Classical Human Ecology still applies to Neo-Ecology 
(cf. footnote 2,p.l02), then there may be some likelihood that it 
will also apply to Modern Ecology. 
d) Tlill SEARCH FOR HISTORIC FOUNDATIONS IN MODERN ECOLOGY. 
Comment has already been made with regard to the speed with which 
Modern Ecology came on to the contemporary stage. ~xpressing a similar 
_opinion is the Federal President of Western Germany, Dr. Gustav Heinemann 
(Special Report 1970): "Barely ten years ago many people were amused 
that during an election campaign in North Rhine-Westphalia one party 
campaigned with the slogan: We want blue skies above the Rhine and 
Ruhr. Today we realize that this problem will remain on the agenda 
for the foreseeable future." 
While "pollution" and with it "ecology" are generally thought to be 
issues of high priority for the seventies if not for the rest of the 





(cf. Southwick,l972:xii). The very suddenness of the upsurge in 
interest has led to the fear among some conservationalists that "the • 
whole thing may be one of America's periodic fads" ~Newsweek,l970, 
Jan.26 :25). This reaction is surely partly legit.imate, for the 
quick rise to priority heights, and the institutional changes 
already being made as a consequence of it, in political, academic 
and legal spheres, to mention only these, is bound to draw some 
conservative reaction. Moreover, as Southwick (Ibid) points out, 
"Despite the prominence of ecology as a public issue and newswort_!:ly 
subject, the fact remained that its prominence was built ~pon ~ 
remarkably weak educational foundation." 
In response to this, no doubt, there has arisen the need to justify 
the ecological approach and some historians have risen to the occasion 
i~ attempting to fill in the background to man's relationship with 
his environn1ent .. What can be rightly described as a celebrated article(l) 
is that of Lynn T. White, Jr. (1976): "The Historical Roots of our 
Ecological Crisis." Also there is the recent chapter, "Man's Use of 
the Earth" in Max Nicholson's, The Environmental Revolution A Guide 
for the New Masters of the World, _l970~(cf. Detwyler,l97l). Barbara 
Ward and Rene Dubos', Only One Earth, 1972, too, starts with an historical 
chapter, "The World We Inherit." Southwick's book has three chapters 
which are best described as historical. 
Various issues form the content of these writings. Biblical attitudes 
are commented upon by White; the "Baconian Creed" is discussed by 
South\vick; Ward and Dubos focus on "the technological age" and energy 
production; and Nicholson, taking the long view, speaks of "the new 
dynamic, mobile, innovating civilizations which have become paramount 
during the past 3000 years," and more recently, of the "Eight Horizons 
of Expanding Technology," the most spectacular of 'vhich is man's new 
ability for mobility. 
This is a very inadequate account of the content of these works, nevertheless, 
(l) "reprinted 1ri several settings, this address has become one of 
the landmarks of the contemporary ecological movement" (Barbour, 1972: 11±0). 
It is reproduced in Bar'r (1971) and Detwyler (1971). Lynn T. White 
is professor of History and director of the Center for Medieval and 




brief as the overview is, it is accurate in this that none mention 
the theoretical merits or demerits of the ecological mode1 of explanation. 
And none mention the Classical Human Ecologists, their quick rise 
to fame, or the reasons for their dissolution. 
D: NOTES ON THE APPLICATION OF THE ISSUES 
TO MODERN ECOLOGY. 
a) INTRODUCTORY RE~UUU\S, 
"~ile Classical Human Ecology and Modern Ecology are both creatures 
of the twentieth century, they are separated by t'vo or three decades 
during which time there has been much theoretical innovation. Obviously 
the issues will not apply in exactly the same way to Modern Ecology 
as to C.H.E. In the first place Modern Ecology is far more diversified. 
Just how, and whether, a particular issue would apply would require 
individual attention in each case. "~ile we do not intend to draw 
out just where inModern Ecology all sixteen issues may apply (such 
a task being beyond the scope of this thesis), it seems desirable 
to give some indication of their applicability and use as an alerting 
device. In order to do this we propose to use the three major theory 
generating concepts as a basis for' drawing some parallels. Even here 
two limits must be placed on the discussion. ('i.) It is proposed that 
three books will be chiefly referred to in the discussion which follows: 
Thomas R. Detwyler (ed): Man's Impact on Environment, 1971. This is 
a reader collecting together articles from professional journals. 
Most of the articles are written strictly within the discipline of 
geography, ecology, biology, meteorology, etc. and comment upon these 
articles should not be sought for here. However, there are a few 
articles, particularly the Introduction and Summary by Detwyler, which 
are relevant. It is here that a movement from the more traditional 
orientation is made towards an inclusive reference to man. 
f;:harles H. Southwick: Ecology and the Quality of our Environment, 1972. 
This book was written in the belief that "Those in business, law, 




social service, and other related fields can all benefit from the 
insights and perspectives of ecology ... Its primary purpose •.. is to 
integrate the principle of ecology with the social and environmental·· 
problems of man. 11 (Ibid:v). Much of the book introduces basic 
biological ~nd ecological concepts and perspectives. Again, it 
must be said, commentary upon this section should not be sought for here. 
However, both in the Preface, Introducation, Part 2 dealing with 
11Historical Aspects of Ecology, 11 and in the final chapter, 11Ecology 
and the Future of Man,' . .' where application of ecological principles 
and concepts are extended to man, there is material which is grist 
to our mill. 
Barbara \vard and Rere'Dubos: Only One Earth, 1972. Commentary on the 
contents of the book have already been made (pp.l21-122 above). The 
sections which interest us more. particularly are Chapters 1,11± and 15. 
The grounds for singling out j;hese books lies in the fact that they 
are attempts at an overall integration of piologi.cal and sociological 
perspectives. 
(ii) A summary of the components of the three major theory generating 
concepts is given below. While it would be desirable to draw out 
parallels in terms of each of the components of the major theory 
generating concepts listed below, only those, which immediately came 
to mind were used. 
(1) The Natural Area Concept. 
(a) The limits or boundaries of the 11 communi ty11 (p .18). 
(b) The forces (or activities (p.26,27,60)) of mobility are regarded 
as indexes of human behaviour. 
(c) 
(d) 
The interrelationship of the forces form spatio-temporal regular 
patterns (indicating homogeneous areas - p.27). 
These are empirically measurable (p.22), (visibility). 
(2) The Ecological Concept.· 
(a) The organism-environment relationship is basic (p.48). 
(b) The ecological .framework (pp.34-38) serves as a means for 
examining the processes of succession (p.52-58), domination (p.62-66). 




(3) The Socio-Cultural Concept : The Dichotomy. 
(a) Man is a creature of tw·o worlds: ecological =;subsocial (p. 62) 
and cultural (p.BB-89). 
(b) These worlds or points of reference are polar (or antithetical, 
mutually exclusive - p.88). 
(c) The cultural element (aspect) is regarded as a superstructure 
resting upon the more fundamental biotic element (or aspect) 
(p.92-94). 
(d) The time factor (p.96) is used. 
(e) Social control is linked to the cultural aspect (p.98-99) 
l. THE :NATURAL AREA CONCEPT. 
( .i) The conceptual distinction between the spatial/geographic and 
ecological/biological elements is recognized. 
Unlike the development of the C.H.E. historical developmental stages 
should not be looked for. However, a conceptual distinction remains. 
Thus as Bowen (1970:13) points out, "an ecologist uses the term 
"ecosystem" to mean the community of living things and the physical 
environment, both together, in the segment he is ·studying." We have 
here a reference to both spatial (geographic) and biological (ecological) 
aspects. The same double reference is noted, for instance, in Odum's 
(1970: 50) definition: "The ecosystem, or ecological system, is 
considered to be a unit of biological organization made up of all the 
9rganisms in a given area (that is, "community'') interacting with the 
physical environment so that a flmv of energy leads to characteristic 
trpphic structure and material cycles within the system." 
Southwick's (1972:104-105) explicit treatment of essential terms makes 
the conceptual distinction clearer. There are five important terms 
population, community, environment, habitat, and ecosystem. While 
the terms habitat and environment are used primarily for physical 
features 'such as topography' water supplies and climate' the terms 
are not confined to physical features, for vegetation and other .. 
. animals also form major components of any given habitat or environment: 
In brief, while a conceptual distinction can be observed between a 
geographic and a biological referent the usual practice would appear 
to merge the two. Thus a dual reference can be noted in Southwick's 
definitions which are as follows: 
-~ .. 
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A habitat is the natural abode or locality of an animal, plant 
or person (from the Latin, habitare, to dwell). Thus it also 
includes all features of the environment in a given locality. 
Environment literally means "to surround" (from the French 
verb environner), and it therefore means surroundings or 
something that surrounds. It includes "all the conditions, 
circumstances, and influences surrounding, and affecting ... 
an organism or group of organisms (Webster's New Twentieth 
Century Dictionary, 1966). An ecosystem includes.populations, 
communities, habitats and environments, and it specifically 
refers to the dynamic interaction of all parts of the environ-
ment, focusing particularly on the exchange of materials between 
living and nonliving parts. 
It will be recalled that an in~ortant component in Park's spatial view 
of the city was population size ( more clearly in HcKenzie and Wirth); 
and that in determining population size a geographic, o~ aerial unit, 
was automatically implied (cf. Chapter Two). Following upon this 
conception therefore, as is expected, a geographic and spatial 
referent is still a key feature in Southwick's definition: "a population 
is a group of interacting individuals, usually of the same species, 
in a definable space." 
It is~·Detwyler (1971:5-6) though, who stresses the contribution of 
geography to Hodern Ecology. He points out that "Unlike ecologists, 
geographers have tended to study broad spatial patterns and relations 
between man and landscape." It is because of this that Detwyler 
recommends that "Geographers should provide the emerging science of 
environment with an appreciation of scale and valuable methods of 
spatial analysis, as well as the integrative, interdisciplinary view-
points mentioned above." Here we have an interesting return to the 
G.H.E. point of departure! 
(ii) 'l.'he subjective element in establishing the boundaries of ecosystems. 
Of particular significance in most if not all of the above definitions 
is the reference to a "given area," "the natural abode or locality of 
the animal," or "a given locality." What. we wish to refer to here is 
the important subjective element in the establishment of linii ts or 
boundaries;(Issue I). The point is that areas are not "given" or ~ 
"natural." Bowen (l97Q:l3) draws attention to this implicitly when 
he says "Ecologists study all kinds of segments, great and small. 
One ecologist may investigate how various species of mites coexist 
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in the pine-needle litter on a forest floor by occupying separate 
"niches," or ways of making a living ... Another ecologist may work 
out the intermeshed food chains of various species in a pond or a 
forest. Still another, a worker in the sprawling, almost unbounded 
field called 1 human ecology~ may trace the paths by which radio-
active substances and persistent pesticides ... accumulate in the 
tissues of our bodies." The subjective element is also implicit 
in the distinction between the broad and narrow focus of geographers 
and ecologists noted by Detwy-ler (1971:5)._ Interestingly he points 
out that "The bulk of recent research in ecology appears to have 
added little to our understanding of man-environment relations, 
partly because so often 'pristine nature' is sought out for study 
and in part because of the arbitrary, often minute, scale of most 
investigations." (Hy emphasis). As we noted in discussing C.H.E. it 
is best that the subjective aspect of all concepts be duly admitted 
and brought to the surface: cf. Issue 1 
and Reification. 
Subjectivity; Issue 2 -Realism 
R.e lated to this problem of establishing limits or boundaries the Parkian 
distinction (pp.20-22) between "natural" and administrative boundaries 
takes on a contemporary significance. Referring again to the Stockholm 
Conference the question of sovereign national rights and the meaning 
of, or perhaps meaninglessness of, state boundaries in terms of pollution 
was raised. Two of the twenty-three established principles may be 
mentioned in this connection (cf. The Environment this Honth, July 1972): 
Principle 18: States have in accordance with the charter of the 
United Nations and the principles of international law, the 
sovereign J~ight to exploit their own resource A pursuant to their 
own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other states or of areas beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction. 
Principle 22: Co-operation through international agreements or 
otherw-ise is essential to prevent, eliminate or re.duce and 
effectively control adverse environmental affects resulting from 
activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due 
account is taken of the interests of all states. 
As can be expected froci the nature of the representation of the Stockholm 
Conference, national and administrative or jurisdictive boundaries\\ere 





is a point in marked contrast to Park's point of view. Nevertheless 
the fact that we have again, "a dispute between the appropriateness 
of one set of boundaries weighed against another'' (p.2l) is born out 
in the last three chapters of Ward and Dubos' book. The modern 
debate is, because of its more realistic political appraisal, p~ssibly 
more interesting. An attempt to debunk the importance of national 
boundaries in a discussion such as that at Stockholm could be construed 
as disloyalty - no, such inhibitions bothered Park. One may indulge 
here in a speculation. Given the academic detachment of Park, would 
not the most logical procedure be to hand over the governance of the 
world to a select group of ecologists, 'and at the same time substitute 
ecological regions, as the basis of organization, for political ones? 
(Cf. Newsweek, 1970' Jan.26:1±5: "Any rational approach to a worldwide 
affliction such as pollution requires that national and local rivalries 
be put aside.") In this way a "quality environment" may be achieved, 
and the dictum (Southwick,l97l:xiii) "What is best for the world as 
a whole is ultimately best for man" be put into practice! Happily 
there is little trace of such a speculation in Ward and Dubos! discussion. 
Only in one passage (1972:293) do they speak of national sovereignity 
having to "adapt to the environmental imperative." For the most part 
the sovereignities of states are treated as realities, though their 
shortcomings in "global decision-making" are stressed (1972:270): "It 
requires a new commitment to global responsibilities. Equally, it 
needs effective action between the nations to make responsibility a 
fact." The balance of this statement is typical throughout their book. 
(iii) The Questions of Visibility and Consensus. 
A comparison between the manner in which Park claimed a reality for 
the ecological concept, and the manner in which the reality of the 
ecological point of view is asserted in Modern Ecology is pertinent. 
Basically Park adopted two strategies: 
(a) to stress the visibility of the referents of his concept.(p.22). 
(b) to convince others and build up a high degree of consensus as 
to the usefulness and appropriateness of his concept (p.23). 
These strategies are still employed. To illustrate this, two passages -
one taken from C.H.E.,possibly Park's most celebrated statement, and 




to one another, are juxtaposed. We may see how upon a conceptual 
basis, in both cases, certain elements from a wider context may be 
selected and emphasized, and others disregarded. Thus the subjective 
and objective elements are both related to one another in conceptu~l 
analysis: 
Park (cf. Reissman,l964:95): I expect that I have 
actually covered more ground tramping about in cities in 
different parts of the world, than" any other living man. 
Out of all this I gained, among other things, a conception 
of the city, the community, and the region, not as geo-
graphical phenomenon merely, but as a kind of social 
organism. 
Southwick (l972:v): While this book was being written, 
my work involved several extended trips throughout the 
world to countries I had visited in the 1950's and 1960's. 
This provided the opportunity to see the world of the 1970's 
in terms of changes "Tought by ten or twenty years of rapid 
development ... In this age of ecological panic, I entertained 
the ~ope that I would find the world in pretty good shape 
after all. But reassurances were few and far between ... I 
did find ample evidence that man still fails to understand 
his true position on this planet. 
The following similarities may be noted: 
(a) Both use a "look and see" method of observation. Conclusions are 
reached on the basis of the extensiveness of their travels and observations 
Park: "I have actually covered more ground tramping about the cities in 
different parts of the world"; Southwick appeals to a double visit as 
well as extensiveness in coverage: "I did find ample evidence." 
(b) Both claim to have found something- Park found that the city was a 
kind of social organism; Southwick found that "man still fails to 
understand his true position" (my emphasis). Certain conclusions 
are asserted, the organismic basis of city organi~ation on the one 
hand, and the claim that it is within the ecological perspective that 
man's true position is made manifest, on the other. 
Yet the subjective element upon which the conclusion is drawn is blatant; 
for we are not told the criteria upon which their claims were made, 
only that their travels were extensive. As Turner (l967:xxi) comments, 
"A scholar's choice of methods depends upon the character of findings 
and conclusions that h~ finds most useful or intuitively most satisfying." 
And indeed, there is nothing objectionable in this, only that he should 




What authenticates both Park's 9nd Southwick's omission? Only the fact 
that the publics to whom they addressed themselves shared their assumptions. 
It was unnecessary in Park's case to mention the various types of buildings, 
the highways, etc., in order to justify his statement with regard to 
asserting an organismic hypothesis~!) it was unnecessary also for 
Southwick to specify the oils licks, smoke, etc., 'vhich caught his 
eye, upon which basis, he asserted man's ignorance of his true position. 
These things can indeed, where there is a high degree of consensus, be 
taken for granted - but only for a time. If we are to learn from 
experience, and this is surely the only basis upon which science can 
cumulate, then it is to be hoped that the questions raised by the 
issues in Chapter Two: (l) Subjectivism, (2) Realism (and Reification), 
(3) Dogmatism (or the Fossilization of concepts),· (4) The Transference 
Fallacy, (5) Positivism; and (7) Localism, will prove to some degree, 
to be pertinent. 
2, THE ECOLOGICAL CONCEPT : ARGUMENT BY PLANT OR ANIMAL ANALOGY. 
The assumption upon which the argument from plant· and animal analogy 
to human beings is made, is the notion that there is a common element 
between them. They are like each other in some respects, and because 
of this, it is argued, by extrapolation, what holds in the one case 
will also hold in the other. Very often, however, when this argument 
is employed it is not done follo,ving an explicit formula - and, as 
we have seen, there are fundamental problems with the argument. Can 
the less evolved he fairly compared with the more evolved? Does 
self-consciousness (or a particular degree of self-consciousness) in 
the case of human beings invalidate the argument? Is there in fact 
a common element between them upon which argument may be based? If 
so, how is this element abstracted and identified? Should one start 
with ecological concepts? And, if one does, how will this affect 
.I 
th;e rest of the argument? And so on. 
(1) Organismic theory hovers in the background of C.H.E. thought (cf. 
Burgess,l925:58; Park,l9}l!;l952:161) as a supporting body of theory. 
Most of the issues which might be brought to the surface in their use 
of the organismic analogy, have, we feel, been discussed under other 
related concepts such as the Natural Area concept (idea of a closed 
system) and the ecological concept (functional analysis presupposed 
in ecological processes e.g. symbiosis, web-of-life). Gettys (1940; 
1961:99) charges that the theoretical system promulgated by the 





We have already spoken about the contemporary enthusiasm for ~sing 
ecology as a starting point in analysis (cf. footnote (1) p. 119), 
and we have also noted the ecological element in the concepts (such 
as ecosystem) which are popular today in analysing human induced 
problems such as pollution. What we wish to do here is merely 
illustrate with two modern analogies the fact that the same type 
of argument is still with us. 
First example: THE CASE OF THE MUTANT CARP AND THE TOLERANT URBANITE. 
The description is as follows: 
Kenneth Allsop (The Environmental Handbook, l97l; I~troduction) drawing 
a distinction between "THEM" (governments, corporations, officialdom,etc.) 
and "US" (the fine in spirit) states: 
I believe that we must understand that there is a grimmer prospect 
than catastrophy- adaptation ... ! think it possible that THEY may 
stay on course and may also stay intact. It may be that WE, and 
our concepts of quality and beauty and harmony, are obsolescent 
and doomed to extinction. I have read a chillingly terrible 
reference to the discovery in the dead waters of Lake Erie - an 
American cesspool of chemical effluent and human sewage - a "new 
strange mutant of carp which actually lives off the poisons of 
the water" ... I think we must reckon on there being fewer on our 
side than we imagine, that the human race is also producing its 
mutant carp which can live off poison. 
Another description is given in Newsweek (l970,Jan.26:45) in which an 
.explicit reference to Rene Dubos is made: 
Perhaps the greatest obstacle to rescue of the environment is·· 
man's own uncanny adaptibi li ty. "Modern man," as Dubos notes 
ruefully, "cari adjust to environmental pollution, intense 
crowding, deficient or excessive diet, as well as to monotonous 
and ugly surroundings." And these adjustments are reinforced 
by the process of natural selection; so that the human beings 
who take most readily to regimentation, overcrowding and 
esthetic privation rise to positions of leadership and also 
outbreed their less adaptive fellows. The real specter that 
pollution casts over man's future is not, the extinction of 
Homo sapiens but his mutation into some human equivalent of the 
carp now lurking in Lake Erie's fetid depths, living off poison. 





the logic by which this analogy is made proceeds as follows: 
Because the carp has properties: 
mutation through natural selection; 
which is also shared by man: 
- cf. Newsweek above 
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-Also see Rene Dubos (1965:270) " ... man 
has entered a phase of his evolution in which many of his 
ancient biological attributes are no longer called into play 
and may therefore atrophy through disuse .•. Natural selection 
cannot possibly maintain this state of adaptiveness to an 
environment that no longer exists." 
it therefore follows that just as the carp developed the capacity to 
live off poison, so will man develop the capacity to live in a fouled 
environment: 
Southwick (1972:287·- expounding Dubos): 
Man will manage to survive with deplorable conditions, abysmal 
pollution_and poverty, fantastic crowding and computerized 
automation. 
Dubos (in Barr,l971:38): 
Step-by-step, people become tolerant of worse and worse environ-
mental conditions without realizing that the expressionsof this 
tolerance wi 11 emerge later in the form of debilitating ailments . 
Second example: Again from Dubos (1966 in Detwyler 1971:687-688): 
THE CASE OF THE DOMESTICATED DOG AND THE 'UNHEALTHY' SUBLlRBANITE. 
The argument, following the formula,. is as follows: 
Because the domesticated dog and cat have properties: 
{a) "veneer of civilization" 
(b) the r,etention of "many of the behavioral characteristics 
of the wild species from which it was derived." 
-\..;liich is also true of man: 
(a) v~neer of civilization: "The knowledge of man's or1g1ns is 
admittedly very incomplete, but it is sufficient nevertheless 
to have no doubt that;his genetic evolutiun came almost to 
a standsti 11 many thousands of years ago." 
(b) the retention of many ancestral behavioral characteristics: 
"In man also there persists certain deeply ingrained 
psychological needs that have as much force as orthodox 
physiological requirements." 
It. follows;that just as "the cat still has a 'need' to hunt even when 
pampered and well-fed in a city" so too man has a "biological urge . 
to maintain contact with the kind of environment in which he evolved." 






ever·conditions permit obviously means more than the mere search for 
comfort and quiet ... biological man cannot remain healthy very long if 
he loses all contact with his earthy origins." 
Lack of time forbids a detailed discussion here. Certainly Dubos' 
treatment is not as simple as the extracts given here might lead one 
to assume, and further argument and qualification would be necessary. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the two analogies suggest sufficient 
resemblance to those analysed in Chapt~Three to warrant the suggestion 
that the issues which were shown to emerge in the discussion i.e. 
(9) Semnotism, ( 10) Pessimism, (ll) Oversimplification, ( 12) Anthropo-
morphism and (13) Determinism may be regarded as pertinent to at least 
some of the contemporary argumentation. 
3. THE SOCIO-CULTURAL CONCEPT : ARGUMENT BY DICHOTOMY. 
One of the most interesting features of the modern debate has been a 
number of spectacular clashes between theorists of high standing. 
Mention can be made of the reputed (Time,l97l,Jan.ll:qq) clash between 
Paul Ehrlich(l) and Barry Commoner~ 2 )both biologists, over the implications 
of population growth. Ehrlich· sees unchecked population growth as 
the chief villian. He predicts "war, pestilence, and famine as the 
eventual consequence of mankind's proliferation." However, Commoner 
takes issue with him over the question of priorities in ecological 
problems: "Saying that none of our pollution problems can be solved 
without getting at population first is a cop-out of the worst kind." 
Rather, argues Commoner, "the root problem lies in consumption patterns,"· 
connected with a "rampant technology." It is with this focus that he 
points out the prior importance of changing "social habits." Here, 
in short, we have an "ecology" versus "culture" clash. 
The contrast between Theo Leferve (3)and the late Louis .A.rmand~q) on the 
one hand, who maintained (cf. Urban,l971) a scientific optimism, and 
Jacques Ellul(5)and Philip Rieff~ 6 )on the other, who were pessimistic 
!~
ll Paul Ehrlich is Professor of Biology at Stanford University, .America. 
Barry Commoner is Professor of ~Iicrobiology at \vashington University. 
Theo Lefevre is Minister in Charge of Politics and Scientific 
Development in the Belgian Government. 
(q) Louis .Armand- see p.l23. 
(5) Jacques Ellul is Professor of History and the Sociology of Institutions 
at the University of Bordeaux . 
(6) Philip Rieff is the Benjamin li'ranldin Professor ofsociology at the 
· University of Pennsylvania. 
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with regard to life in a technological world, may also be noted; or 
again (cf. Dialogue,l970) between R. Buckminster Fuller's(l) machine f 
based optimism and Lewis Mumford's( 2 )pessimistic views with ·regard to 
machine technology in modern affairs; similarly Dennis G~bor( 3 ) and 
Werner Heisenberg( 4 ) (cf. Urban,l97l). 
More generally Arthur Bourne( 5) (The Environment This Month,l972:87) 
writes of the recent Stockholm conference, "Not only was there 
polarisation between the "doom" prophets and those that believed that 
things were not so bad, but there was disagreement between the "doom" 
prophets themselves." Ward and Dubos (1972: 29-30), with these same 
sort of contrasts of opinion in mind, state that "in reality experts 
rarely disagree on the validity of the facts themselves; they differ 
only with regard to the interpretation and use of these facts." For 
instance it would be expected that when making predictions of the 
future.on the basis of these facts differences would magnify. Ward 
and Dubos are of the opinion that "in most cases the difficulties will 
originate not from uncertainties about scientific facts, but from 
differences in attitude toward social values." Undoubtedly this is 
correct. And yet, it would seem that the same sort of issues raised 
by the C.H.E. tradition, are, again, being raised in the modern debate: 
(i) We may recall the C.H.E. dilemma with regard to man's dual position 
as occupying a role in society as a possessor of culture, and also as 
having a place in nature as an animal i.e. being a creature of two 
spheres, the socio-cultural and the biological (or ~cological). Again, 
it is a question of: "~ere to put the emphasis? Ecologically there 
fs "Only one earth," but culturally, as Ward and Dubos point out ("the 
difficulties ... originate ... from differences in attitudes toward social 
vaiues") there are many earths. Resources are limited; all except man's 






R. Buckminster :F'uller is an Architectural Engineer and writer. 
The late Lewis Mumford was a historian of cities. 
Dennis Gabor is Professor of Electron Physics at the Imperial 
College of Science and Technology in London. · 
Werner Heisenberg is Director of the Max Planck Institute for 
Physics and Astrophysics and Profe.ssor at the l,Jni versi ty of Munich. 
Arthur Bourne is the Editor. He is a biologist and Research Fellow 
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It is the decision that makes the resources. 11 U Thant. ( cf. Forbes, 
1968 j 1971 :7). 
(ii) Again it may be recalled that in C.H.E. argumentation from concepts 
such as the "natural area" and the ecological concept, the theorists 
were automatically involved in the problems of dichotomous classification. 
It would seem that in the modern debate theorists may be· arguing from 
different sides of a similar dichotomous division. Urban (1971:18) 
suggests that it is generally more fashionable in America to prefer 
the kinds of "soft" sciences that "can sport some of the paraphernalia 
of the harder variety," than in Europe. It should be remembered that, 
soft or hard, the scientific quest is built on explanatory models which, 
by their very nature, are partial in their perspectives. Basic or 
.. 
central (cf. Soutpwick,l972:xii; Detwyler,l971:3) as ecology may be 
fr~m certain points of view, an absolutist claim to exhaustiveness 
in explanation would be an overstepping of the mark. (Issue 2, Realism). 
The dilemma: Which Authority? is not easily solved. 
(iii) Again we may recall the ambivalence noted in Park's treatment 
of competition (pp.99...;.10l), the question of social control, and the 
possible suggestion, because of reaction against graft, of a conservative 
stance. Indeed it was not that social controls were not needed but· 
that in seeking a solution to present ills, through a focus on disruption(!) 
and the measures needed for its control, other significant social 
movements were not recognized. A parallel may be suggested in the 
modern ambivalence toward "technology," the focus on man's disruption 
of the environment, and the call for more social and legal controls. A 
question which may be suggested on the basis of C.H.E. experience is: 
How far are the estimates of man's disruption based upon romantic and 
therefore unrealistic models? With regard to disruption Ward and 
Dubos (1972:24) note that "Those of our consultants whose primary interest 
is theoretical ecology naturally urge that emphasis be placed on the 
earth ecosystem per se, man being considered chiefly as a disturbing 
element in it." (My emphasis). That they feel the need to make 
qualifying remarks about this point of view seems to be an important 
(l) Cf. Turner (l967:xvi) and Hartindale (1958:26-28) who also point 




mark of dissimilarity between Classical Human Ecology and Modern Ecology. 
Not to be too much taken up with disruption so as to be able to be 
more aware of social movements in which we may well be participating 
indirectly (but with not as much self-consciousness as may be desirable -
see pages 113-116) seems to be a lesson to be learned from C.H.E. 
experience. This. is not meant to imply the unimportance of social controls. 
(iv) Again following the C.H.E. reaction to Mannheim's challenge one may 
query the facts-values divide presupposed in. \vard and Dubos' observations-
above. What does it mean to be told that experts agree on the "facts" 
but disagree on the "interpretation"? Or that difficulties arise not 
from uncertainties about scientific facts, but from.differences in 
attitudes toward social values? In recognizing the importance of 
cultural values Ward and Dubos move in the same direction as Park and 
Wirth did (and the Neo-ecologists after them), in the last stage of 
C.H.E. The challenge, though, was to a greater awareness of the 
subjective and social elements by which scientific concepts themselves 
are generated and maintained. The recognition that "facts" are not 
isolated from the socio-cultural environment, especially in sociological 
analysis, needs to be recognized: The social and psychological histories 
of Ward and Dubos are not irrelevant. 
E: A BRIEF COMPARISON BETWEEN 
CLASSICAL HUMAN ECOLOGY(!) AND MODERN ECOLOGY 
a) WIDE RANGE IN INTERDISCIPLINARY INTERACTION IN HODERN ECOLOGY. 
The interest Hodern Ecology has provoked has reached a remarkably wide 
range of academics, writ~rs, professionals, etc. While Classical Human 
Ecology drew its inspiration from biologists and geographers, and 
economists, the scale of interdisciplinary interaction in the modern 
debate is something new. This has made for refreshing debate. For 
instance, as against remarks of Professor Fuggle( 2 ) who is reported 
(The Argus,l972,Dec.9) as saying that ·his courses for Environmental 
(1) Cf. Chapter One, Section D, p.lOff. 
(2) Dr. R.D. Fuggle is Professor of the newly established Shell Chair 
of Enviromncntal Studies at the University of Cape Town. 
